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IN THIS ISSUE

This volume collects the invited papers of the XLVII Scientific Meeting of the Italian Society of Economics, Demography and Statistics held in Milan on May 27-29, 2010. The Meeting was organized together with the University of Milan-Bicocca, and had “A Changing World: A Multidisciplinary Approach to Migration” as main topic.

The opening paper, delivered by Salvatore Strozza, provides an overview of international migration in western Europe over the past decade. The detailed analysis of the statistics available has allowed the drawing of a realistic picture of the most recent trends as well as the highlighting of the elements of continuity and discontinuity with the same phenomenon in the past. Due to its specific feature of touching several aspects of the Meeting’s main topics, this paper has been placed at the beginning of this volume.

The paper presented by Anna Maria Birindelli and Giancarlo Blangiardo sketches out the most important steps on field survey research as regard foreign migrants in Italy, starting from the 80s to nowadays and considering the main academic and institutional experiences.

Corrado Bonifazi and Cristiano Marini examine, through an empirical analysis based on the application of a regression model, the causal factors of the exponential growth of immigration in Italy from the 1990s up the first decade of the 21st century, thus aiming at finding out the interactions among them.

On the basis of the outcomes of a research carried out by “Fondazione ISMU” aimed at measuring the integration processes of migrants in Italy, Vincenzo Cesario presents and discusses such results highlighting the multidimensionality of this phenomenon as well as its dependence on structural, environmental and personal factors.

Aiming at pointing out the segmentation of labour market in Italy, the paper presented by Enrico Del Colle examines the interregional migratory flows through a statistical procedure based on the detection of the most common qualitative profiles of migrants.

The paper delivered by Antonio Golini and Cecilia Reynaud points out the greater mobility of the individual, linked to great economic changes, as one of the main features of present-day society.

Focused on the impact of global economic imbalance on migrant workers and economies of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), the work by Olga Marzovilla proposes the adoption of a basket peg system whereby national currencies would be anchored to a basket of strong currencies that reflect the features of commercial and financial flows on the international market.

The study presented by Fulvia Mecatti reviews two popular and widely applied strategies feasible for sampling difficult-to-access populations, then unified under the multiplicity approach.

The last paper in the present issue is by Laura Tersera and deals with the processes of settlement of immigration in Italy from a demographic point of view.

Enrico Del Colle

INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION IN EUROPE IN THE FIRST DECADE OF THE 21ST CENTURY

Salvatore Strozza

1. Introduction

Several reconstructions are now available of the migrations which took place across the European continent in the 20th century, especially in the period following World War II (for example: King, 1993; Fassmann, Münz, 1994; Zlotnik, 1999; Bonifazi, Strozza, 2002; Zimmermann, 2005; Jennissen *et al.*, 2006). The timings proposed by scholars are usually based on the identification of a few significant moments and events which somehow caused a break between the previous and the following periods in terms of volume, direction and features of the international migration flows. No doubt the two world wars were two major divides, alongside the economic crisis of 1929 and the oil crisis of 1973. Another significant event was the fall of the Berlin Wall which, built in the early 1960s, had symbolised the division of the world into two opposing blocks. When the Wall was eventually pulled down in the autumn of 1989, the cold war came to an end and East-West intra-European migration started again after more than 30 years in which the iron curtain had virtually stopped it, with a few exceptions due to political crises (Hungary in 1956-57 and Czechoslovakia in 1968-69), ethnic-based reasons and to the peculiar situation of former Yugoslavia, the only country in the area of real socialism which allowed its workers to migrate abroad by signing a number of bilateral agreements with the target countries (Fassmann, Münz, 1994).

More than 20 years after the collapse of the Soviet bloc it is possible to look back at the recent past and realise, first of all, that the major East-West migration flows expected in the early 1990s took place only in part and that the alarm raised by the potential massive population shifts towards Western European countries has not been substantiated by the migration dynamics recorded in the 1990s. It is probably too early to say if and when in the past twenty years the phase that started in the late 1980s has finished and a new one has begun. There are not enough elements yet to say whether the enlargement of the European Union (EU) or the economic crisis that started in 2008 may have been a significant turning point for international migration flows in the next few years.

The first decade of the 21st century being now behind us, it could be useful to propose an early analysis of and a few reflections on the international migration

which have taken place in Europe, namely in ‘western’ countries, in this period in order to assess continuities and discontinuities with migration in the preceding decades. Even though it is too early to draw a final picture, some novelties are so evident as to leave very few doubts, especially when compared to far-off times or more recent past (the first decade after the fall of the Berlin Wall, for example). The aim of this paper is therefore to offer a background picture, developed on the basis of the data available, about what has happened in the last decade as well as the changes that have affected international migration flows and the foreign and/or immigrant populations in the countries of so-called ‘western’ Europe – a somehow anachronistic way to define the countries which made up the EU prior to the last two enlargements (EU15), plus Switzerland and Norway.

2. Some preliminary remarks

For the purposes of this paper it is necessary to present, although briefly, some issues concerning the definition of the phenomena and categories under study, their gathering and, finally, the limitations of international comparisons, in order to stress their importance and show to what extent the statistics available can be used.

While it is clear that “migration is a fuzzy concept with many definitional problems” (Willekens, 1984, pp. 2-3), there is no doubt that harmonising the definitions of international migrations has become a widely accepted need (Krali, Gnanasekaran, 1987), and several initiatives have been aimed at favouring international comparability of data (United Nations, 1978; 1991; 1998; Poulain 1991; 1993; Salt *et al.*, 1994; Hoffmann, Lawrence, 1996; Bilsborrow *et al.*, 1997; Poulain *et al.*, 2006; Lemaître *et al.*, 2007). The United Nations recommendations (1998) define an international migrant as “any person who changes his or her place of usual residence”, with the country of usual residence being described as “the country in which a person lives, that is to say, the country in which he or she has a place to live where he or she normally spends the daily period of rest. Temporary travel abroad for purposes of recreation, holiday, visits to friends and relatives, business, medical treatment or religious pilgrimage does not change a person’s country of usual residence”. Two different categories of migrant are also included: “short-term” migrant (staying or intending to stay less than 12 months) and “long-term” migrant (staying or intending to stay at least 12 months).

The UN definitions of long-term migrant and usual place of residence have been adopted in Regulation 862/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council on “Community statistics on migration and international protection”, which defined immigration and emigration as follows: “immigration means the action by which a person establishes his or her usual residence in the territory of a Member State for a period that is, or is expected to be, of at least 12 months, having previously been

usually resident in another Member State or a third country”; “emigration means the action by which a person, having previously been usually resident in the territory of a Member State, ceases to have his or her usual residence in that Member State for a period that is, or is expected to be, of at least 12 months” (article 2, sections 1b and 1c).

Despite the efforts and the progress made there is still a lot to do and most of the problems are still up for discussion. In the analysis of migration flows and immigrant populations major differences still exist between countries with regard to data collection systems, registered categories, data control and processing procedures and dissemination of information. Official statistics on international migration flows also show that different sources are available to different EU15 countries: although population registers are the most frequent source type, they are not always centralised (they are not in Germany, Italy and the Netherlands). In some cases they are not available altogether, which means recourse must be made to administrative sources, like the residence permit archive (Greece and France) or sample surveys (Ireland and the UK). In other cases a register of the foreign population exists, whose most interesting example is arguably the Swiss one.

However, even when the same source is used, the universe of reference is not always the same. The requirements to be included in the population register for foreign persons often change from country to country. The most widespread situation is the one in which even the people moving to other countries only on a temporary basis are counted as migrants, while the minimum stay required to be counted changes depending on the receiving country and the nationality groups involved (Kupiszewska *et al.*, 2010). To support the assumption whereby the target population is not always exactly the same it should be remarked that some categories such as refugees, asylum seekers and irregular migrants are taken in consideration only in a few countries. In this respect, a comparison between the cases of Italy and Spain on the registration of irregular migrants can be enlightening. In Italy only non-EU citizens with regular permits of stay can be included in a municipal population register by change of place of residence from abroad. Conversely, in Spain registration in the *Padrón Municipal* does not require a regular immigrant status, which means that official statistics on international migration flows and on the foreign resident population also count irregular immigrants. It is evident that many of the differences are due to specific national regulations and the efforts made by international organisations to standardise categories and related statistics often find their limits in the national frameworks.

While in the data collections of international migration flows the most widespread criterion is arguably current citizenship, whereby nationals can be distinguished from foreigners, when determining the population to study foreigners and foreign-born individuals (also called immigrants) are only two of the possible aggregates to refer to. Although some scholars misuse the terms foreigner and immigrant as synonyms, it should be highlighted that these aggregates are defined using different criteria

(nationality and country of birth respectively), are only partly made up of the same people and often vary greatly in terms of numbers. Several classifications have been proposed aiming at showing the components making up the various population aggregates based on the identification criteria used. The synoptic table taken from Poulain and Herm (2010) crosses current nationality (distinguishing nationals by birth from nationals by naturalisation) and the country of birth (separating the native-born who never emigrated from those who emigrated and returned thereafter) thus identifying nine different categories (Table 1). In synthesis, this shows how foreigners and foreign-born individuals have in common the subset of persons who were born abroad and hold a foreign citizenship at the same time, that is, the first generation of immigrants who have not obtained the citizenship of the receiving country. However, the group of foreigners also includes foreigners born in the country, both those who have never left it and those who have experienced an emigration and following immigration, whereas the group of the foreign-born also includes the nationals by birth or by naturalisation who were born abroad.

Table 1 – *Classification of the population groups considering country of birth, immigration, citizenship and naturalization.*

		Nationals		Foreigners
		by birth	by naturalisation	
Native born	Never migrated	Native born nationals by birth who never emigrated	Native born nationals by naturalisation who never migrated	Native born foreigners who never migrated
	Emigrated and immigrated thereafter	Native born nationals by birth who emigrated and immigrated thereafter	Native born nationals by naturalisation who emigrated and immigrated thereafter	Native born foreigners who emigrated and immigrated thereafter
Foreign born	Only immigrated	Foreign born nationals by birth who only immigrated	Foreign born nationals by naturalisation who only immigrated	Foreign born foreigners who only immigrated

Source: extract by Poulain and Herm, 2010, p. 12.

Some figures should help clarify the issue further. Table 2 reports data on foreigners and on foreign-born immigrants residing in the nine countries of EU15 around 2008 in which both types of information are available and crossed. Without going into a very detailed analysis, two cases are identified: the Netherlands and Sweden on the one hand – nations where immigrants are more than twice as numerous as foreigners, considering that two thirds of them hold the country's citizenship; and Spain and Ireland on the other, with foreigners being not many fewer than immigrants, only a small percentage of whom have the country's citizenship. The two former countries have a longer history of immigration and one of Europe's most liberal citizenship regulations (Howard, 2005), which explains why the share of foreigners born in the country is still rather small. The other two countries have a more recent, although more intense, history of immigration and

quite restrictive immigration regulations. Ireland still shows a substantial emigration until the early 1990s, with nearby UK being the main target country. Of the 45 thousand Irish ‘with a hyphen’ – Irish-English, Irish-American, Irish-European, etc., that is people of Irish origin who have declared a dual citizenship, the great majority were born abroad (69%). The weight of the Irish and of people of Irish origin among the group of born-abroad is therefore evident. Table 2 shows how the choice of the aggregate affects the size and ranking of countries by absolute or relative numerousness of the population under study.

Table 2 – Foreign citizens and immigrants (born abroad) enumerated in selected European countries, 2008. Absolute values (thousands) and percentages.

Country	Foreigners			Immigrants			Foreigners per 100 immigrants
	Abs. values (thousands)	% of total population	% born in the country	Abs. values (thousands)	% of total population	% nationals	
Austria	871	10.4	14.2	1,268	15.2	41.3	68.6
Denmark	320	5.8	13.3	486	8.8	43.0	65.9
Finland	143	2.7	10.6	214	4.0	40.8	66.9
Ireland ^(a)	421	10.1	3.9	613	14.7	33.3	68.7
Netherlands	719	4.4	12.1	1,794	10.9	64.7	40.1
Portugal	443	4.2	5.1	782	7.4	46.3	56.7
Spain	5,651	12.3	6.0	6,339	13.8	16.2	89.1
Sweden	562	6.1	11.1	1,281	13.8	61.0	43.9
UK	4,162	6.9	5.6	6,677	11.0	41.4	62.3

Note: (a) 2006 Census data. Not Stated, Irish-English, Irish-American, Irish-European and Irish-Other are not considered among foreign citizens.

Source: elaboration by data of Eurostat, 2010 (for Ireland data of Central Statistics Office of Dublin).

Foreigners and immigrants are not the only two possible aggregates, considering that depending on the topic dealt with it may be appropriate to adopt a specific target population to be defined through the joint use of several criteria relating to the individuals’ and their ancestors’ (usually, parents) characteristics. For example, according to the definition of the *Haut Conseil à l’Intégration* an immigrant is a resident of France who was born abroad and had a foreign citizenship at birth. This definition does not include the persons born abroad and residing in the country who had French citizenship at birth. It is therefore the country of birth rather than citizenship that defines an immigrant’s geographical origin. This definition only refers to the first generation and does not include immigrants’ children. As of 2008 in France there were 5 million immigrants and 6.5 million immigrants’ descendants, that is persons with at least one immigrant parent (for 3 million both parents were immigrant). Remarkable differences become evident as the target population changes. At present there are 3.5 million foreigners in France, roughly as many as there were 30 years ago, accounting for less than 6% of the total population.

Conversely, immigrants account for more than 8% whereas immigrants together with their direct descendants account for over 18% of the resident population of France (Borrel, Lhommeau, 2010).

The picture on the European scale changes significantly following the type of population considered. The size of the foreign population depends on the past volume of its migration balance as well as of its natural and juridical balances – the latter being mainly constituted by the number of citizenship acquisitions in the receiving country. The differing national regulations on citizenship and citizenship acquisition, in a *continuum* ranging from the situations in which *ius soli* is prevailing over those inspired by *ius sanguinis*, affect the numerosness of foreign residents in differing ways. Hence a blurred picture of the immigrant presence, considering that the countries with a longer history of immigration or a more liberal legislation usually have greater numbers of naturalisations and of immigrants' children enjoying citizenship since birth. The foreign-born population, which does not include the second generation (i.e. immigrants' children born in their parents' receiving country), comprises the whole first generation of immigrants regardless of citizenship. In this case, however, it should not be forgotten that some of these immigrants do not have foreign origins but are descendants of nationals who emigrated beforehand. There are then both positive and negative aspects involved in the various possible solutions. When using official statistics the advantages and disadvantages of the various options should be considered, together with the other limits in terms of comparability which were briefly mentioned above.

3. Net immigration: an extraordinary increase

In order to propose a first background picture on migration in Europe in the past decades recourse was made to the data from the Eurostat database on resident population and on the natural events recorded by European countries in the past fifty years. This data was first reviewed following the same criteria used by Sobotka (2009) and then was used to estimate residual net migration, which in the last period (2000-2009) will show remarkable variations following the results of the next censuses. Before moving on to the analysis of the results it should be remarked that residual estimations of net migration have already been proposed, based on data gathered by the United Nations or Eurostat or directly on the statistics of individual countries (for example: Fassmann, Münz, 1994; Zlotnik, 1999; Bonifazi, Strozza, 2002; Bonifazi, 2008). The recently set-up Eurostat database, despite some faults, makes it possible to gather data by single year and to distinguish between countries taking into account the variations that have radically changed the political geography of the continent in the past few years. However, it should be stressed that the results obtained concerning the past decades are for the most part similar to those proposed before.

As early as the 1960s, the EU15 countries recorded a positive net migration (about 800 thousand net arrivals) which grew to 2.3 million in the 1970s and remained more or less stable in the 1980s. It is in the last twenty years, however, that this geopolitical area has become increasingly attractive: positive net migration was close to 8 million in the 1990s and almost doubled in the first decade of the 21st century (Table 3). About 15.7 million net arrivals account for 54% of net migration in the whole of the 50-year period, and such an important net inflow is *per se* a major novelty. As Sobotka (2009, p. 224) emphasises “the EU has not only reached, but even surpassed the migration gains of the United States in 2001-2008”.

Table 3 – Net migration in the 15 European Union member States as of 2003, divided by regions. Periods 1960-1969, 1970-1979, 1980-1989, 1990-1999 and 2000-2009. Absolute values (thousands) and annual average rates (per 1,000 inhabitants).

Geographical areas into EU15	Periods				
	1960-1969	1970-1979	1980-1989	1990-1999	2000-2009 ^(a)
	Absolute values (thousand)				
North	-103	19	-39	998	2,823
West	4,206	2,171	2,496	4,877	3,357
South	-3,284	129	-164	2,089	9,540
Total EU15	818	2,320	2,293	7,965	15,720
	Net migration rates (annual average per 1,000 inhabitants)				
North	-0.1	0.0	-0.1	1.2	3.3
West	2.8	1.3	1.5	2.8	1.9
South	-3.2	0.1	-0.1	1.8	7.7
Total EU15	0.3	0.7	0.6	2.2	4.1


Note: (a) Estimates subject to revisions after the results of 2010 census round. Data for 2009 are projected values by Eurostat.

Source: elaborations from data of Eurostat, 2010.

Classifying EU15 countries into three regional groups (northern, western and southern countries) makes it possible to highlight more elements of novelty. While in the first thirty years only western EU15 countries recorded significant positive net migration values – the southern ones remaining massive emigration areas until the 1960s – in the last twenty years the three regions have all shown a remarkable net immigration, which has been growing in southern and northern countries over the two decades. Traditionally an emigration area, after twenty years (1970-1989) of net migration close to zero southern Europe has become an immigration area and more recently the most attractive area in the EU, its net immigration rate (annual average of 7.7 immigrants per 1,000 inhabitants) being remarkably higher than the one recorded in the 1960s by the ‘traditional’ receiving countries, that is western European countries.

In the 50-year period under study, the contribution of the natural and the migratory components to the population dynamics of EU15 countries has changed dramatically (Figure 1).

Figure 1 – Average annual natural increase, net migration and total population increase (per 1,000 inhabitants) in 15 European Union member States as of 2003, divided by regions. Periods 1960-1969, 1970-1979, 1980-1989, 1990-1999 and 2000-2009.



Source: elaborations from data of Eurostat, 2010.

In the 1960s population growth was mainly due to the natural component: of the average annual increase of 7.7 units per 1,000 inhabitants 7.4 was due to the natural balance (births being much more numerous than deaths). In the following decades, as the demographic transition came to an end, together with lower fertility rates and the population ageing, the contribution of the natural component gradually decreased (with an imperceptible recovery only in the last decade) whereas the contribution of migration has grown mainly in the past twenty years. In 2000-2009 almost four fifths of the population growth rate (5.3 more people every 1000 inhabitants) was due to net immigration (4.1 more immigrants every 1,000 inhabitants). It is exactly because of the exceptional growth of net immigration that EU15 countries have recorded a growth in


their rate of increase in the last two decades, after it had gradually decreased in the three preceding periods.

The analysis of the three individual regions of the EU15 is particularly interesting. Due to space constraints attention here will be devoted especially to the western and southern regions. In 1960-1969 the western region recorded the highest rate of increase (8.7 per 1,000) among the three geographical areas because of the joint effect of a widely positive natural component (6.0 per 1,000) and a significant contribution of net migration (2.8 per 1,000). In 1970-1979 the population growth rate went down to a third following the fall in natural and migratory increase, the latter being affected by policies aiming at stopping workers' immigration after the 1973-74 economic crisis. The situation remained virtually unchanged in the following decade, while in 1990-1999 the growth rate increased as a result of an intense recovery of net immigration, possibly due to the migration flows following the collapse of the Soviet Union and its satellite States. However, the dynamics in the last decade is similar to the 1970s and 1980s, with the migratory component (1.9 per 1,000) having a greater weight than the natural component (1.1 per 1,000) in determining population growth, even though its impact is smaller than it was in the previous decade. The evolution in southern EU15 countries has been very different. In 1960-1969 the growth rate (7.2 per 1,000) recorded by this geographical area was lower than in the western region because the natural component, much higher (10.4 per 1,000) than in the other two regions, was partly balanced out by the very negative migratory component (-3.2 per 1,000). In the following decades the decrease in births due to a rapidly weakening period fertility entailed a rapid decrease in the natural growth rate, which came close to zero in 1990-1999 and has remained very low even in the last decade, despite a slight recovery partly due to the more favourable natural dynamics of immigrants. The migratory component, close to zero in 1970-1989, grew in the 1990s (1.8 per 1,000) and reached exceptional levels during the last decade (7.7 per 1,000). The unexpected population growth in the last decade is mainly due to the exceptional levels of net immigration, which is even more interesting considering that until a few decades ago the population growth in the southern region was completely ascribable to the natural component. The path followed by the northern region is more or less midway between the other two regions. It should be noted that in the last decade the rate of increase in this geographical area (5.7 per 1,000) was for the first time greater than in the western region, since the higher natural increase (2.4 versus 1.1 per 1,000) recorded beforehand was combined to a stronger migration increase (3.3 versus 1.9 per 1,000) which reached unprecedentedly high levels, higher than the natural component. In the past decade southern and northern Europe have become the main receiving areas in the EU15 and their population growth is largely due to immigration from abroad.

A more detailed picture can be obtained from the analysis by individual country focusing on the last two decades, where new EU27 countries are considered

alongside old ones only for the first period. The coordinates on the Cartesian plane are natural increase (horizontal axis) and net migration (vertical axis) (Figure 2).

Figure 2 – Average annual natural increase and net migration (per 1,000 inhabitants) in selected EU countries. Periods 1990-1999 and 2000-2009.



Note: (a) Data may differ from the official Eurostat statistics because of some revisions introduced following Sobotka, 2009 (see notes in table 6 of his paper, p. 229). For the period 2000-2009 data that are likely to be strongly affected by unreported emigration are not shown. Net migration estimates subject to revisions after the results of the 2010 census round. Data for 2009 are projected values by Eurostat.

A sharp contrast is evident for the 1990s between ‘old’ and ‘new’ EU countries. The EU15 countries are mainly concentrated in the first quadrant, showing a positive natural and migratory increase, while New EU12 countries are often found in the third quadrant or nearby, pointing to negative values for both the components of population dynamics or at least for one of them (Figure 2.a). In the majority of cases the migratory component is negative, since the 1990s recorded major population movements originating in Central and Eastern Europe caused by ethnic conflicts in the Balkans and the Soviet Union, by the disintegration of socialist regimes and by the transition towards market economies. The removal of barriers to emigration after about thirty years and the changes in the political and institutional framework also contributed to the major east-west flows. These cannot always be documented through official statistics because new forms of mobility have appeared (see Okólski, 1998; 2001),

mainly characterised by short distances and/or a recurring and often irregular nature. While in absolute terms Romania, Poland and Bulgaria rank first, second and third in terms of negative net migration, it is the Baltic republics that have the greatest negative values in the net migration rate. At the same time, the cases of Hungary and the Czech Republic, which record positive net migration, are evidence of the rapid changes experienced by some countries in Central Europe. Outside EU27 countries, the Russian Federation remains an important centre of attraction, in the 1990s more before, as a consequence of the collapse of the Soviet Union and of the international nature taken on by changes of residence that until then had been considered internal migration. Ukraine and the other former Soviet republics in Europe, instead, have a very negative net migration rate. Albania experienced an exceptionally fast and intense emigration because of the political, economic and social crisis which had hit the country at the end of the communist regime and which became worse following the 1997 financial default. Greece is the most important receiving country for Albanian emigration together with Italy. For this reason it ranked among the first EU15 countries by net immigration rate in 1990-1999, following only Luxemburg which, as is widely known, has a very small population and a share of foreigners that has long been the largest on the continent (no less than 30% of the population). The most striking case is that of Germany which in the first half of the 1990s received a massive flow of people of German origin (*Aussiedler*) arriving mainly from Poland, Romania and the Soviet Union (Münz, Ulrich, 1998). As a general rule, the role of the oldest immigration countries seems to be confirmed, also because these have a greater inclination towards receiving the “flows of refugees, asylum seekers and internally displaced persons from war zones [that] played an important part in the migration movements of this period” (Bonifazi, 2008, p. 119).

The reference framework changed radically in the following decade. EU15 countries keep positioning themselves in the first quadrant¹, but the impact of the migratory component on these countries’ demographic growth was greater than in the previous period. The countries experiencing greater net immigration rates change as well. The main centres of attraction are located in southern and northern Europe. Spain and Italy, by now long-established receiving countries, receive an exceptional, mainly unexpected flow of immigrants in this decade: it is mainly labour immigration disguised behind other reasons or irregular immigration, which is only regulated *a posteriori* through regularisation procedures, sometimes included in flow management policies (Strozza, Zucchetti, 2006; Arango, Finotelli, 2009). In 2002 Italy (Law No 189/2002, known as Bossi-Fini law, and following regulations) and in 2005 Spain (Royal Decree 2393/2004 of 30 December) launched the two regularisation procedures

¹ The main exception is Germany, which have a greater negative natural increase than in the previous decade.

which would record the largest number of participants ever in a European country – in both cases about 700,000 applications, of which slightly less than 650,000 were accepted in Italy and about 600,000 in Spain. Migration flows have also grown because of family reunions which often follow immigrants' regularisation. Ireland, the UK and Sweden have also experienced a remarkable increase in the net immigration rate as compared to the past, which is partly ascribable to the decision not to restrict access to their labour market by New EU citizens in the transition period following the 2004 enlargement. Ireland has a unique situation due to the significant contribution of both the natural and the migratory components to demographic growth. Interestingly, until the early 1990s Ireland was a country of emigration. From the mid-1990 to the early 2000s it recorded a growing immigration driven by returning Irish nationals. In the first years of the past decade new peaks were recorded in non-EU immigration flows and asylum applications and, following the EU enlargement, high, unprecedented levels of immigration have been recorded mainly from the New EU Member States (Ruhs, Quinn, 2009).

4. The role of nationals and foreigners in the migration flows

The analysis based on the indirect (residual) estimation of net migration cannot help quantify the size of incoming and outgoing flows or distinguish the migration of nationals from that of foreigners. The data obtained from direct data collections of migration flows enables such deeper analyses despite the limits in comparing the information available at the international level (see section 2 above). The most evident limit is that in some countries (France, for example) the necessary data is not available; the least evident limit, instead, lies in the differences between countries in terms of what official statistics take into account. However, because our aim is to provide an overall picture of migration flows in western Europe as a whole, comparability limits do not seem to have a major impact on the validity of our considerations. Data from direct data collections will be used to analyse any changes that have taken place in the last period and to support or confute some theses on overall migration dynamics. Some EU15 countries are not included because of the lack of all necessary data, while Norway and Switzerland have been added in order to complete the picture of the main western countries.

The first issue to discuss concerns whether the net inflow from abroad recorded by EU15 countries is due to nationals, foreigners or both. The distinction between nationals and foreigners is based on the criterion of citizenship, which is the most common in official statistics.

It should be noted that, between the first and second sub-periods in the 2000-2008 interval, immigration was increasing in all the countries considered, with the exception of Germany and the Netherlands. This evolution was mainly due to an

increase in foreign immigration, which in several countries was remarkably higher than immigration (returns) of nationals, the latter flow often being decreasing (Table 4).

Table 4 – Immigration, emigration and net migration by citizenship (nationals and foreigners). Selected European countries, 2000-2008. Annual average (thousand).

Countries	Periods	Immigration			Emigration			Net migration		
		Total	Nationals	Foreigners	Total	Nationals	Foreigners	Total	Nationals	Foreigners
Denmark	2000-2004	52	22	30	44	26	18	8	-4	12
	2005-2008	58	22	36	43	23	20	15	-1	16
Finland	2000-2004	18	8	10	13	10	3	5	-2	7
	2005-2008	25	9	16	13	9	3	12	-1	13
Sweden	2000-2004	62	16	46	34	20	14	28	-4	32
	2005-2008	90	16	75	43	25	19	47	-9	56
Norway	2000-2004	37	9	28	25	11	14	12	-2	14
	2005-2008	51	8	43	20	9	11	32	-1	32
Ireland	2000-2005	64	27	36
	2006-2008 ^(a)	100	18	82	41	14	27	59	4	55
UK	2000-2004	414	99	315	292	159	133	123	-60	182
	2005-2008	523	80	442	356	174	182	166	-94	260
Austria	2000-2004	103	18	85	71	23	48	32	-5	37
	2005-2008	107	16	92	73	20	53	34	-4	39
Belgium	2000-2004	109	30	78	78	38	39	31	-8	39
	2005-2007	139	36	103	89	44	45	50	-8	58
Germany	2000-2004	822	183	639	646	123	522	177	60	117
	2005-2008	683	111	572	661	159	502	22	-48	70
Luxembourg	2000-2004	12	1	12	9	1	7	4	0	4
	2005-2008	16	1	15	10	2	8	6	-1	7
Netherlands	2000-2004	117	35	82	67	45	22	50	-11	61
	2005-2008	113	35	79	89	61	28	25	-27	51
Switzerland	2000-2004	120	23	97	81	27	55	38	-4	42
	2005-2008	149	21	128	87	29	58	62	-8	70
Italy	2000-2004	301	41	260	51	41	9	250	-1	251
	2005-2008	412	37	374	61	45	16	351	-7	358
Spain	2000-2004	483	34	449
	2005-2008	811	36	775	176	26	150	635	11	625


Notes: (a) The period considered is 2006-2008 because emigration data by citizenship has only been available since 2006.

Sources: elaborations from Eurostat (2010) and National Statistical Institute data.

The most important aspect is that the nationals' net migration is negative in almost all the countries considered and therefore the positive values of the overall net migration are due for the most part to foreigners' net immigration, which is remarkably higher than nationals' net emigration. This situation has already been pointed out for Italy, where the coexistence of a persistent net emigration of Italians and of a growing net immigration of foreigners led Pugliese (2002) to remark that Italy has also become (though not exclusively) a receiving country. This element, which brings together Italy and several European countries, is not a


phenomenon of the past few years: in the broader picture of the past twenty years the situation is the same (see net migration annual rates by citizenship in Figure 3).

Figure 3 – Net migration rates by citizenship (nationals and foreigners) in selected European countries, period 1990-2008. Annual average per 1,000 inhabitants.



Sources: elaborations from Eurostat (2010) and National Statistical Institute data.

Figure 3 (continued) – Net migration rates by citizenship (nationals and foreigners) in selected European countries, period 1990-2008. Annual average per 1,000 inhabitants.



Sources: elaborations from Eurostat (2010) and National Statistical Institute data.

With the exception of Germany, the net migration rate of nationals in the countries considered is negative in many or even all of the years examined. Similar indications are obtained even if we look farther in the past. In the past fifty years the nationals' net migration has been almost always negative in several western countries, such as Denmark, Norway, Sweden, the UK and Belgium (Conti *et al.*, 2002). An interesting novelty is that in the last period the net emigration rate in some EU15 countries (Denmark, the UK, Belgium and the Netherlands) has grown. It is now evident that a growing part of EU citizens' migration is made up of high-skilled subjects who find more suitable employment opportunities abroad. Unlike the great migrations at the turn of the 20th century or in the decades following World War II, the number of people who leave in search of fortune or with a work contract for dirty, dangerous and demanding jobs has decreased strongly in favour of the number of migrants who hold high or medium-level professional jobs in their countries of destination. It should be

added that the increasing emigration of nationals from EU15 countries could be explained by economic globalisation but also, less obviously, by the growing European integration which fosters mobility within the Union's borders of people looking for better life and work conditions². EU internal mobility could also explain why even Germany, which ever since the 1970s had always recorded a positive net migration of its citizens, has recorded a growing negative net migration in the past four years (Table 4 and Figure 3). Interestingly, some of these emigrants could be people who arrived in the past decades and acquired the German citizenship (a rather frequent situation for the *Aussiedler*, but much more difficult for foreigners until a few years ago) and who, at the end of their working life or of their migration experience, decided to go back to their areas of origin³.

The countries which in 2000-2008 recorded the greatest net inflow from abroad are Spain, Italy and the UK – countries which in the past few years have experienced an unprecedented foreign immigration. With all due proportions, even Ireland has had a very high average number of net arrivals per year – a number which remains lower than that of some countries with a longer history of immigration (Switzerland, Sweden, Belgium, the Netherlands and Austria). In addition to that, the impact of foreigners' net immigration on the resident population has increased in the last decade not only in these four countries but also in Norway, Sweden, Belgium and Switzerland.

5. Old and new origins of foreign immigrants: trends of inflow by nationality

This section analyses foreign immigration, with special focus on its evolution by citizenship in the last decade: what changes have taken place? Even though data is aggregated by macro-areas, the different evolution and distribution of inflows by nationality is immediately evident (Figures 4 and 5).

In Luxemburg and Switzerland EU15 citizens are still the prevailing group among all new arrivals: approximately 3 out of 4 immigrants in Luxemburg and up to 2 out of 3 in Switzerland. In 2000-2008 their inflow gradually increased, so much so that in Switzerland their relative weight increased accordingly (from less than 50% to about 66%). EU15 citizens account for 20-30% of immigrants in Norway, Austria, Denmark and Sweden, 10-20% in Germany, Finland and Spain and much less than 10% in Italy. With the exception of Germany and, above all, Italy, the inflow of EU citizens has been growing in the past nine years, confirming that much of EU15 nationals' emigration targets countries in the same economic area.

² These groups of migrants include highly qualified young citizens who do highly qualified jobs abroad and pensioners looking for better environmental conditions in other countries.

³ Actually, this component could be even larger in those European countries which have long had liberal (or less restrictive) regulations on the acquisition of citizenship.

The main novelty of this period, however, is the remarkable growth of immigration among citizens of New EU countries. With the exception of Luxemburg and Switzerland, in all the countries considered the inflow of New EU12 citizens has increased remarkably since 2004 – the year of the first EU enlargement to the east – with a peak in 2007 – the year of the second enlargement (when Bulgaria and Romania joined the EU). This increase was particularly high in Norway and Denmark where New EU immigrants have quickly become the prevailing component, accounting for 38 and 31% of the total arrivals respectively in 2008.

In order to fully understand the importance of arrivals from New EU countries, however, we need to look at some of the European countries which have recorded the largest inflows. In Germany the number of New EU immigrants grew from slightly more than 150 thousand in 2001 to over 200 thousand in 2004, reaching 250 thousand in 2007. In the last four years new EU citizens accounted for no less than 40% of foreign immigration in the country. In 2008 60% of immigration concerned citizens of another EU country, with the southern European component being outnumbered by the eastern European one. The inflow of New EU citizens to Spain and Italy increased more than in Germany. In the latter country arrivals increased gradually from less than 30 thousand (9% of the total) in 2000 to over 250 thousand (almost 28%) in 2007. In Spain New EU immigration grew from about 25 thousand per year in 2000-2002 to over 50 thousand in 2003-2006, reached 300 thousand in 2007, and then settled at 200 thousand in 2008. At first this growth was mainly due to the major regularisation of 2002, after which the immigrants who had arrived in 2000-2002 were recorded in the population registers in the following two years. Later, the growth was mainly due to the EU enlargement and changed regulations on the entry and stay of EU citizens. The extraordinary immigration of new EU citizens of 2007 was mainly due to the fact that about 260 thousand Romanian citizens (i.e. almost 87% of all new EU citizens and 53% of the total inflow) entered the population registers from abroad, totalling – in one year only – the same number of arrivals as in the six preceding years. Similarly, the UK and Ireland – the only countries together with Sweden which have not introduced any restrictions on the free circulation of workers from the new Member States – have seen a remarkable increase in the number of new EU citizens' arrivals. In both cases the most numerous were immigrants coming from Poland, for the most part young males. Generally speaking the increase in immigration from the New EU member states was not limited in terms of numbers and geographical area as it could have been expected in the years immediately following the first enlargement to the east (Drew, Sriskandarajah, 2007). Significant migration flows have appeared in the period, which have contributed to feeding the east-north and east-south flows within the continent, in addition to the more traditional east-west flows. The UK and Ireland on the one hand and Spain, Italy and Greece on the other have become important destinations for New EU citizens.

Figure 4 – Immigration by area of citizenship in selected Northern European countries, period 2000-2008. Absolute values (thousand) and percentages.





Figure 5 – Immigration by area of citizenship in selected Western and Southern European countries, period 2000-2008. Absolute values (thousand) and percentages.



The data on inflows by citizenship also shows that the immigration of non-EU citizens from Central and Eastern Europe is remarkably smaller than that of New EU citizens and records high numbers especially in Italy and Germany. In Italy arrivals were about 50 thousand per year in 2000-2002; then, because of the regularisation they grew to over 225 thousand, then went down again to 60 thousand per year in the following three years and finally became more than 100 thousand in 2008. Germany recorded an average 150 thousand arrivals of non-EU citizens from Central and Eastern Europe in 2001-2003, a figure which went down in the following years to reach slightly more than 80 thousand per year in 2006-2008. Two more receiving countries deserve some attention: Austria recorded a positive peak in the number of non-EU eastern European citizens (35-40 thousand per year), mainly from the Balkan area, in 2002-2005, while Spain experienced a slow growth of these arrivals, which in 2008 were almost 25 thousand.

Extra-European immigration from LDCs is remarkable in almost all the receiving countries considered. In Finland and Sweden it appears to be growing and accounts for slightly less than 40% and over 50% of the total inflow of foreigners respectively. In Denmark and Norway it accounts for over one quarter of all arrivals. In Germany extra-European immigration from LDCs went down from almost 190 thousand arrivals per year to about 125 thousand at the turn of the decade, its weight decreasing from 28 to 22% of total arrivals. In Switzerland too the importance of this immigration has gradually decreased, reaching below 20%. The situation is different in Italy and Spain, which record a major inflow of LDCs non-European citizens: more than 100 thousand arrivals per year in Italy, with peaks in the years following regularisations (now it accounts for only one third of the total); a total number of arrivals ranging between 450 and 500 thousand in the last three years in Spain, where immigration from LDCs remains prevailing. Therefore, foreign immigration in western receiving countries has concerned mainly New EU citizens and extra-European citizens from LDCs in the past decade. The enlargement contributed to the increase of EU internal migrations and to the establishment of east-south and east-north migration currents. However, it is especially in some of the new receiving countries in northern and southern Europe that extra-European immigration is particularly strong for a number of reasons, e.g. colonial or political and institutional bonds (e.g. Spain and the UK), globalisation processes (and the simultaneous regionalisation of migration), as well as the 'pull effect' of migrants' networks.

6. Immigrant and foreign population: evolution, components and origins

Despite the limitations mentioned above, recourse to stock data on the foreign-born population and the population with foreign citizenship enables us to complete

the picture, showing some changes that have taken place in the last decade and differences between receiving countries.

Between 2001 and 2009 the foreign-born population residing in EU15 countries, Norway and Switzerland increased by over 11.5 million, from 35 to 46.6 million people (Table 5). That was definitely a remarkable growth, which concerned Norway and Switzerland only in a marginal way and mainly affected the southern EU15 countries (6.5 million more foreign-born people), namely Spain and Italy (4.2 and 2.1 million more respectively). The number of foreign-born people also grew in northern European countries more than in western European ones (2.5 versus 2 million more people), with the UK recording the biggest absolute increase in the region. Among older immigration countries, only France recorded a remarkable growth in the period considered. The overall picture obtained is by all means similar to the one described through the estimates of net migration, despite the differences in the context of reference being limited to people born abroad only and the net inflow being certainly greater than the mere difference between the two stock sets of data which do not take into account deaths.

At the latest date about half the 46.6 million people born abroad live in a western European country, where they account for over 12% of the total population; in southern Europe they are less than 13 million, i.e. 10% of the total, and in northern Europe they are more than 9 million, that is 11% of residents. Regional differences appear to be much smaller than they used to be, as a result of the differential dynamics recorded in the past decade. Germany remains the country with the largest foreign-born population (over 10 million), followed by France (more than 7 million), the UK and Spain (6.7 and 6.3 million respectively). Italy ranks fifth, with almost 4.4 million born abroad – a much smaller figure than that of the countries above it, but much bigger than that of those that follow. In relative terms, the ranks are very different: Luxemburg is first with 33% of foreign born on the total resident population, followed by Switzerland with almost 25% and Austria with slightly more than 15%, and then Spain and Sweden – both with slightly less than 14%.

The picture changes significantly if the population with foreign citizenship is considered. At the most recent date its total value of 32 million in the whole of the countries considered is remarkably smaller than that of foreign-born people. There are also major differences between the two aggregates from country to country. Foreign-born people do not include second-generation foreigners (those born in their parents' receiving country) but do include national citizens occasionally born in another country or born abroad because they are emigrants' children, as well as naturalised citizens, that is the foreign immigrants who have acquired the country's citizenship. It seems evident, then, that past migration (both emigration and immigration) and the degree of

liberalness of the regulations on citizenship play a major role in determining the size of the foreign population and the difference from the foreign-born population.

Table 5 – *Foreign-born and foreign population in EU15 countries, Norway and Switzerland around 2001 and 2009. Absolute values (thousand) and percentages of total population.*

Country or area of residence	Foreign-born population					Foreign population				
	Absolute values (in thousands)			% of total population		Absolute values (in thousands)			% of total population	
	2001	2009	Difference	2001	2009	2001	2009	Difference	2001	2009
Denmark	357	487	130	6.7	8.8	259	320	62	4.8	5.8
Finland	136	219	82	2.6	4.1	91	143	52	1.8	2.7
Ireland ^(a)	400	685	285	10.4	15.4	225	512	287	5.8	11.5
Sweden	1,004	1,282	278	11.3	13.8	477	562	85	5.4	6.1
United Kingdom	4,897	6,705	1,808	8.3	11.1	2,658	4,162	1,504	4.5	6.9
Austria	1,003	1,277	274	12.5	15.3	711	871	160	8.9	10.4
Belgium	1,100	1,380	280	10.7	12.9	862	971	110	8.4	9.1
France	5,865	7,045	1,181	10.0	11.0	3,263	3,706	443	5.6	5.8
Germany	10,405	10,477	73	12.6	12.8	7,268	7,186	-82	8.8	8.8
Luxembourg	145	163	18	33.0	33.0	162	216	53	36.9	43.7
Netherlands	1,615	1,794	179	10.1	10.9	668	719	52	4.2	4.4
Greece	1,123	1,247	124	10.3	11.1	762	930	167	7.0	8.3
Italy	2,240	4,375	2,135	3.9	7.3	1,335	3,891	2,556	2.3	6.5
Portugal	651	783	131	6.3	7.4	216	443	227	2.1	4.2
Spain	2,172	6,339	4,167	5.3	13.8	1,164	5,651	4,487	2.9	12.3
Norway	313	489	176	6.9	10.2	184	303	119	4.1	6.3
Switzerland	1,614	1,883	269	22.1	24.8	1,424	1,670	245	19.8	21.7
Northern EU	6,794	9,377	2,583	8.3	11.0	3,710	5,700	1,990	4.5	6.7
Western EU	20,133	22,136	2,004	11.5	12.2	12,933	13,669	736	7.4	7.5
Southern EU	6,187	12,744	6,558	5.2	10.0	3,477	10,915	7,438	3.0	8.5
Total UE-15	33,113	44,258	11,145	8.8	11.2	20,121	30,284	10,163	5.4	7.7
TOTAL 17 countries	35,039	46,629	11,590	9.0	11.4	21,729	32,257	10,527	5.6	7.9

Note: (a) The differences with Table 2 are principally due to the inclusion of multi/no nationality and not stated.

Sources: elaborations from OECD (various years), Council of Europe (various years), Eurostat (2010) and National Statistical Institute data.

In 2001-2009 the foreigners residing in the 17 countries considered increased by 10.5 million, that is only one million less than the variation recorded among the foreign-born. However, most of this growth concerned southern EU15 countries, which recorded a 7.5 million increase in the number of foreigners residing on their territories (of which almost 4.5 million in Spain and 2.5 million in Italy), as compared to an increase of less than 2 million in northern countries (1.5 million in the UK alone) and slightly more than 700 thousand in western ones. The intensity of recent immigration as

well as the past migration history in the various countries certainly affect the variation in foreign population. However, the important role played by national regulations on the entry, stay and, above all, acquisition of citizenship should not be neglected. Southern EU15 countries, namely Spain and Italy, have recorded an extraordinary increase in immigration in the past decade, reaching unprecedented levels. At the same time these countries have kept restrictive regulations on citizenship, so much so that the number of naturalisations is still relatively small and the people born of foreign parents – a rapidly increasing number following family reunions and the stabilisation of their presences – have maintained a foreign citizenship. In western European countries and in some of northern Europe foreign immigration has a longer history and therefore immigrants have been on the territory for longer, which means that they often meet the requirements to apply for naturalisation, also thanks to less restrictive regulations. The children of immigrants born in their parents' receiving country also have the citizenship of the country in which they reside from birth, or acquire it quite soon. Hence the variation of the foreign population does not depend on net immigration alone – which, however, has been less intense in the past decade than in the previous periods or in southern EU15 countries – but also on the natural balance and, above all, the juridical balance, i.e. the major outflow due to acquisition of citizenship. This explains the major differences in the variation of foreign population between southern and western EU15 countries in 2001-2008. These remarks should be also taken into account later, considering that we are going to focus our attention only on the population with foreign citizenship, which includes part of the population of first generation immigrants and their descendants (the so-called second generation and following ones), which varies from country to country. Therefore, the comparative picture which can be drawn reflects the actual foreign population recorded, with all the limits related to the differences in data collection systems and peculiarities of national regulations determining the categories recorded – which provides a distorted, unfocused image of the immigrant population (Bonifazi, Strozza, 2004).

As a result of the major increase recorded in the last period, the foreign population registered in southern EU15 countries is close to 11 million, accounting for 8.5% of the total residents in the area, a higher share than that of the whole of the 17 countries considered (8%). In less than a decade this region has moved from the smallest to the largest share of foreigners. With 13.7 million foreigners, western EU15 countries maintain a share of approximately 7.5% while the northern ones, with 5.7 million, have not reached 7% yet. Germany remains the country with the largest number of foreigners (slightly more than 7 million), but Spain leaps ahead and becomes second with over 5.6 million registered in the *Padrón Municipal*, part of whom irregular according to the regulations about stay in Spain. The UK and Italy get ahead of France and rank third and fourth with 4.2 and 3.9 million foreign residents respectively. The picture that can be drawn is quite different from the one of only eight years ago.

Several southern and northern EU15 countries are now facing a foreign presence which in absolute numbers (Spain, UK and Italy) and/or by impact on the total population (Spain, Ireland, Greece, UK and Italy) is at least equal to if not greater than the one recorded in some western countries with a longer immigration history.

Another important aspect to consider is the weight of the irregular component, which only in Spain is counted in official data. According to the evaluations proposed in the CLANDESTINO project, in EU15 countries irregular foreign residents were estimated between 3.1 million and 5.3 million in 2002, with a major absolute presence in western (1.5-2.4 million) as well as in southern countries (1.2-2.2 million), where their relative weight appeared to be markedly greater, being estimated between 28 and 52% of the total foreign resident population (Kovacheva, Vohgel, 2009). However, the regularisations implemented in the past few years, especially in southern EU15 countries, have brought to light the regularised component in the official statistics and have reduced the absolute number of irregular immigrants and their weight on the overall foreign presence. Irregular foreign residents are estimated to be between 1.8 and 3.2 million in 2008, that is 7-12% of the total foreign residents. Only in the whole of northern EU15 countries their absolute number, ranging between 450 and 950 thousand (9-19% of foreign residents), has increased, while it has gone down in western countries (between 550 thousand and 1.1 million, that is 9-13%). The UK is the country where the largest presence has been estimated for 2008, with about 400-850 thousand irregular foreign residents accounting for 11-24% of foreign residents. Italy, Germany, France and Spain follow with a similar number of irregular foreigners, whose numbers range between 200 and 450 thousand. In relative terms, Greece and Portugal rank at the same level as the UK with the highest estimate being close, on average, to one irregular every four foreign residents (Kovacheva, Vohgel, 2009). While being standardised, these evaluations should be considered with great caution, considering that what is being counted is by definition uncountable and the estimates proposed are rarely of high quality. Nonetheless, the change that has taken place in this period shows a significant decrease in the irregular presence especially in southern countries, which since the 1980s have been characterised by very high irregular immigration, managed only *a posteriori* through recurring regularisations.

Similarly, asylum seekers are rarely counted among the registered foreign population. According to data of the United Nation High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in EU15 countries asylum seekers were 400-500 thousand per year in 2000-2003 and decreased to about 200-250 thousand in the past 2-3 years. In 2000-2008 there were almost 3.5 million applications, of which less than 500 thousand (14% only) received a positive decision. The refugee population, which in the 1990s was above 2.1 million, had less than 1.8 million at the end of 1999 and went further down in the following years to slightly less than 1.3 million at the end of 2008. Germany, the UK and France are still the countries receiving the greatest

number of refugees, that is 580 thousand, 290 thousand and 160 thousand respectively, altogether over three quarters of all those present in EU15 countries. Conversely, the number of refugees is rather small in southern EU15 countries. The recent decrease in the refugee population, recorded mainly in Germany, Sweden and the Netherlands, is mainly a consequence of repatriations and changed statuses (including acquiring the citizenship of the receiving countries) which have become more numerous than the new recognitions of refugee status. While the 1990s were characterised by the significant weight of movements of people caused by political reasons, ethnic-religious conflicts and wars, the first decade of the 21st century has seen a sharp prevalence of flows due directly or indirectly to economic factors.

If we limit our analysis to foreign residents only, remarkable differences are noticeable between countries in the breakdown by area of citizenship (Table 6). Very importantly, it should be remarked that about a quarter (or almost 7 million) of the foreigners living in one of the 17 countries considered have the citizenship of one of the EU15 countries. This share is greater than 30% in western countries, with remarkably higher shares in Belgium (61.5%), where among the first five nationalities are Italian, French, Dutch and Spanish, and in Switzerland (59.8%), where Italians, Germans, Portuguese and French are among the first five nationalities. Although detailed data is not available, the situation in Luxemburg is expected to be the same. The importance of the EU-immigrant component is due to migration caused by geographical closeness and to south-north migration which was particularly intense until the early 1970s.

New EU citizens are over 4.4 million in the whole of the 17 receiving countries, that is more than 14% of total foreigners. Their importance has grown remarkably in the past few years: between 2001 and 2009 they increased by about 3.3 million, the most significant increases being recorded in Spain, Italy and the UK. The increase of new EU citizens has been much greater than that of foreigners from the old EU countries, hence the weight of the latter has decreased while that of the former has grown considerably. This increase is more than 20% among foreigners living in southern and northern EU15 countries, with even greater shares in Ireland (42.4%), where the Poles have become the first foreign nationality and the citizens of the Baltic republics rank among the first in the list, and in Italy (almost 25%), where the Romanians have become by far the most numerous nationality. Conversely, in western EU15 countries non-EU immigrants from eastern Europe are particularly numerous: they are more than 30%, with even greater shares in Austria and Germany because of the great number of Turks and Ex-Yugoslavian citizens.

Altogether, old and new EU citizens account for 40% of the total foreign residents in EU15 countries. In other words, two foreigners out of five are EU citizens and if other Europeans are added up the result is that three out of five foreigners are from a European

country. Therefore, only 40% of the foreigners living in the EU15 are non-European and mainly from LDCs: 16.5% from Africa, 12.6% from Asia and less than 10% from Latin America. In northern countries the Asian and Sub-Saharan African components are quite large (almost 25% and almost 12% respectively), the Asian one being important in all the region; in western countries north-Africans (10.4%) are slightly more numerous than Asians (9.9%); in southern countries, featuring a greater non-European presence, Latin Americans (22.3%) are slightly more numerous than Africans (20.1%) who, in two cases out of three, are citizens of countries along the Mediterranean shore. Past colonial bonds are evident in the breakdown by nationality of the foreigners living in France (over 30% from North Africa and 11.4% from the Rest of Africa), in the UK (26.7% from Asia and almost 14% from Sub-Saharan Africa, in many cases citizens of a Commonwealth country) and in Portugal (almost 29% are African, mainly from the PALOP, and less than 26% from Latin America, especially Brazilians). Latin Americans are a major group in Spain (over 30%), not so much because of past colonial connections as of linguistic and cultural bonds.

Table 6 – Percentages by area of citizenship of foreign population living in EU15 countries, Norway and Switzerland around 2009.

Country or area of residence	% by area of citizenship ^(a)								
	EU15	New EU-12	Eastern Europe	Other Europe	Other MDCs	North Africa	Other Africa	Asia	Latin America
Denmark	23.3	11.3	20.4	7.9	3.3	1.3	5.6	25.2	1.7
Finland	16.1	20.7	27.2	0.9	2.5	1.3	8.7	21.0	1.6
Ireland	31.7	42.4	2.4	0.6	5.2	0.3	4.6	10.5	2.4
Sweden	36.2	11.1	7.1	7.6	2.3	1.0	7.2	24.0	3.5
United Kingdom	24.2	19.1	2.5	0.7	7.3	1.2	13.9	26.7	4.4
Austria	21.1	15.8	50.5	1.0	1.2	1.0	1.5	6.9	1.0
Belgium	61.5	6.6	7.8	0.4	1.5	9.6	5.2	6.0	1.4
France	32.8	2.2	8.7	1.2	1.3	30.3	11.4	7.2	4.9
Germany	24.7	10.7	44.3	0.7	1.9	1.8	2.2	12.1	1.5
Luxembourg	---	86.0	---	-----	-----	14.0	-----	-----	-----
Netherlands	35.7	10.3	17.5	0.7	3.5	11.9	3.8	13.0	3.6
Italy	4.2	24.9	24.2	0.3	0.5	15.5	6.9	15.8	7.7
Portugal	10.8	8.3	18.5	0.3	0.8	0.6	28.6	6.5	25.6
Spain	20.8	19.5	3.3	0.7	0.5	13.8	4.1	5.3	32.1
Norway	36.0	18.9	1.7	8.6	5.7	0.7	8.3	19.7	0.5
Switzerland	59.8	2.1	0.2	24.4	4.2	1.2	2.1	5.8	0.2
Northern EU	25.7	20.0	4.6	1.8	6.3	1.1	11.8	24.8	3.9
Western EU	30.8	8.2	30.7	0.8	1.7	10.4	4.9	9.9	2.5
Southern EU ^(b)	13.9	21.1	12.1	0.5	0.5	13.9	6.2	9.4	22.3
Total UE-15 ^(b)	24.0	14.9	19.3	0.9	2.2	9.8	6.7	12.6	9.6
TOTAL 17 countries ^(b)	26.1	14.3	18.1	2.2	2.3	9.3	6.5	12.3	9.0

Note: (a) Stateless and missing case are not considered. (b) Without Greece.

Sources: elaborations from OECD (various years), Council of Europe (various years), Eurostat (2010) and National Statistical Institute data.

The breakdown by nationality provides details of the considerations just made while showing one of the characteristics of migration in the past two decades, that is the multiple origins determining a greater heterogeneity based on the origin (in this case, nationality) of the foreign population. Figure 6 considers the breakdown by the first five citizenships of foreign residents with the residue, given by the weight of the remaining nationalities, which can be considered as a rough indicator of the group's heterogeneity⁴.


Firstly, the importance of geographical closeness and of past and/or present belonging to a common market or area is confirmed. Not only does the Finnish nationality remain the first in Sweden, with Danes and Norwegians ranking third and fourth, but also in the other Scandinavian countries the nationalities from nearby countries always rank among the first. Secondly, the important role often played by the citizens of nearby Baltic republics and of Russia is also evident. With the exception of the Poles, the largest national group in Ireland is that of the British, and in the UK the Irish one. In this last country the weight of Indians and Pakistanis shows how attractive the country is to Commonwealth countries' citizens – an aspect which has led to consider the UK as the core of a unique international migration system in the framework of western Europe (Zlotnik, 1992). The importance of the French component in Belgium, of the German one in the Netherlands and Austria, of the Italian, German and French in Switzerland are only a few more examples of the role played by geographical closeness. We could add former Yugoslavs in Austria and Switzerland and the Poles in Germany, even though in the latter case other historical, cultural and institutional reasons come into play as well. In southern European receiving countries, the most striking example is probably the presence of Albanians in Greece and Italy, where geographical proximity is combined to cultural closeness. In Greece, Bulgarians and Romanians are among the largest national groups, which confirms the Balkan origin of a large part of the immigration, which originates in the same region in which the receiving country is located.

It is in the western European countries with a longer history of immigration that the prevailing foreign nationalities include those reminding of the past intra-European migrations along the south-north axis, which were particularly important in the 1950s and 1960s. Italians are still the largest community in Belgium and Switzerland, the second largest in Germany and fifth largest in France. The Portuguese are still the first national group in France and the third in Switzerland. Spaniards are the fifth nationality in Belgium, whereas the Greeks are the fourth in Germany. In this case, even more than belonging to the same common market (which is not the case for Switzerland), what counted were the bilateral recruitment agreements of the 1950s and 1960s in setting or feeding the migration currents and increasing foreign communities in receiving countries. With respect to this another example could be that of the former Yugoslavs, who are present in several western European countries. These communities

⁴ The larger it is, the smaller the importance of the first five nationalities and the greater the internal variety of the aggregate.

were formed following the migrations of the 1960s and 1970s, favoured by the bilateral agreements signed by Tito with some of the main European receiving countries. A major role was also played by the migrations of the 1990s which followed the bloodsheds in the former Yugoslav Republics – displacements of refugees and asylum seekers who obtained recognition of their refugee status *de facto* and only in part returned to their origin countries in the following years – and by the most recent ones for economic reasons.

Figure 6 – First five national groups in the foreign population living in selected European countries around 2009.



Sources: elaborations from OECD (various years), Council of Europe (various years), Eurostat (2010) and National Statistical Institute data.

Despite the transition period, EU membership has certainly enhanced the latest east-west migration which is evident in the breakdown by nationality of the foreign population especially in northern and southern EU15 countries. The Poles have become the largest community in the UK, Ireland and Norway, like the Romanians in Italy and Spain. These are only the most evident examples of a much wider-ranging phenomenon involving other nationalities and European receiving countries.

In southern EU15 countries the presence of non-Europeans is also remarkable. In addition to the Moroccan component, which together with the Turkish one is quite large in several European countries, we should report the significant number (i.e. among the first five nationalities) of the Chinese in Italy, Ecuadorians and Colombians in Spain, Cape Verdeans and Angolans in Portugal, Pakistanis in Greece. These are only a few examples of a complex distribution of the foreign presence due to the so-called globalisation of migration which has increased the number of areas of origin, some of which are far away from the destination countries.

This very process, which is typical of migration in the past twenty years, has brought about a greater heterogeneity of the foreign population in terms of areas and countries of citizenship, a variety which is more evident in the countries which have become destinations of international migration flows only in recent times. With the exception of Ireland, a great heterogeneity in the foreign resident population is observed in all the northern EU15 countries, as compared to the other countries considered. In western European countries heterogeneity by citizenship is smaller than in the north, but greater than it was in the past. In 1975 Italians were more than half the foreigners in Switzerland; Italians and the French accounted for more than 50% in Belgium; Turks, former Yugoslavs and Italians were 58% in Germany; the Portuguese, Algerians and Spaniards were 57% in France (Conti *et al.*, 2002). Today, in order to reach 50% of the total presence the first four citizenships should be considered in Switzerland and Belgium, the first five in France and the first seven in Germany. In southern EU15 countries, with the exception of Greece where Albanians are the prevailing national group (over 50% of the total), there is still a wide variety in terms of nationality of the foreign population, even though to a slightly smaller extent than in the past, as a result of the immigration of New EU citizens especially in Italy (after 2007 the Romanians have become more than 20% of foreign residents).

7. Classification of the European receiving countries and final considerations

In order to produce a synthetic picture of the present role of the 17 European receiving countries with reference to recent international migration and foreign presence, 10 elementary indicators have been considered concerning the evolution of the phenomenon (net migration rate and rate of change of foreign-born population), the impact and distribution of the foreign population by citizenship (percentage of foreigners in the resident population, percentages by area of citizenship and minimum number of nationalities needed for 75% of the foreign population), as well as the weight of special categories of immigrants (percentage of irregular foreign residents and percentage of refugees) and the importance of naturalisations. Table 10 reports the median, minimum and maximum values of the indicators as well as the correlation between these elementary indicators and the three factors extracted by means of factor analysis in the principal components. Factor loadings make it possible to match a meaning to the three synthetic factors, all with an eigenvalue greater than one, which together make up over three quarters of the total variance.


Table 10 – Median, minimum and maximum values of elementary indicators and factor loadings of factor analysis in principal components (units= 17 countries).

Indicators	Values			Correlation with indicators		
	Minimum	Median	Maximum	1 st factor	2 nd factor	3 rd factor
Net migration rate 2000-2009	0,98	4,14	12,00	-0,21	0,90	-0,23
Rate of change of foreign-born population	0,09	3,41	23,98	-0,05	0,92	0,13
% of foreigners in the resident population	2,69	6,87	43,67	-0,17	0,34	-0,79
% of New EU-12 citizens	2,10	10,68	40,81	-0,01	0,62	0,03
% of Eastern Europe citizens	2,33	16,93	76,55	-0,49	-0,53	-0,40
% of LDCs citizens	10,30	31,52	61,22	-0,04	0,34	0,85
N. of nationality for 75% of foreign population	2	16	29	0,78	0,17	0,39
% of irregular in the foreign population (mean)	1,01	8,21	21,46	-0,73	-0,18	0,36
% of refugees on foreign population	0,02	4,31	13,70	0,85	-0,33	0,09
Rate of naturalization (per 100 foreigners)	0,50	3,80	7,60	0,85	-0,30	0,08
% of variance				29,04	28,13	18,75
% of cumulated variance				29,04	57,16	75,91

The first factor has a positive correlation with the indicator expressing the heterogeneity of the foreign presence by citizenship, with the percentage of refugees and with the rate of naturalisation, and a negative correlation with the percentage of irregulars in the resident population. It expresses the degree of liberalness of the regulations, taking care of the refugees' problems and acting in favour of including immigrants into the receiving reality. The second factor has a positive correlation with the net migration rates, the rate of change of the foreign-born population and the percentage of New EU12 citizens, and represents the attractiveness of receiving countries for migration purposes in the past decade, which concerned mainly New EU citizens and non-EU citizens from the LDCs. The third factor has a positive correlation with the weight of LDCs citizens and a negative one with the impact of foreigners. It summarises a situation which has on the negative semi-axis the typical cases of Switzerland and Luxemburg – the countries with the highest percentage of foreigners in the resident population, these foreigners being mostly European.

The aggregative hierarchical cluster analysis with Ward's method using the factor scores of the three factors extracted made it possible to obtain a breakdown of the 17 European receiving countries into five clusters, which could be possibly reduced to three. Figure 7 shows the process of aggregation highlighting the groupings obtained.

Figure 7 – Dendrogram of cluster analysis using Ward method.



While Luxemburg remains a unique case, northern European countries (plus France and the Netherlands) make up a quite cohesive cluster, with a low share of foreigners and a low net migration rate, whereas the share of refugees is high and the rates of naturalisation are the highest. These countries are also characterised by a great heterogeneity of the foreign population by citizenship. Four western European countries (Belgium, Germany, Austria and Switzerland) make up another cluster, which in the past decade recorded a minor growth of the born-abroad population, had a small share of foreigners from the LDCs and was characterised by the lowest rates of irregulars. As for the two remaining groups, one is made up of Ireland and Spain and the other of Italy, Portugal and Greece. These are the so-called new receiving countries of southern Europe – not really ‘new’, though, considering that foreign immigration started a few decades ago. The country which may still be labelled as ‘new’ receiving country is Ireland, which has only experienced this phenomenon in the last ten years. The first group is characterised by a large share of foreigners, small weight of those from Eastern Europe as well as a small share of refugees and low rates of naturalisations. The second group is characterised by a very low rate of naturalisations and small share of refugees, but also by a share of irregulars above average and weight of foreigners on the total population still below the European average. In the following stages of the aggregation process these two clusters are joined and make up a group including the main receiving countries of the last decade, even though with a greater internal variance. These countries have not yet come to terms with a phenomenon which speeded up unexpectedly and needs to be properly ruled in order to allow immigrants to become fully integrated in the receiving societies. High rates of irregulars and low levels in the naturalisation rates point to a still inappropriate management of migration flows and stocks.

In synthesis, the population growth recorded in Europe in the last decade has been mainly due to net immigration, with a demographic impact that has been particularly evident in countries like Spain and Italy which, according to the population forecasts made in the late 1990s, were to expect a decreasing number of residents, unlike what has actually happened (Livi Bacci, 2010).

As was stressed in section 3, the European continent (or rather the so-called European economic area) has become the world’s main centre of attraction, with net immigration being greater than in North America in the decade. A major part of the migration flows heading towards the ‘old’ EU originated in the countries that joined the Union in 2004 and 2007, which shows the appearance of east-west or, better, east-north and east-south migration flows, which were still secondary (with a few exceptions) in the 1990s and which are now to be considered as internal within the EU.

While in the 1990s much of the migration was caused by wars in the Balkans, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the transition of its satellite States to market

economy, in the past decade increased flows have been mainly due to economic factors.

The countries which recorded the largest inflows are in southern (Spain and Italy) and northern Europe (UK and Ireland), where the number (and, in some cases, the incidence) of foreigners is now greater than in the countries with the oldest histories of immigration. Needless to say, the picture would be partly different if the population of foreign origin or with a migratory background were considered.

In southern European countries, namely Spain and Italy, the large volumes of immigrants have fed into a regular/resident foreign population that has grown remarkably, even as a result of the family reunions and births from foreign parents which occurred after the recurring regularisations, that is the main tool used to manage migration flows *a posteriori* (Bonifazi *et al.*, 2009; Arango, Finotelli, 2009).

It seems difficult to be able to continue in the same way in the presence of a structural, well-established immigration, which needs at least a more realistic management of migration flows and requires the adoption of effective integration policies as well as growing attention to second generations (Dalla Zuanna *et al.*, 2009).

Despite the economic crisis of the last two years, a return to the past sounds hardly feasible: for a number of reasons – including, very importantly, the demographic factor – the European population is going to be more and more heterogeneous in terms of areas of origin, ethnic groups, religions, etc. (see, on the topic, Coleman, 2006; 2008). It is in the light of these very elements that the European societies of the next few years should be (re)designed.

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SUMMARY

The aim of this paper is to provide an overview of international migration in Europe over the past decade from the perspective of 'old' versus 'new' receiving countries in western Europe (EU15 countries plus Norway and Switzerland). Special attention is placed on the migration flows originating in Central and Eastern Europe, highlighting the weight taken on by east-south and east-north flows, which often occur within the borders of the EU. In this framework, the receiving countries of southern (Italy, Spain, Greece and Portugal) and northern Europe (namely the UK and Ireland) are the main focus of the analysis, since in the past few years they have been the main centres of attraction for migration flows originating in Central and Eastern Europe as well as in the least developed countries in the rest of the world. A detailed analysis of the statistics available made it possible to draw a realistic picture of recent trends, highlighting the elements of continuity and discontinuity with international migration in the past.

THE FOREIGNERS IN ITALY: EXPERIENCES IN THE FIELD SURVEY RESEARCH

Anna Maria Birindelli, Gian Carlo Blangiardo

1. Introduction

Foreign immigration in Italy is now a permanent aspect of Italian society affecting greatly both the composition of the population, and economic and social reality of the different local contexts.

This is a phenomenon that started quietly in the 70s when it was gradually stopping our outmigration, at least in its traditional configuration of labor force directed to the industrial nations belonging to the European Community. With the 80s Italy increases its power of attraction for thousands of men and women from developing countries, and moves permanently to reach the oldest nations with immigration propensity.

Few figures give an idea of the present dimensions of the phenomenon, at least as measured by the National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT): at the end of 2010, foreign residents account for about 4.6 million (over 7 per cent of the total population). It is estimated that just over 20 per cent is made up of children and teenagers and that the second generation, that is foreigners born in Italy, is estimated at 600,000 persons, presumably still consisting mainly of minors given the relatively recent flows of rooting (ISTAT, 2010).

The social visibility is highly diversified across regions, especially with regards to the various provincial contexts. Going from the North to the South, we note a progressive decline of the percentage of foreigners among residents, that is persons recorded in the population register: as a matter of fact higher levels can be observed in some provinces of the North (13 per cent in Brescia, about 12 per cent in Piacenza, Reggio, Modena and Mantua) and of the Centre (nearly 13 per cent Prato and levels just under 11 per cent, for Perugia and Macerata).

In the heterogeneous mix between pull and push factors the economic reasons are a major cause behind the decision to emigrate, whether taken on a personal level or within the family context. Participation in the labor market is therefore a key for success of migration projects in the medium term. At the same time, a factor that shows the roots of foreign communities in various areas of our country is represented by the presence of children and is reflected on within the school

system: in 2009-10 school year (ISMU, 2010) 7.5 per cent of the students are foreigner, reaching nearly 674,000 units with an increase of 7 per cent compared to the previous school year.

The characteristics of the foreign communities are highlighted by the many surveys conducted since the 80s. The information gathered at the local level are valuable information to monitor changes in the social fabric and in the labor market. However, differences in sampling procedures, assumptions made, issues under investigation, the formulation of the questions, etc., do not allow to draw appropriate comparisons of time or space even for those communities coming from the same nation.

In this contribution we are considered investigations¹ that have provided information on a heterogeneous territorial set through a shared frame of reference. Taking cue from the reviews made by various scholars (Blangiardo, 2008, 2010a; Bonifazi, Caruso, Conti, Strozza, 2003; Conti, Gabrielli, Prati, Strozza, 2010) our purpose is to sketch out the most important steps that have marked the development of the field survey research. Starting from the 80s, when the first organic exploration on quantitative and qualitative knowledge of foreign immigration shows up, to nowadays, when it seems gained a new level of maturity especially in terms of methods of sampling and heterogeneity of the institutions involved in the task of monitoring the phenomenon.

2. The pioneering stage: the eighties

The establishment of a broad cognitive process begins with the 80s under the guidance of Nora Federici first and Marcello Natale later (Table 1). The first stage of this process takes shape into the Workshop on Foreign immigration in Italy, organized by the CISP (Italian Committee for the Population Study - Comitato Italiano per lo Studio della Popolazione) on March 22 1983 in Rome at the CNR (National Research Council - Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche) and aimed at a preliminary review of the data sources and methods to tackle new challenges in migration. More than 180 representatives from academia and institutions participate and that meeting laid the groundwork for the establishment of a project that would become a milestone in the studies of foreign presence in Italy. Nora Federici's (1983) conclusions are bound to find a comprehensive and effective follow-up: "...It's our intention to promote as soon as possible a meeting of those who have declared their willingness to develop a research project, taking into consideration the local social and economic condition... □ (p.451).

¹ For a list of selected researches see Appendix

Table 1 – *Stages in the process of knowledge.***1983, March 22:** *Workshop on Foreign immigration in Italy*

CISP and Demographic Institute, University of Rome “La Sapienza”

Sources and data collection methods

Direct and secondary data analysis

Research hypothesis on foreign immigration in Italy

1986: *Foreigners in Italy: new scientific contributions*

Studi Emigrazione XXIII, No 82-83

Dimension and dynamic of foreign population

Field survey researches

Legislation proposals and legislative implications

1986, September 8-10 Section on *Recent aspects of foreign immigration in Italy*

AIDELF “Les migrations internationales” Università della Calabria

Summary report, Sviluppo Review, No 51-52, 1987

Statistical sources and methodological issues

G.C.Blangiardo, A.Campus (Milan area, field survey)

S.Lauro (Lombardy, census data)

A.Montanari (Emilia Romagna, population register)

A.Angeli-L.Pasquini (Emilia Romagna, population register)

L.Lecchini (Tuscany, field survey)

O.Barsotti (Tuscany, field survey)

C.Buccianti (Siena, field survey)

E.Moretti (Marche, field survey)

E.Todisco (Teramo, field survey)

F.Accardi (Mazara del Vallo, field survey)

E.Greco (Mazara del Vallo, official data sources)

G.Chinnici (Italia, official data sources)

A.Cortese (Italy, census data)

1987, December 17-18 Conference on *Foreigners in Italy*

CISP and National Committee for population studies

Studi Emigrazione XXV, n.91-92

Information system

The state of art of interuniversity project

Research and politics into perspective

Between 1984 and 1988, eleven local groups, relating to the national interuniversity research, carried out field surveys in various areas and with different sampling methods. Because of the lack of an appropriate statistical documentation about the population of reference each research group adopt non

probability sampling, taking into account the qualitative information based on interviews with privileged witnesses and on informal contacts with associations.

Researchers agree on a standard questionnaire (Gesano, 1986) in which are gathered information on the structural characteristics of respondents (sex, age, nationality, etc.), on their current working conditions and at the place of origin, on their migration history, on their living conditions (economic resources, social relationships) and on the prospects for the future. These issues follow the classic scheme adopted in the migration research and so they will be adopted also in other future researches. Furthermore each group can include additional questions designed to reflect the specific problems of different contexts. Interuniversity research carried out a total of about 3200 interviews.

Time seems ripe for a new check-up of the state of art and Marcello Natale organizes a monographic number of the review *Studi Emigrazione* n.82-83 (1986), entitled *Foreigners in Italy: new scientific contributions*. The various articles offer a multidisciplinary frame of reference by which it is possible to evaluate the dimension and the dynamic of foreign population, the preliminary reports of field survey researches and the interplay of legislation proposals and legislative implications. Another important initiative in 1986 pulled together, in a perspective of international comparisons, the scholars involved into the research on the topic of foreigners: it's the congress of the Association of French-speaking Demographers (AIDELF) held in Cosenza, in which it is provided an account of the ongoing work in the field surveys². The research path end up with the conference on *Foreigners in Italy* held at the CNR (Rome) in December 1987: one section is dedicated to the contributions of the groups engaged in the interuniversity project and other two sections concern the migration information system and research and political issues in perspective.

3. The medium phase: propagation of research sites

The gradual increase of the non-EU immigrants, including those without sojourn permits or without employment contract, brings about the diffusion of research sites in addition to the academic ones.

² The final reports of these researches are published by F. Angeli in a book series entitled *The foreign presence in Italy* (Barsotti, 1988; Brunelli, Bussini, Cecchini, Tittarelli, 1989; Calvanese, Pugliese, 1989; Moretti, Cortese, 1990; Dell'Atti, 1990; Birindelli et al., 1993)

In 1990 CENSIS³ (Centro Studi Investimenti Sociali - Center for Social Studies and Policies) on behalf of the Italian Government, carries out the survey on *Needs, attitudes and expectations of immigrants*. The selection of 16 national groups to be interviewed is the result of the intersection between the official data and information gathered from experts and privileged witnesses: 1525 interviews in 12 geographical areas divided up throughout the country are carried out. The questionnaire has three main areas: the migration process (recursive migration, push factors, reasons for the choice of Italy), living conditions (work, personal needs, integration process) and future migration plans

From the methodological point of view it should be noted that in the early 90s' starts the experimentation and subsequent consolidation (IRER-OETAM, 1990; Irer Regione Lombardia, 1991) of the sampling technique for centers or places of aggregation developed by Gian Carlo Blangiardo (Blangiardo, 1996 and 2004, Blangiardo et al., in press). The identification of a comprehensive and varied range of meeting places and the definition of objective criteria for the selection of either the center where to carry out the survey and of the people to be interviewed allow to make the transition from the sample outcomes to the target population. In this way it is possible to have a probability sample of foreigners in the territory (without discrimination with respect to residence and regular residence) even in the absence of a list of units that form the target population from which to select the sample. This sample scheme was adopted in the following field surveys:

- 1) The national inter-university project on *Integration Indicators* aimed to analyze the foreigners from developing countries and Eastern Europe: 3139 interviews are carried out between 1993 and 1994.
- 2) The survey conducted by the Institute for Population Research of the National Research Council, within an international project financed by Eurostat and managed by the NIDI (Netherlands Interdisciplinary Demographic Institute), regarding the *Push and pull factors of international migration*: the survey, carried out in the first half of 1997, was conducted in three provinces for the Egyptians (about 700 interviews) and six provinces for the Ghanaians (827 interviews).
- 3) The sub-project on *Insertion in the labour market, income and remittances sent by foreign immigrants in Italy* (Conti, Strozza 2003): 1,920 persons, coming from the former Yugoslavia, Albania, Poland, Romania and Morocco and residing in Rome and in some provinces of the Veneto and of Campania regions, are interviewed between 1997 and 1998.

³ In 1979 this Center have already carried out a research on *The condition of foreign workers*: the field survey was conducted in four area in the North (Milano, Triveneto, Emilia Romagna) and in Sicily.

4) A research study on *Foreign immigration in the Italian Adriatic areas*, conducted under the “InteMiGra” project managed by the Abruzzi Regional Authorities and financed by the European Social Found: in the first phase of this research are interviewed nearly 1,000 foreigners living in some areas of the seven Adriatic region (Carchedi, 2001).

To complete this brief account of research activities of the period under consideration can be mentioned two other studies that offer examples of links with specific actors (unions) in the labor market and of focus on reality in a phase of consolidation (second generation).

The University of Modena and the regional IRES (Economic and Social Research Institute) promote the survey on *Working conditions and social integration of migrants*: under the supervision of Trade Unions, between 2000 and 2001, over 1,600 foreign workers of 23 different nationalities are interviewed directly at the workplace or in private homes. The main aims of the survey regard information on current employment and on the employing enterprise, on education, training and job experience at home and in Italy, on the family structure and family-reunion projects as well as on the relationships with the trade union.

The national survey on the *Second Generation in Italy* (ItaGen2), coordinated by G. Dalla Zuanna, sees the involvement of different research groups (academic and otherwise): of the second generation. The target population is formed by 10-14 year old boys and girls attending lower secondary school and the main aim is to analyse the multi-faceted aspects of integration process. Data consider 10,554 students with at least one foreign parent and 10,150 Italian peers who act as a control group for comparisons in the analysis of results. The survey is conducted in 43 provinces where the proportion of students with at least one foreign parent is equal to or exceeds the 10 per cent in the Central and in the North and 3 per cent in the South. The basic questionnaire, which could be combined with other questions related to research interests of the individual groups, is divided into seven sections, regarding the human capital (educational performance, language skills, plans for the future), social capital (family and friendships), the system of values, leisure activities and the socio-economic status of the family (Casacchia, Natale, Paterno, Terzera, 2008; Dalla Zuanna, Farina, Strozza, 2009).

4. The current phase: two institutional examples, Istat and Ismu Foundation

In recent years also the institutional bodies have increased their focus on issues of migrations. Here we draw our attention on two initiatives undertaken by the National Statistical Institute (Istat) and by Ismu Foundaton: the last one can be hold up as a model for its continuance and for its enlargement of the interests of knowledge.

In 2005 ISTAT realizes a survey on *Health and use of health services*: the national sample includes approximately 60,000 families, among which about 3,500 foreigners enrolled in the population registrar. For the first time in Italy it is possible to get information about foreign lifestyles, health status and care, use of health services and motherhood condition (Istat, 2005). With reference to labor force survey, in 2008 (second quarter) ISTAT arranges a specific module on *The integration of migrants and their descendants in the labor market*, which complements the routine documentation on foreign workers began in 2006 (ISTAT, 2008). The purpose of this module is to explore the degree of integration into the labor market (ISTAT, 2009): the collected information concern the channels used to find work (formal and informal intermediaries), the use of public and private services in the first two years of permanence, recognition of foreign educational qualifications, the correspondence between professional work and competences already acquired, the use of Italian language in different relational contexts (labor relations, friends, relatives).

The ISMU Foundation has a traditional vocation to investigate the heterogeneous issues that gradually have been coming to light in connection with the increase of foreign immigration; established in 1991 as CARIPLO ISMU Foundation, it has been acting as ISMU Foundation since some years. Since 1995 an annual report is published on immigration in Italy and since 1996 a field survey on the foreign presence in the Milan town is carried out applying the centre sampling method. The results are so satisfactory as to get the interest of the provincial administration of Milan which allocates a four years funding for the investigation of the entire territory under its jurisdiction. This also induces other provincial governments to make available the necessary funds to carry out similar surveys in the municipalities belonging to the territory of Varese and Cremona (2000), Lodi and Mantua (1999 and 2001), and Lecco (2001). Further developments took place in 2001 with the establishment of the Regional Observatory for Integration and Multi-ethnicity (ORIM), which will be fully involved with the Lombardy Region and ISMU in an exchange of financial and human resources. Since 2001 and for the first time in Italy it has been possible to monitor the foreign presence through an integrated system regarding the various phases of yearly survey research: the sample consists of 8 thousand units (increased to 9 thousand in 2006) selected from the target population of foreigners coming from so-called *countries with strong migratory pressure*.

The final assessment of 15 annual surveys (1996-2010) conducted in Milan town and 10 years of monitoring the Lombardy region is summarized by a total of 100 thousand interviews.. Through the collected material it's possible to evaluate the dynamics of the phenomenon, taking into account both regular and illegal components. Information on some structural aspects (religion or education level)

and living conditions (such as working condition, family situation, income) are indispensable for managing some migration issues such as poverty or integration process.

The time is ripe to expand activities beyond regional borders. In 2005, on behalf of the Minister of Labor and Social Policies a national survey on the effects induced by the regularization of immigrant workers (the Bossi and-Fini act) on the labor market as well as in the social environment units was carried out. The reference areas are made up of 30 provinces in the six regions qualified as “Target one” (Basilicata, Campania, Calabria, Puglia, Sardinia, Sicily), but were also considered other 10 provinces chosen in the North and Central Italy. The statistical material supplied by the field survey research regarding 30 thousand interviews (Blangiardo, Farina, 2006) gave the opportunity to estimate the presence of foreigners on July 1st 2005, both at national level and in detail of the 40 provinces and six regions, providing information about regular and irregular condition. Furthermore several elements were acquired with particular reference to integration aspects. The possibility of measuring the integration through the acquisition of data at the micro level provides an opportunity to obtain insight on the contextual conditions that characterize the living condition as well as the reaction of individuals up against to the rules of the place of settlement.

For a further discussion of this topic in 2008 the Ismu Foundation starts the research *Measuring integration* along with 20 research groups around the country; were interviewed 12,000 foreigners present in 32 provincial and municipal areas coming from countries with strong migratory pressure. The purpose was to evaluate the level of integration both in global terms and in restricted terms with respect to a subsets of population defined according to demographic, socio-economic and ethno-cultural criteria.

Finally, in 2009, by a collaboration with the IPRS (Psychoanalytic Institute for Social Research, Rome) and CENSIS, is was conducted a research on *Per.La: The career paths of extra-EU citizens*, cofinanced by the 7th EU Research Program. The field survey carried out in 18 Italian provinces was divided into two parts (Ismu, Censis, Iprs, 2010). In the first part respondents were 16 thousand foreigners over 18years, coming from countries with strong migratory pressure: about 13 thousand have been employed at the time of the interview or in the previous 12 months. The characteristics of the employed and unemployed, mobility history, any access to employment centers and attendance of training courses allow to explore the entry and permanence in the work market. The second part seeks to provide a comprehensive framework of the services of the Employment Centres (ICC) for foreigners and their function between demand and supply of labor. Through semi-structured interviews addressed to each of the responsible provincial, employment

centers has rebuilt the routes and reasons which led them to the eventual activation of services for users.

5. Conclusion

The outcome of more than 30 years of commitment to describe and interpret the reality of a new country of immigration should be considered generally positive. Albeit with difficulty, the research and the production of statistical data are moving towards a system of monitoring the dynamics of migration.

Alongside to the continuous and rapid availability of official data, initiatives of investigation has broadened over time moving from a context strictly academic toward new horizons where institutions that are called to manage and interact with a population of over 5 million people (Blangiardo, 2010b), increasingly ask more and more information to act and to assess the effect of their interventions.

The next Italian census of 2011 will deliver a picture of a Country that, on the occasion of its 150th birthday, will officially acknowledge a sort of *change of skin*. And even if the census will show us a picture of the foreign presence very different from that of the times when Nora Federici muster the scientific community for a new challenge in research, we could not help but remember with gratitude those who have since then understood that "North Africans working into the factories in Reggio Emilia or the Tunisians engaged on fishing boats in Mazara del Vallo" were nothing more than the beginning of a phenomenon that will change forever some aspects of our society and our life.

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Appendix 1 – Characteristics of the Main Field Surveys on Foreign Immigrants in Italy: 1984-2007^(a)

Body/group in charge and title of the research study	Period of survey	Geographical reference	Nationality surveyed	Categories considered	Number of interviews
Inter-university survey on "Foreign Immigration in Italy"	1984/88	11 Italian regions (entire region or sub-regional areas)	Single nationalities or areas of origin most recorded in the 11 regions	Active persons or students ^(b)	3,230
CENSIS survey on "Migrating and hosting: the different paths of integration"	1990	12 geographical areas (large municipalities)	16 nationalities	Age 14 and over	1,525
Inter-university survey on "Integration indicators"	1993-94	7 Italian regions (metropolitan municipalities or provincial areas)	Immigrants from LDCs and EECs	Age 14 and over	3,139
IRP-CNR survey on "Push and pull factors of international migration"	1997	3 provinces for the Egyptians and 6 provinces for the Ghanaians	Egyptians and Ghanaians	Age 18-65	1,526
Survey by the "La Sapienza" Univ. of Rome on "Job	1998	6 geographical areas (Naples, Caserta, Rome,	Albanians, former Yugoslavs,	Age 18-65	1,920

insertion, income and remittances sent by immigrants”		Vicenza, Verona and Treviso)	Moroccans, Poles and Romanians		
<i>InteMiGra</i> survey on “Foreign immigration in the Adriatic regions” Univ. of Modena and Reggio Emilia and <i>IREs</i> Emilia Romagna survey on “Working conditions and social integration of migrants” Survey by the “La Sapienza” Univ. of Rome on “Integration of immigrants in the Rome area”	1999/2000	7 Adriatic regions	Immigrants from LDCs and EECs	Age 15 and over	991
Inter-university survey on “The children of foreigners and of Italians” (ITAGEN2)	2001	Emilia-Romagna ^(c)	Immigrants from LDCs and EECs	Workers aged 14 and over	1,643
	2001	Rome Municipality	Filipinos, Moroccans, Peruvians and Romanians	Age 18 and over	1,297
	2005/06	48 provincial areas	Foreign and Italian young boys and girls	Junior high school students	20,964

Notes: (a) see table 3 for ISMU research activities. (b) Students were the only category considered in the survey conducted in Umbria and Marches. (c) Excluding the province of Ferrara.

Source: Conti, Gabrielli, Prati, Strozza (2010)

SUMMARY

The aim of this contribution is to sketch out the most important steps on field survey research as regard foreign migrants in Italy. We consider the main academic and institutional experiences that provided information on a heterogeneous territorial set through a shared frame of reference. This review starts from the 80s, when the first organic exploration on quantitative and qualitative knowledge of foreign immigration was accomplished, to nowadays when it seems gained a new level of maturity especially in terms of sampling methods of and heterogeneity of the institutions involved in the task of monitoring the increasing incoming of foreign immigrants with a medium or long project to settle in Italy.

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THE IRRESISTIBLE GROWTH OF IMMIGRATION IN ITALY¹

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1. Introduction

The number of foreigners in Italy has more than tripled in less than ten years, rising from 1.3 million counted in 2001 census to 4.2 in early 2010. This fast growth is attributable to the action of several factors. First, one should consider the high levels of income and production achieved from the country, especially in the central and northern areas where the presence of immigrants is higher. Secondly, it is not difficult to see behind the current trends the action of a series of structural imbalances of the country. Among these should be mentioned the lofty weight of the underground economy, the continuing low fertility, which led to a reduction in the native population aged between 15 and 39 years of 4.3 million units between 1991 and 2009, and a welfare system largely inadequate to cope with an aging process that brought the number of people over 65 years to 12.1 million in 2009 (including 2.3% with at least one form of disability). In sum, an increase of 3.3 million people in just eighteen years.

All these factors should be examined to try to find out what the elements are in Italian society that attract immigrants and to assess the weight they have had in determining such an intense growth in the phenomenon. This growth in size and timing is as high, if not higher, than even those recorded by countries of immigration from central and northern Europe during the Golden period of European labour migration (Bonifazi, 2010). The analysis will cover these causal factors, from demographic to economic and social, trying to highlight the interactions among them. This is an aspect of migration that has clear and important political fallout, because it aims to highlight the structural factors in the demand for foreign labour. The analysis of these factors will be supplemented by an attempt at empirical verification through the application of a regression model. Such a model will be used to verify the direction and intensity of the influence that these factors have on the size of the foreign resident population of working age at the provincial level.

¹ Paper prepared in the frame work of the Progetto Migrazioni of the Department of *Identità culturale* of National Research Council (CNR).

2. The size of the growth

Since the late 1970s of the last century, Italy has started to become a country of immigration and has seen a more and more sustained growth in the phenomenon. This trend has meant that the foreign presence has assumed more and more weight and importance both in absolute and relative terms (Table 1). From the 211,000 registered foreign residents in 1981, Italy arrived at 4.2 million in 2010, representing 7% of the entire population. The annual growth rates of the phenomenon moved from the already high 5.4% in the years 1981-1991 to a much more substantial 14.1% and 13.7% in the next two decades (Table 2). Although the increase in foreigners has been widespread, the phenomenon has marked regional differences. On January 1, 2010 foreigners legally resident in the South amounted, in fact, to about 555,000 units against 3,680,000 in the Centre-North. In relative terms, this means moving from 2.7 to 9.4% of the total population.

Table 1 – Resident foreign population in Italian divisions, 1981-2010.

Divisions	1981	1991	2001	2010
Absolute values (in thousands)				
Centre-North	161.9	287.7	1158.7	3680.4
South	49.0	68.5	176.2	554.6
Italy	210.9	356.2	1334.9	4235.1
% on total				
Centre-North	0.4	0.8	3.2	9.3
South	0.2	0.3	0.9	2.7
Italy	0.4	0.6	2.3	7.0

Source: Istat data of Censuses and population registers

When viewing the provinces and considering only the most recent period (2001-2009), the absolute increase of foreigners in 4 provinces has even exceeded 100,000 units (100,000 Brescia, Torino 131,000, Milan and Rome 224,000 and 237,000). In relative terms, the increase within the same time frame was less than a doubling in just four provinces (Trieste, Brindisi, Palermo and Biella). In 52

provinces, the multiplication factor is between 2 and 3, in 43 provinces between 3 and 4, and in 8 provinces the foreign population has more than quadrupled (Ravenna, Rovigo, Lodi, Pavia, Venice, Latina, Ferrara and Salerno).

The main factor for this growth is still represented by the flow of immigration from abroad. Although in fact a dynamic and growing positive natural population change (the natural balance of foreigners from 2003 to 2008 has more than doubled from 31,000 to 68,000 units), net migration with other countries is by far the most important variation of the total foreign population. Suffice to say that in 2007-2008, the excess of registrations and cancellations of foreigners in population registers to and from foreign countries amounted to 964 thousand units.

Table 2 – *Compound annual growth rates of the resident foreign population in Italian divisions, 1981-2010.*

Divisions	1981-91	1991-01	2001-10
Centre-North	5.9	14.9	13.7
South	3.4	9.9	13.6
Italy	3.4	14.1	13.7

Source: *calculations from Istat data of Censuses and population registers*

This extraordinary growth in the foreign population, which occurred mainly for economic reasons, has significantly changed the composition of the labour force in the country. In the 2001 Census, foreigners in labour force, employment and unemployment accounted for about 3 percent of each total. In 2010 the incidence of foreigners in the labour force and employment has tripled, while the weight of the foreign component of the unemployed has quadrupled (table 3). In the second quarter of 2010, the latest available data, the foreign labour force amounted to 2 million 377 thousand people of which 2,100,000 were employed and 276,000 were job-seekers. In 2001, instead, the number amounted to 724,000, of which 636,000 were employed and 88,000 unemployed. It is interesting to note that a growth in foreign labour force continued during the economic crisis. Between 2007 and 2010, in fact, while the Italian workers decreased by more than 800,000 units, foreigners employed showed an increase of 600 thousand units. This growth of foreign employment could be a statistical effect of the lag between the entry of immigrants in the country and their enrolment in population registers (Cingano et al., 2010).

Table 3 – Foreign labour force in Italy, 2001-2010.

Labour force	2001	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010*
Absolute values (in thousands)							
Employed	636	1,169	1,348	1,502	1,751	1,898	2,101
Unemployed	88	132	127	136	162	239	276
Labour force	724	1,302	1,476	1,638	1,913	2,137	2,377
% on total							
Employed	3.0	5.2	5.9	6.5	7.5	8.2	9.1
Unemployed	3.2	7.0	7.6	9.0	9.6	12.3	13.2
Labour force	3.0	5.3	6.0	6.6	7.6	8.6	9.5

*II Quarter

Source: Istat data, Census (2001) and labour force survey

In Italy, unlike the older countries of immigration, foreigners activity rates and employment rates are higher than the native population rates (Reyneri and Fullin 2008). Overall in 2009 the activity rate for foreigners is higher than that of the Italians by 11.1 percentage points (72.7 to 61.6%) while the differential in the employment rate is 7.6 percentage points (64.5 to 56.9%) (Table 4). These averages are, in truth, affected by very strong macro-regional differences and equally strong gender differences (Bonifazi, 2007; Bonifazi, Rinesi, 2009; Istat, 2009). In the North, market participation by foreign workers is only slightly greater than that of the Italians and the employment rate, albeit very little, is higher among the indigenous population. In the South, on the contrary, there are 14 percentage points of difference between the two indicators in favour of foreigners and in the Centre the advantage for foreigners is smaller than in the South.

When we examine instead the overall levels of unemployment, we see a state of relative disadvantage for foreigners, who have a proportion of the labour force unemployed at 11.2 % to 7.6 % for Italians. In this case, however, the disadvantage for foreigners is all concentrated in the north-central areas, while in the South, the unemployment rate for foreigners compared to Italians' is less than 3.4 percentage points and is even less than that for foreigners in other areas.

Table 4 – Activity, employment, and unemployment rates by citizenship, gender, and division (%), average 2009.

Division	Activity rates		Employment rates		Unemployment rates	
	For.	Ita.	For.	Ita.	For.	Ita.
	Males					
North-West	87.6	77.0	77.9	73.7	11.2	4.3
North-Est	86.9	77.2	79.4	74.6	8.7	3.3
Center	86.5	75.6	77.7	71.6	10.1	5.4
South	79.5	66.0	73.5	58.6	7.6	11.2
Italy	86.2	72.7	77.7	67.9	9.9	6.6
	Females					
North-West	59.6	60.1	51.7	56.4	13.2	6.2
North-Est	58.9	61.1	51.4	58.0	12.8	5.1
Center	65.3	56.3	56.4	51.5	13.7	8.7
South	51.8	35.7	45.9	30.1	11.4	15.6
Italy	59.9	50.4	52.1	45.9	13.0	9.0
	Total					
North-West	73.8	68.6	65.0	65.1	12.0	5.1
North-Est	72.9	69.2	65.3	66.4	10.4	4.0
Center	75.1	66.0	66.2	61.5	11.8	6.8
South	64.2	50.7	58.3	44.3	9.3	12.7
Italy	72.7	61.6	64.5	56.9	11.2	7.6

Source: Istat data of labour force survey

3. The Italy of immigration between wealth and structural imbalances

3.1 The Italy of wealth


Although Italy has been characterized in the first decade of this century by a slow or negative economic growth, the current level of wealth is largely higher than for those countries represented among the foreign communities residing in Italy. Suffice to say that the difference in gross domestic product per capita at

purchasing power parity for the 27 EU countries, between Italy and Romania - which has the highest foreign citizenship in Italy - amounted in 2009 to about 13,300 euro, with a ratio of more than 2 to 1, the values being respectively 24,000 and 10,700 euro. In recent years Italy has experienced, firstly a low growth and then a severe recession that has brought the value of real gross domestic product in 2009 to about the one of 2000 (Istat, 2010). This has also pushed down the average value of GDP per capita, already affected by the growth in population brought about by immigration. Even from a comparative perspective with other EU countries, Italy has lost weight and position over the years. In the nominal GDP per capita in purchasing power parity of the EU-27, the Italian value fell from 120 in 1995 to 112 in 2002 to 102 in 2009 of the EU-27, hence falling by a substantial 20 percent to 2 percent in just fifteen years. Italy's GDP per capita at purchasing power parity was greater than the average EU-15 until 2001, after which the country recorded lower values in the following years until it reached a difference of 2,000 euro at current prices in 2009, values being respectively 24 and 26 thousand euro. But if you look at the Italian divisions, even if united by the same downward trend in recent years, very strong differences emerge. In 2007, for example, levels of wealth in the Centre-North were higher than both the average of the EU-27 and the EU-15 and more specifically for the North such values are even higher than the average values of the largest and most important EU countries such as France, Germany and the United Kingdom, while the average values for the South and the Islands, quite similar, both are below the average of EU-15 and EU-27 and thus extremely low when compared to northern and central Italy. Being 100 the GDP per capita of EU-27, we have a value of 124 in the North-West, the area's richest region, and a value of 68 in the South, the area of Italy most economically backward, and a ratio of about 2 to 1 between the two areas, the values being respectively 31,400 and 17,100 euro.

Figure 1 shows the trend of GDP per capita at purchasing power parity of some Italian provinces compared to the average EU-15. We have considered the top three provinces for absolute amount of foreign residents in 2009 (Milan, Rome and Turin) and the first three provinces affected by the foreign population in the total population (Brescia, Prato and Mantua). While it appears the phenomenon already noted earlier of a general decrease, on the other hand it is evident that in all the areas considered, the levels of wealth have certainly been an important factor of attraction. In 1995, as compared to the average of the EU-15, the wealth of the province of Milan was greater than 60 percent, in Rome, Brescia and Prato more than 30 percent and in the provinces of Turin and Piacenza GDP was higher than 20 percent. These differences have steadily decreased over the years, but in 2007 all values are still more or less markedly above the average EU-15, with the

exception of the province of Prato, which has the same GDP per capita at purchasing power parity of EU-15.

Figure 1 – Gross domestic product per capita in PPS (EU15=100 in each year) in some Italian provinces, 1995-2007.




Source: Eurostat database

The strong direct relationship between wealth and the foreign presence on Italian territory is well depicted in figure 2. The impact of the foreign population (at January 1, 2009) strongly increases at the provincial level with the increase of the added value (2007). In the lower left of fig 2 are almost all the provinces in the South with a value added per capita of less than 18,000 euro and an impact by the foreign population of less than 4 percent in all areas of the South except in the province of Ragusa (value added less than 16,000 euro and incidence of foreigners by 5.2%). In the top right there are only north-central provinces, where the incidence of the foreign population is not less than 8% achieved in areas with a value added hardly less than 24,000 euro. Exceptions are the provinces of Terni, Perugia, Macerata, Asti, Imperia and Pistoia, which all have high levels of foreign presence with lower levels of wealth (especially in the provinces of Perugia and Terni, respectively, we have an added value of 20,976 and 22,063 euro and an impact by the foreign population of 8.0 and 10.2%). Provinces with a value exceeding 28,000 euro per capita all have extremely high values due to the foreign

impact: Vicenza (added value amounting to 28,067 euro and the impact of foreigners 10.5%), Reggio Emilia (EUR 28,233 and 11.4 % of foreigners), Forli-Cesena (28,563 euro and 9.0% of foreigners), Parma (28 631 euro to 10.6% of foreigners), Brescia (28 801 euro and 12.2% of foreigners), Mantua (29 448 euro and 11.4% of foreigners), Bergamo (29 475 euro and 9.5% of foreigners), Rome (29,650 euro and 8.9% of foreigners), Modena (30 613 euro and 11.1% foreign), Bologna (30,977 euro and 8.9% of foreigners) and Milan (34,228 euro and 9.5% of foreigners).

Figure 2 – Relationship between value added per capita (2007) and incidence of foreigners (2009) in Italian provinces.



Source: Istat data

3.2 Italy's Structural imbalances

High levels of wealth can now be enjoyed in Italy but should deal with some important structural imbalances, due to both some characteristics of the production structure and the intensity and velocity of recent demographic trends also in relation to the inadequacy of welfare system in responding to them.

A structural imbalance in Italy is undoubtedly represented by the weight of the underground or black economy. From a strictly economic point of view, the most recent estimates of value added product from the undeclared economic sphere is no less than 255 billion euro. A figure that represents 16.3 percent of the Italian gross domestic product (Istat, 2010). Over 100 billion euro of value added produced in undeclared work is attributable to the use of non-regular workers, i.e., that set of labour services that do not comply, in whole or in part, to regulations. In the first decade of this century in Italy the amount of non-regular work units, or the number of full-time equivalent jobs, was not particularly variable staying around 3 million, which corresponds to a rate of irregularity of about 12 percent. At the level of the productive sector, in 2008, the deficiency is particularly evident in the primary sector, where 1 worker in 4 (Ula) is irregular. It is less strong in services where 13.5% are irregular, while the rate in the industry in general shows that irregularity is much lower and equal to 5.7 percent. However, if you make distinctions within the same economic activity in the secondary sector, there is much more widespread irregularity in construction with 9.8 percent of total Ula, rather than in industries excluding construction that are equal to 4.0 percent of Ula, while in the domestic sector we find a 50% of Ula that is irregular. The majority of economic activities in the phenomenon of irregularity are thus precisely those where the supply of foreign labor is particularly high and compensated for the unsatisfied demand from the local workforce.

A second important structural imbalance is closely linked to the Italian demographic trends that have affected for at least thirty years the country. From a demographic point of view, Italy is one country that for thirty years has had, on the one hand, the lowest levels of fertility and birth rates but on the other, the higher survival levels.

The total fertility rate in Italy fell below the replacement level of generations in the second half of the 70s of last century and reached a low of 1.19 children per woman in 1995. It has only been in recent years that we have seen a slight recovery in the value of the indicator, which in 2008 stood at 1.42 children per woman. This is largely due to the contribution of foreign women². The effects of this persistent low fertility is twofold: to significantly reduce the Italian population of working age in some areas of the country (Table 5); producing a deep and widespread bleeding in the youngest members of the population of working age, that being a 5 million reduction in the Italian population aged 15-34 from 1991 to 2009. The foreign presence in the working age has more than replaced the decline in the Italian population of this age group. More so in northern Italy, being more involved

² In 2008 the TFR of foreign women was 2.31 children per woman, while the value for Italian women was 1.32.

with this bleeding than southern Italy, where the reduction was far less evident. From the 1991 Census, the Centre-North in the face of a reduction in the Italian population in the age group 15-64 years was 2.162 million, registered an increase in the foreign population in the same macro age class of 2.416 million individuals. As a result, this led to a positive balance of 254 000 people. About the same balance was recorded in the South at the same time, where people aged 15-64 years increased by 208,000 units because of the decrease in the Italian population, it being " only " 145 thousand people, and an increase in foreign visitors amounting to 353,000 individuals. Overall, therefore, the country can count on about half a million more people of working age from 1 January 2009 to the date of the Census of 1991, due to an increase of 2.8 million units recorded in this age group in the foreign population.

Table 5 – *Changes in working-age (15-64 years) population, 1991, 2001, 2009 (absolute values in thousands).*

Years	Centre-North	South	Italy
Italian Population			
1991-2001	-1,457	-111	-1,568
2001-2009	-705	-34	-739
1991-2009	-2,162	-145	-2,306
Foreign Population			
1991-2001	659	86	745
2001-2009	1,757	267	2,023
1991-2009	2,416	353	2,769
Total Population			
1991-2001	-798	-24	-822
2001-2009	1,052	232	1,285
1991-2009	254	208	462

Source: *calculations on Istat data of censuses and population registers.*

In contrast to fertility, survival levels of the Italian population have grown steadily, so that the life expectancy from birth for females reached 84 years in 2007, from the 76.6 years in 1977, while that of males reached 78.7 from the 69.9 it was thirty years before. The general increase in life expectancy at all ages has increased the absolute number of elderly and very elderly. In particular, from the 1991 Census to the 2009, the population with Italian citizenship and with more than

65 years increased by 3.3 million, reaching 12 million individuals (Table 6), while the population over 80 years increased by about one and a half million units in the same time period, reaching 3.4 million. On a regional basis, the positive change in the elderly and very elderly was much stronger in the Centre-North than the South, with a ratio of about 2 to 1, since the growth of people over 65 in central and northern Italy was 2.2 million compared to 1.1 million in southern Italy, while the increase of over eighty values were respectively equal to 943,000 and 451,000.

Table 6 – *Changes in population aged 65 years and over, 1991, 2001, 2009 (absolute values in thousands).*

Years	Centre-North	South	Italy
Italian Population			
1991-2001	1,233	685	1,918
2001-2009	1,003	399	1,403
1991-2009	2,236	1,085	3,321
Foreign Population			
1991-2001	24	3	27
2001-2009	32	5	37
1991-2009	56	8	64
Total Population			
1991-2001	1,257	688	1,946
2001-2009	1,035	404	1,439
1991-2009	2,292	1,093	3,385

Source: *see table 5.*

The extraordinary increase in the elderly and older population has meant a strong increase in the population with disabilities. The latest figures available, although not recent, indicate that in 2004/2005 the over sixty five year olds with disabilities living in the household were more than 2 million, of which 1.2 million were over 80 years (Table 7). Despite significant regional differences, the rate of institutionalization of people with disabilities is generally extremely low, “so that in our country the main instrument of support for people with disabilities and their families is the system of monetary transfers, both in the way of a pension and assistance. Therefore, there remains a lack of formal healthcare services by way of the healthcare system. This gap inevitably falls on the families who continue to play this role and take care of most of the activities and areas of care and aid to

their family members in terms of disability "(Istat, 2010 p.11). In recent years Italian families have identified the figure of a new form of caregiver assistance in foreign *badanti*. The most conservative estimates say that the foreign caregivers in Italy are about 700,000 and that the cost for families is around 9 billion euro per year (IRS, 2008).

Table 7 – Disabled population in Italy according sex and age, 1999/00, 2004/05.

Years	Absolute values (in thousands)			Rates (%)		
	Males					
	65-79	80+	65+	65-79	80+	65+
1999/2000	333	260	593	9.6	38.7	14.3
2004/2005	294	328	622	7.8	35.8	13.3
Females						
	65-79	80+	65+	65-79	80+	65+
1999/2000	636	722	1,358	14.0	52.0	22.9
2004/2005	580	879	1,459	12.4	48.9	22.5
Total						
	65-79	80+	65+	65-79	80+	65+
1999/2000	970	982	1,952	12.1	47.7	19.4
2004/2005	873	1,207	2,080	10.4	44.5	18.7

Source: *Istat data*


4. An attempt at empirical verification

From this context, we have tried to analyze the type of relationship in recent years that has elapsed between the size of foreign population and pull factors considered above. To do so we tried to verify empirically, at the provincial level, the relationship between the incidence of the foreign population of working age and its possible determinants, which include economic, demographic and social factors as described previously.

The growth in migration in Italy, especially in reference to the last decade, is particularly evident when you consider the weight of the foreign component on the total working age population (15-64 years) (Fig. 3). As of 1 January 2009, the value of this indicator overtakes 8 percent in less than half of the 107 Italian provinces and it is higher than 10 percent in almost one province in every three.

About one third of the total did not reach the threshold of 4 percent. The impact of the foreign component of the total working age population strongly divides the provinces of the Centre North from the southern ones that still nowadays hold little attraction for international migration. In the South, with the exception of the provinces of Abruzzo and those of Olbia-Tempio, Ragusa and Reggio Calabria, the incidence is always inferior to 4 percent. The only provinces with a margin of less than 7 percent in the Centre North are Biella and Sondrio in the North and the Lazio provinces of Frosinone and Latina in the Centre. The highest value is found in the province of Piacenza, where one person aged 15-64 to 7 is a foreigner, as opposed to the small new Sardinian province of Middle Campidano where only 1 in 100 people are foreign nationals in the same age group. Figure 3 allows us to appreciate the growth in the foreign population of working age in just over 7 years. In 2001 only 19 provinces had rates above 4 percent and of these only three, Trieste, Vicenza, Prato, reached the threshold of 5 percent.

Figure 3 – Percentage of foreign working age population (2001; 2009).




Source: *Istat data*

From an economic point of view, it is clear that the most developed areas of the country appear to be an important destination for migrants. As a measure of

economic conditions the provincial value added per capita, value of production of goods and services provided by the various branches of production less the value of intermediate goods and services consumed by them, have been considered. This variable, as is known, presents very marked geographical differences (Fig. 4). For example, the provinces of the richest quartile, those with an income of over EUR 25,000, are all in the North with the exception being Rome and Florence. While the provinces with the poorest quartile, those with an income of less than 15 000 euro, are all in the South. The province with the highest added value in the South is Pescara, with a value of 18,169 euro. The province with the lowest value in the North is Verbano-Cusio-Ossola with a value of 19,356 euro. The value added of the richest province of Italy, Milan, is three times that of the poorest province, Middle Campidano, and the absolute difference is over 22 thousand euro, as the values of the two provinces amounted to 33,777 and 11,040 euro.

Figure 4 – Value added (left) and employment rate of working age population (right) (2005).



Source: Istat data

Just as the wealth produced in an area appears to be an important factor of attraction for international migration, so the chances of employment in local labour markets and the various provincial employment levels crucially affects the

direction and the consistency of the migratory flows. The indicator that we have chosen to use is the employment rate of the working-age population aged 15-64 years. That being the proportion of employees in the total population of the same age group (Fig. 4). The data tell us that: the provinces of the first quartile, where those employed are less than 50% of working age population, are located entirely in the South, while the provinces of the fourth quartile - those in which at least 2 out of 3 people are employed - are all in the North with the exception of the Tuscan provinces of Siena, Florence, Prato and Pistoia. The province of southern Italy with the highest employment rate of the population aged 15-64 years is that of Teramo with a value of 58.6 percent. The northern province with the lowest employment rate of the same population is that of Imperia with a value of 59.3 percent. The highest employment rate is in Reggio Emilia (70.8%) and it is 1.8 times greater than the lowest one which is in Crotona (39.6%), a difference of more than 30 percentage points.


In addition to economic and work related aspects, we have considered the demographic and social factors. The combined effect of persistent low fertility on the one hand, and increased life expectancy on the other, has caused a revolution in the age structure of the Italian population, with a significant reduction in the working age population and a huge increase in the old and very old populations. These demographics were synthesized with two indicators, one static and one dynamic, referring to the Italian population (Fig. 5). The static indicator considers the percentage of the working-age population in 2009 and provides us with a measure of potentially productive individuals in the provinces. The dynamic indicator, instead, is the change in percentage point of the incidence of people with more than eighty years between 2001 and 2009, which allows us to identify areas where, in recent years, there has been a higher potential work demand in health care due to the increase in the weight of very old population.

The lower incidence of age group 15-64 years is a problem today that concerns, almost exclusively, and in a generalized way the Centre-North. In fact, the 40 Italian provinces that have a proportion of working-age population of less than 64 percent are all concentrated in the Centre-North, although, within this macro area, only Bergamo and Lodi reach the value of 66 percent.

Among the provinces that have experienced the greatest change in the incidence of older people in terms of percentage points, namely those in the fourth quartile with a change of more than 1.22 percentage points, only three (Chieti, L'Aquila and Vibo Valentia) are not located in the Centre-North, and it is mainly the Centre (12 provinces) being the more represented, followed by the north-east (9 provinces) and north-west (3 provinces). The provinces in the first quartile with a variation in the incidence of over 80 years population of less than 0.72 percentage points are distributed more evenly, although they outweigh those of the South (14 provinces),


while the Centre is represented only by the province of Lucca. The variation range of such an indicator is wide and sees at its extremes two provinces in the same area, the North-West, since the minimum change of 0.11 points was recorded in the province of Vercelli, and the maximum of 1.85 points in the province of La Spezia.

Figure 5 – *Percentage of Italian population aged 15 to 64 in 2009 (left) and change in percentage points for Italian population aged 80 and over between 2001 and 2009 (right).*



Among the explanatory variables for the impact of the foreign population was the weight of the underground economy, which does not play a secondary role in Italy (Anastasia, Sestito, 2005; Reyneri, 2004) (Fig. 6). The lack of estimates for the underground economy at the provincial level has forced us to make some assumptions to construct the indicators used in the model. In particular, we have calculated two indicators: the level of irregularity, obtained by giving each province the regional average provided by ISTAT, and the weight of each province on the combined total irregular work. In this case, units of work by each province are calculated by multiplying the product of the total provincial Ula's by the total regional irregularity rates. There are, quite evidently, two very strong assumptions and they tend to crush the provincial variability due to the use of regional averages.

Figure 6 – Rate of irregularity of full-time equivalent workers as percentage of total full-time equivalent workers in 2005 (left) and irregular workers full-time equivalent as percentage of total national irregular workers in 2005 (right).



Source: Istat data

In general, the use of irregular labor is particularly evident in the southern regions, Campania and Sicily, for example, where one full-time job in 5 is irregular and in Calabria where it reaches 27 percent. Even in central and northern regions, albeit with lower levels, the phenomenon of undeclared work is present and significant. The region with the lowest values, Lombardy, still has a significant 7.8 per cent of Ula which is irregular. Liguria is instead the region of the area with the highest incidence of irregular employment, equal to 12.5 percent. Unlike the level of irregularity, the second indicator used highlights a growing value from north to south, with more diverse local situations clearly influenced by the population size of the provinces themselves. Based on our estimates, Rome, Naples, Milan, Turin, Bari and Palermo are the provinces with the highest number of irregular Ula. As a whole there are a total of 13 provinces in the centre north of the fourth quartile with the highest number of irregular jobs (after Rome, Milan and Turin, there are Genoa, Florence, Brescia, Bologna, Padua, Bergamo, Verona, Treviso, Vicenza and Perugia). Conversely, among the provinces in the first quartile, which have the

lowest distribution of irregular workers, there are 5 from the South (Ogliastra, Middle Campidano, Isernia, Carbonia-Iglesias and Enna).

To this information set, summarized in Table 8, was applied a multiple linear regression model. This model attempted to assess the effect of the explanatory variables identified by the demand for foreign labor, expressed in our work by the percentage of foreign population of working age compared to the total in each province (Table 8).

Table 8 – *Some statistics of variables in the model.*

VARIABLES	MIN	MAX	AVERAGE	COEFF. OF VARIATION
Working age (15-64) foreign population (% of total working age population. 2009)	0.8 Medio Campidano	14.0 Piacenza	7.3	52.9
Italian population aged 15 to 64 (% of total population. 2009)	59.4 Trieste	69.8 Cagliari	64.7	3.1
Change in percentage points for italian population aged 80 and over 2001-2009	0.11 Vercelli	1.85 La Spezia	0.99	34.4
Value added (basic prices; current euro. 2005)	11 040 Medio Campidano	33 777 Milano	20 462	25.3
Employment rate for persons aged 15 to 64 (%. 2005)	39.6 Crotone	70.8 Reggio nell'Emilia	57.7	15.4
Rate of irregularity of full-time equivalent workers (% of total full-time equivalent workers. 2005)	7.8 Lombardia	26.9 Calabria	13.3	42.8
Irregular workers full-time equivalent (% of total national irregular workers. 2005)	0.93 Ogliastra	7.39 Roma	0.93	119.6

Source: *Istat data*

Most of the results is clearly in the expected direction (Table 9). From a socio-economic point of view, high employment levels and wealth denote a higher weight of foreign population, since the coefficients of such variables are highly significant and positive, especially for added value. From a demographic point of view, on one hand the relatively high numbers of Italian citizens of working age significantly restrains the incidence of foreign population. However, on the other, a

higher speed in the ageing process increases the demand for foreign workers. The situation is different in the case of the role played by irregular labour. The regional average rate of irregularity of work units applied to all the provinces has a regression coefficient that is negative but not significantly different from zero (model 1). Similarly, the coefficient of the distribution of the total of the irregular working units turns out not to be significant, but rather, positive (model 2). It would appear that the incidence and level of undeclared work does not affect, positively or negatively, the regular presence of a foreign population of working age, depending on the socio-economic, occupational and demographic context expressed through the other utilized variables. But we must consider that the lack of provincial data forced us to use indicators constructed with assumptions that, inevitably, heavily influenced the variability of the provinces.

Table 9 – Multiple linear regression model of working age foreign population.

Independent variables	Model 1		Model 2	
	Coeff	St. error	Coeff	St. error
Constant	11,55	8,73	9,41	8,40
Value added (basic prices; thousand current euro. 2005)	0,33 ***	0,08	0,32 ***	0,09
Italian population aged 15 to 64 (% of total population. 2009)	-0,28 *	0,11	-0,29 *	0,11
Employment rate for persons aged 15 to 64 (%. 2005)	0,12 *	0,06	0,16 **	0,06
Change in percentage points for italian population aged 80 and over. 2001-2009	1,14 *	0,55	1,15 *	0,55
Rate of irregularity of full-time equivalent workers (% of total full-time equivalent workers. 2005)	-0,06	0,07		
Irregular workers full-time equivalent (% of total national irregular workers. 2005)			0,09	0,19
R ² corrected	0,80		0,80	

*** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05

5. Conclusion

The value of R^2 is, in both models 80% of total variability, which demonstrates its high explanatory power. Empirical analysis carried out essentially confirmed the hypothesis of a close causal relationship between the size of the foreign population of working age and the attractive factors of economic, demographic and social nature. Italy has achieved, especially in the Centre-North, income levels and participation in the labor market that would constitute, if only for this, an important potential goal for international migration. If to these elements we add the demographic factors, represented in our analysis by the share of the Italian population of working age and the growth in percentage points of the 80 years and older ages, one can explain a decisively high proportion of the total variability.

This confirms that during the 90's, and more intensely in the current decade, the growth in immigration in Italy resulted from a demand for foreign workers from industry and households due to the combined pressures of a different nature (Allasino et al., 2004; Ambrosini, 1999; 2005; Bonifazi, Chiri, 2001; Bonifazi et al., 2008; Cangiano, Strozza, 2005). This situation would suggest a more pragmatic approach is needed to the problem. An approach able to take into account the relevant pull factors existing in Italian society. In fact, immigration has so far been a not-planned response to the problems posed by the economic, demographic and social regimes of the country. But it is well known that it can not be a long-term solution to these problems. An aging population, a declining population of working age, and structural deficiencies of the welfare system, are mitigated by immigration. However they ask for a more complex political action. The analysis has, in fact, confirmed that immigration in Italy is strongly demand-driven, which suggests the inclusion of migration policies within a global approach in which the structural determinants of the flows and their direct and indirect effects must be considered in detail (Golini, 2005). In this way, you might also highlight the positive contribution of immigration and transfer the political debate onto more pragmatic grounds, even with positive effects on the perception of the problem to the public.

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SUMMARY

The number of foreigners in Italy has more than tripled in less than ten years, rising from 1.3 million counted in 2001 census to 4.2 in early 2010. This fast growth is attributable to the action of several factors. First, one should consider the high levels of income and production achieved from the country, especially in the central and northern areas where the presence of immigrants is higher. Secondly, it is not difficult to see behind the current trends the action of a series of structural imbalances of the country. Among these should be mentioned the lofty weight of the underground economy, the continuing low fertility and a welfare system largely inadequate to cope with a relevant aging process. All these factors have been examined to try to find out what the elements are in Italian society that attract immigrants and to assess the weight they have had in determining such an intense growth in the phenomenon. The analysis covers these causal factors, from demographic to economic and social, trying to highlight the interactions among them. Empirical analysis carried out essentially confirmed the hypothesis of a close causal relationship between the size of the foreign population of working age and the attractive factors of economic, demographic and social nature. Italy has achieved, especially in the Centre-North, income levels and participation in the labour market that constitute an important potential goal for international migration. If to these elements we add the demographic factors, represented in our analysis by the share of the Italian population of working age and the growth in percentage points of the 80 years and older ages, one can explain a decisively high proportion of the total variability. This confirms that during the 90's, and more intensely in the current decade, the growth in immigration in Italy resulted from a demand for foreign workers from industry and households due to the combined pressures of a different nature.

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FOREIGN IMMIGRANTS' PROBLEMS AND INTEGRATION PROCESSES IN ITALY

Vincenzo Cesareo

1. Introduction

The recent growth of the migrant population in our country, which from the 1,300,000 units reported in 1998 has now reached a total amount of 5 million persons (4.6 million of whom originating from the so-called heavy migration pressure countries), along with the process of migrants' taking roots all over our country – evidenced by the high number of families, of minors born in Italy, and resident immigrants who buy a house – is posing us the urgent problem of their integration in the Italian society. Over the last few years, this theme, which involves several disciplinary areas, has assumed new relevance also in our country, and has increasingly become the focus of attention not only for social scientists, but also for mass media, lawmakers, and policy-makers, who find themselves to face with and to interpret a society that is quickly changing also from an ethnic and cultural point of view. But what do we actually mean by the word “integration”?

2. A definition of integration

We often make use of words without explaining their precise meaning, and in some cases, this term has even been contested, as it has been judged unfit to properly describe immigrants' complex reception and settlement process. Therefore, we think it necessary to define what do we actually mean by the term integration, to examine the distinguishing features of this process more in depth, and to explain their actual meaning.

Consistently with this purpose, we think it is worth to briefly dwell upon the definition of the concept of integration, which is undoubtedly complex and dynamic, as the meaning of it may change over time and space depending on the historical and political circumstances and on the characteristics the migratory phenomenon can take. Over the last few decades, several formulations have been proposed, which assume different ideological visions and theoretical approaches. We meet with different positions as regards the dilemma between a universalistic perspective, according to which the peculiarities of a particular culture are destined

to disappear in favour of the universal values of culture and right, and a relativistic perspective, which assumes there is no single and universally effective standard for comparing individual cultures.

The idea that migrants' integration is both a multi-dimensional process, since it concerns a variety of elements, and a bidirectional process, because it does not only involve the newcomers, but - at least to some extent - also the local populations, is widely shared. Furthermore, migrants' integration depends on a plurality of factors, which refer to: adopted policies on migration, working and educational opportunities offered by the host society, distance between the culture of the country of origin and that of the host country, to which we should also add the dynamics of the migratory process and the reasons that induced these persons to emigrate. Therefore, an analysis of integration needs to be always contextualized, since it actually depends on the context in which it takes place. As a consequence, some policies concerning the governance of migration processes may prove to be effective in some contexts, but not in others.

To this concise reference to the problematic and complex issue of integration, we would also add that integration is studied but at a macro-level, that is to say, by focusing the attention on some specific elements of the policies adopted towards immigrants, on the structural and cultural conditions which can facilitate or become a hindrance to integration, and at a micro-level, by focusing our analysis on a particular kind of migrant (or group of migrants), trying to understand how this migrant has lived and is living his integration experience.

For the research we refer to hereafter, we adopted the second approach, the micro-perspective, for the purpose of closely studying the personal experiences and the problems encountered by migrant persons over their migration process. We therefore adopted the definition of integration as a *multi-dimensional process aimed at ensuring peaceful coexistence, within a specific historical and social reality, between culturally and/or ethnically different individuals or groups, based on a mutual respect of their ethnic and cultural diversity, provided that these differences do not prejudice the fundamental human rights and do not jeopardize the democratic institutions*. Integration is a process which needs to be accomplished over time. It is a goal that cannot be achieved once for all, but has to be constantly pursued and implemented at an economic, cultural, social and political level. Because of its multi-dimensional nature, if exclusively limited to one area, it will be necessarily achieved only in part. Each of these different areas generates, in turn, different integration levels. Therefore, for example, there can be the case of a high economic integration level against a scarce or inexistent social or political integration (or vice versa). These different dimensions may take place

diachronically over time. Finally, integration is a bidirectional process, as it does not only concern migrants, but also, and jointly, the citizens of the host country.

In developing this definition, which might be subject to some criticism, we aimed at ensuring an internal coherence, and at re-establishing the centrality of the concept of person, that is to say, the idea of immigrant intended as a person. This definition gives us also the opportunity to identify a *continuum*, the ends of which are, on the one hand, integration meant as assimilation, or the loss of newcomers' own values, norms and behavioural patterns in favour of the acquisition of the cultural patterns and expectations of the host society (assimilationist paradigm); on the other, the maintenance and creation of ethnic enclaves, in which the contacts with the social context in which they are included are limited to those that are merely functional to their survival (radical neo-communitarian paradigm).

3. The research project: four integration indexes

This definition represents the starting point of a research project carried out on a national scale and coordinated by Fondazione ISMU, which involved several municipalities and 32 different Italian contexts between the end of 2008 and the first months of 2009. For this inquiry, more than 12,000 subjects were interviewed face-to-face, according to a sampling method based on specific meeting centres and places. The inquiry had the purpose of measuring migrants' personal integration levels in the Italian society from an economic, social, political and cultural point of view, by applying for the first time, at an empirical level, an index that allows understanding migrants' integration degree such as they are experiencing it.

Being the purpose of this inquiry a measurement of immigrants' integration level in its different aspects, we considered it necessary to investigate the following areas: knowledge and use of the Italian language; interest in the Italian events; access to information; sense of belonging to the Italian society; self-perception of one's well-being in Italy; and sharing degree of some ideals concerning integration, such as: indexes of cultural integration levels; friendly relations, participation in associations; levels of satisfaction concerning the Italian lifestyle; likings and tendencies as useful elements to determine migrants' social integration; legal status; registration with the Registry Office; migrants' opinion on the importance of citizenship in order to determine their political integration; housing and working conditions, and saving capacity as immigrants' economic integration factors. Finally, the four cultural, social, political and economic integration indexes were grouped into a single overall integration index.

A first result of our research concerns the mean value of the four different integration indexes, which is higher in the economic sphere, followed on par by

cultural and political integration, and finally by social integration. This first datum points out the multi-dimensional aspect of integration.

It concerns, in fact, different dimensions in a migrant person's life, namely the economic, the social, the cultural and the political dimension, as in each of these spheres the integration process can take place in different ways and in different times. As a consequence, a fast integration may be achieved, for example, from an economic point of view but not in political terms. Therefore, it is necessary to analytically examine each dimension, without omitting the possibility to attain also a synthetic index, which simultaneously takes the other dimensions into account.

With a 0.50 overall mean integration index, we can reasonably affirm that the migration universe can be placed halfway between the ideal model of those who attain the highest marks in all tests, and those who, on the contrary, attain the lowest marks.

A second result refers to territorial differences. A quite varied reality, which confirms the multi-dimensional features of integration processes, as well as their dependence on structural and environmental factors, emerged from our research.

The 32 local units in which the inquiry was carried out, show mean values of the overall index ranging from a minimum of 0.40 to a maximum of 0.57, which in most cases (14) gather in the 0.48-0.53 interval.

Now, we would like to examine this territorial differentiation more in detail, and consider the territorial units in which the inquiry was carried out.

The overall index ranking reports the primacy of the province of Trent, after which the provinces of Ravenna, Modena, Campobasso/Isernia and Turin improve their ranking – with respect to non-standard values -, while the provinces of Massa-Carrara and Chieti step back. At the bottom of the list, the provinces of Bari and Catania step back, while the provinces of Naples and Pistoia improve their ranking.

Compared to the single territorial dimensions, standard values report the primacy of the province of Trent in terms of cultural and social integration, while we find the province of Ravenna at the top of the list from the point of view of political and economic integration. The tail-ender position is held by the province of Pescara in three of the four examined areas – namely the social, political and economic areas – ,which in turn is ousted by the province of Pisa only from the point of view of cultural integration.

A few considerations and comments could be made as regards the connection existing between migrants' nationality and integration level. Though no particularly significant differences have been reported, both at a national and a provincial level, we can however note that the most integrated group is the one originating from Latin America.

Going into details, collected data by nationality reveal that the top position in the list is held by the Brazilian group, the second place by the Dominican group, and the third place by the Albanian group, while at the bottom of the list, we find the Ukrainian, Nigerian, Senegalese, and Bangladeshi groups.

As our research points out, migrants' integration level seems to be tightly related to individual factors. The highest integration levels are reported among: women; married persons (especially those married with Italian citizens) who live with their children; those who have achieved a high educational qualification and have a relatively high income; those who have lived in Italy for many years (to a large extent, for more than 15 years); those who live with their family and in an independent house or flat; those who keep scarce relations, in terms of family ties and economic support (remittances), with their countries of origin.

These results point out, on the contrary, that the profile of those less integrated is moderately more angled towards the male gender, which is less characterized by family ties, but reports in average low income rates, fairly modest educational qualification levels, a shorter migration seniority, and above all shares an accommodation with other subjects (relatives and/or friends).

4. Conclusions

Integration is a complex phenomenon, which also depends on external factors in a position to either encourage or discourage it. Among these elements, a first structural element, which seems to affect – in this case negatively - the integration process, consists in the strong impact migration flows have had on the Italian society, from both a quantitative and a temporal point of view (as they have come to our country over a very short time span). A second element is represented by the density of migrants' presence, as their integration level decreases as their number grows, whereas in contexts in which there is a lower presence of migrants, their integration seems more successful. This is undoubtedly a quite significant datum, as it points out the issue of migration flow sustainability.

Other drawbacks, mainly of a "cultural" nature, seem to slow down the integration processes, such as for example, an intensification of ethnic prejudice, that is to say, the negative representations – based on stereotypes and clichés – of those who share a particular ethnic marker. This prejudice – which, we should bear in mind, is always bidirectional – often is not a result of direct interaction, but instead, of the culture one belongs to. A further element of resistance against migrants' integration consists in the ever-growing awareness and attention paid by the local population to the theme of security, though we should note that, in

general, those who report higher criminality rates are irregular and illegal migrants, while regular migrants commit crimes in a proportion that scarcely exceeds the Italians' share.

In addition, the spreading of mixophobic attitudes, which contribute to fuel cases of racism and xenophobia, makes migrants' effective inclusion in the host society increasingly difficult. The fear of living side-by-side with someone different – whether an immigrant or a poor – leads to the creation of homogeneous spaces, which in turn, in a vicious spiral, fuel the fear of getting mixed with the other.

Finally, we believe it necessary to stress once again the need to combine our reception willingness with the respect of coexistence rules. This involves, in the first place, promoting a culture of solidarity capable to fight against any stereotype, cliché, and prejudice, as well as a culture of legality. At the same time, the development and spreading of a culture of solidarity is to be hoped for not only for the purpose of fighting stereotypes, clichés and prejudice, but above all, for the purpose of countering a rampant surge of individualism, which is spreading in our society. To this end, the commitment of educational institutions and mass media becomes essential, as the latter are often inclined to represent with alarmist tones the migratory phenomenon, which has become structural in our country and, according to forecasts, seems destined to further grow in the near future. But we also need to have effective migratory policies at our disposal, capable to ensure both the governance of migrants' entries and, at the same time, compliance with rules.

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SUMMARY

Fondazione Ismu carried out, in close collaboration with several bodies and organizations, a wide-ranging research on a national scale aimed at “measuring” migrants’ integration processes. This empirical inquiry considered in particular the multi-dimensionality of migrants’ integration process. Four dimensions of the integration process were specifically investigated, namely, the economic, the political, the cultural, and the social dimension. This inquiry, which involved many provinces and municipalities throughout Italy, is based on the data collected from a structured questionnaire handed out, between the end of 2008 and the first months of 2009, to more than 12,000 foreign nationals living in Italy.

The results of this inquiry revealed a variety of quite differentiated realities from a territorial point of view, and allowed the researchers to back up and confirm the original hypotheses of this study concerning the multi-dimensionality of the integration process, as well as its dependence on structural, environmental and personal factors. Furthermore, it was possible to create a list of nationalities basing on their respective integration indexes, and to identify the individual characteristics more strictly related to the migrant population’s higher or lower integration level.

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INTERNAL MIGRATION – AN IMPORTANT SIGNAL OF THE SEGMENTATION OF THE LABOUR MARKET IN ITALY

Enrico Del Colle

1. Introduction

It is well known that migration is a very complex phenomenon open to different, difficult interpretations both on the cultural and the socio-economic level. Furthermore, unlike other demographic variables, its effects appear very quickly, as they react strongly to the pressure exerted, for instance, by the economic system. In fact, the migratory variable – since it can quickly move massive groups of people – produces even deep changes in the structures of territories and their populations. On the other hand, the knowledge itself of the migratory phenomenon appears to be always in progress in Italy – above all in an historical age like the current one when all the old schemes of reference seem obsolete. First of all, we can affirm that the demographic balance in Italy has recently registered positive signals thanks to the migratory component only, whose net contribution has widely offset a natural negative balance (the number of births minus the number of deaths). Therefore, migrants have assured some recent demographic vitality to our country, even if the latest data (2009) show a slowdown of about 100,000 units (from 550,000 to 450,000 approximately) in such a contribution.

In the light of such schematic situation and focusing on internal mobility only, we argue that a behavioural model – in terms of territorial strands and migrants' "profile" – is emerging and that it is very different from the past ones. In fact, beyond the rushing South-to-North migratory waves, it is clear, just at the beginning of the 21st century, the emerging of a set of very different trends suggested by reasons and strands that have in common a greater territorial balance.

These trends are undoubtedly led by labour markets, which nowadays represent non homogeneous realities – thus enabling, as a consequence, the segmentation processes to create separate, little or not communicating at all areas.

If we reflect upon labour market and its qualitative and quantitative imbalances, we can verify that labour market and its territorial differentiation give migration a well-established role: since they play a stimulating role, they prove to be factors of redistribution of human resources when significant changes are taking place as regards employment in the different areas of the country. In other words, migratory dynamics, seen as a signal of territorial imbalance within the labour market, aims at

carrying out an action of consolidation and reorganisation in comparison with those inelasticity factors which have often characterised the employment distribution across the territory.

This paper aims at examining migratory dynamics over the last years – with a particular attention to the interregional one, maybe more characterized by economic grounds – as well as the possible existing links with the employment system. The work includes, among other things, a methodological approach so that it resumes what already developed in a paper¹ some years ago; moreover, it is based neither on a direct, quantitative analysis of migratory flows among the various regions nor on their respective balance, but it comes out, as it will be better shown in the next paragraph, from the definition of a “standard profile” of who move across the territory; such a profile is able to describe the main reasons (the basic research refers to the registrations of birth and deaths over the years 2006-2008) of the above mentioned movements. After the individuation of the “dominant” profile within each region and the two groups of Italians and foreigners, the aim of this paper is to distinguish labour market on a territorial level, its possible trends and peculiarities through the statistical procedure described below.

2. The available data and the approach adopted

Both the main data on which this paper is based and the statistical procedure used refer to changes of legal residence in the years 2006 and 2008: in particular, interregional movement was the 30% ca. out of the total (these data concern a little more than 300,000 units), while intraregional movement took up the remaining 70% (800,000 units ca.). Hence, we focused on interregional mobility, taking into account that, as we have already stated, it is mainly caused by economic reasons such as job-seeking².

Table 1, as shown below, suggests useful information on the territorial strands of such a movement. In order to make the reading of data easier, we have thought it proper to report the percentage distribution of the movements only, concerning to

¹ See Del Colle E. 1991: “Dinamiche migratorie e dinamiche territoriali dei mercati del lavoro”, in *Economia & Lavoro*, n° 2.

² On the contrary, socio-environmental reasons such as new housing needs, better quality of life and much more are the main causes of intraregional movements – i.e., the so called short-range mobility.

Table 1 – Percentage distribution of interregional migratory movements, classified according to nationalities as well as incoming and outbound geographical areas.

Years 2006-2008. Average values established on an annual basis.

Incoming geographical areas	Outbound geographical areas				
	North-West Italy	North-East Italy	Central Italy	Southern Italy	Italy
<i>Italians</i>					
North-West Italy	7,4	4,4	3,9	9,0	24,7
North-East Italy	3,4	3,4	2,6	5,9	15,3
Central Italy	3,0	2,6	3,9	6,8	16,3
Southern Italy	13,2	11,5	12,4	6,6	43,7
ITALY	27,0	21,9	22,8	28,3	100,0
<i>Foreigners</i>					
North-West Italy	9,0	9,2	4,2	2,4	24,8
North-East Italy	8,6	7,2	3,7	2,1	21,6
Central Italy	7,7	9,0	5,8	3,5	26,0
Southern Italy	8,9	9,8	6,1	2,8	27,6
ITALY	34,2	35,2	19,8	10,8	100,0
<i>Total</i>					
North-West Italy	7,7	5,0	4,0	8,1	24,8
North-East Italy	4,1	3,9	2,7	5,4	16,1
Central Italy	3,6	3,5	4,2	6,3	17,6
Southern Italy	12,6	11,3	11,5	6,1	41,5
ITALY	28,0	23,7	22,4	25,9	100,0

geographical area-type territorial clusters. It is evident that the analysis carried out refers to the foreign component as well, since it represents 25% ca. (80,000 movements approximately) out of the interregional mobility as a whole. According to an early analysis of the overall results, it is definitely clear that Southern Italy registers the highest percentage in outbound mobility among all the Italian regions (41,5%) – in particular, towards the regions of Central and Northern Italy. Thus, it is not difficult to understand the reasons of such movements since they are due to job-seeking causes. Moreover, the data referring to outbound movements from the North-East of Italy towards the South (8,1%) have not to mislead on the interpretative level: in fact, they are not movements caused by job-seeking but by individuals who, after having worked in the more productive North-East, come back to their own native Southern regions. A further confirmation of this phenomenon can be found in the reading of the same data referred to the Italian component (9,0%), which show a fairly widespread behaviour – i.e., the regions of

the four geographical areas “welcome” a not very different percentage of migrants, even if coming from outbound regions in a different measure (Southern regions of Italy help with 43,7%).

The foreign component shows, on the contrary, a high prevalence in Northern regions as incoming territories (on this point, it is enough to examine that only 2,8% moves among the regions of Southern Italy). Pointing out that, unlike what happens for Italians, the North-East of Italy is the favourite destination for foreigners, even if with a different incidence, seems an important factor as well.

After having concisely analyzed the recent interregional migratory situation, we are now going on with facing the main subject of this work – that is, the likely relationship between internal mobility and job demand and supply³.

The first step to be taken forward concerns the outlining of the qualitative profile of migrants. In accordance with the available data, each movement among the regions has been classified on the basis of five variables such as age, gender, marital status, occupational status and educational qualifications: in fact, we believe that the simultaneous knowledge of such information can allow us to understand the reasons of each movement.

Table 2 collects the fundamental coordinates useful to define the different profiles as they have been outlined through the five variables mentioned above, in order to allow the reader a mere interpretation of the different profiles.

3. Main results obtained

Table 3 shows the first outcomes of our analysis: as it can be seen, the ten most common profiles regarding each interregional movement have been compared; then, we have compared them with a similar, above mentioned analysis we carried out about twenty years ago⁴.

Such a comparison appears to have a great interpretative significance since, among other things, it puts in evidence that – compared to the previous analysis – the ranking of the most relevant profiles is as different as the weight of each profile. In the 1980s the ten predominant profiles took up 75% ca. out of the total,

³ We wish to remind that the issue of interregional mobility is to be examined mainly from a qualitative point of view – i.e., it is necessary not only to verify how many people move across the territory, but to identify who they are above all, thus referring to age, gender, occupational status and so on.

⁴ See Del Colle E. 1991, “Dinamiche migratorie e dinamiche territoriali dei mercati del lavoro”, *cit.*

while they represent less than 50% in recent years. This fact suggests a

Table 2 – *Assignment of codes to the explanatory variables.*

Codes	Variables' position				
	1° (Age groups)	2° (Gender)	3° (Marital status)	4° (Occupational status)	5° (Educational qualifications)
0	-	-	Single	-	No educational qualifications
1	0-19	M	Married	Yes	-
2	20-34	F	Other	-	Lower secondary-school diploma
3	35-59	-	-	-	Upper secondary-school diploma or university degree
4	60 e +	-	-	-	-
9	-	-	-	No	-

Example: the code 11090 means that we are dealing with an under-20, male, single person, without an occupational status as well as educational qualifications.

certain “disintegration” of the profiles – that is, the possible combinations of the five explanatory variables are definitely increasing. The main reason of such evolution concerns a stronger presence, within the most representative profiles, of those having medium-high educational qualifications (the truth of this statement can be easily established over the years 2006-2008, as six out of ten profiles examined are characterized by the presence of holders of an upper secondary-school diploma or a university degree). Such a result shows that, if compared to the past, those who are currently moving across the territory are educated people. A further reading of Table 3 also allows us to highlight similar situations between the two rankings – such as the presence in the higher part of them of a profile

characterized by young, both male and female, single people without an occupational status and educational qualifications.

Table 3 – *Typical profiles of the interregional movements in Italy. Years 1986-1988 and 2006-2008. Average values on an annual basis.*

1986-1988		2006-2008	
<i>Profiles</i>	<i>% values</i>	<i>Profiles</i>	<i>% values</i>
11090	10,0	21013	6,9
12090	9,5	11090	6,7
21012	8,9	12090	6,2
31112	8,1	22013	5,1
32192	8,0	21012	4,6
22192	6,7	31113	3,5
31113	6,4	31112	3,2
12092	5,4	22113	2,8
11092	5,3	32113	2,4
21112	5,1	21113	2,2
Others	26,6	Others	56,4
Total	100,0	Total	100,0

Table 4 is an attempt at deeply examining the ranking of the years 2006-2008 through a subdivision of the movements depending on whether they are Italian or foreign. The data we have collected show similarities and differences between the two rankings: in fact, they are basically similar in the weight of each profile but different in the structure. Such a diversity lies in the different educational qualifications above all: while Italians have a higher level of education, foreigners have a lower one. If we do not consider the last variable in the profile (i.e., education), the three main profiles are the same, except for a change in their positions. What is most surprising is that the ranking concerning currently the foreigners is equivalent to the ranking concerning the Italians in the 1980s.

Therefore, we can affirm that a foreign migrant moving nowadays across the Italian territory has more or less the same features of an Italian migrant of the past.

Table 4 – *Typical profiles of the interregional movements in Italy, classified according to nationalities. Years 2006-2008. Average values on an annual basis.*

Italians		Foreigners	
Profiles	% values	Profiles	% values
21013	7,6	11090	7,1
11090	6,6	21012	6,4
12090	6,1	12090	6,4
22013	5,6	21010	4,7
21012	4,3	31112	3,4
31113	3,7	21013	3,0
31112	3,1	21112	2,7
22113	3,0	31110	2,6
32113	2,6	31012	2,3
21093	2,3	22013	2,3
22093	2,3	22012	2,2
21113	2,3	31010	2,2
32192	2,3	21110	2,1
31013	2,1	31113	2,1
11092	2,0	22010	2,0
Others	44,1	Others	48,5
Total	100,0	Total	100,0

4. The associative structure of the variables typical of migrants' profiles

In the previous paragraphs we have examined the quantitative weight of the more common profiles characterizing interregional migration. In this section we aim at highlighting the qualitative aspect of such profiles, that has been made opaque to some extent by the different codes given to each single variable. In other words, it seems interesting to us to show how the associative structure of the variables, which form each profile, affects the various movements across the territory. The following Figures 1a, 1b, 1c and 1d – the outcomes of the application

of the multiple correspondence analysis – attempt to give an answer to such fact-finding inquiry. The Figure 1a shows only the outbound regional localization of such movements. On this point, it is necessary to consider that regions, unlike variables, do not contribute to define the associative structure but, to some extent, they are the consequence of the acting of the variables themselves.

As it is easy to observe, Northern and Central regions (with the exception of Liguria) place themselves on the right, higher part of the figure mainly, thus leaving the left, lower part to Southern regions. Such an observation, as we will examine later on, will be very useful to understand the clearest links between Italian territory and movements' explanatory variables. In fact, if we move on to analyze the data reported in the Figure 1b, we can observe that both male and female individuals, in their working age and with a medium-high level of education, place themselves on the right, higher part of this figure. If we lay this figure over the previous one, we can state that the individuals with such features tend to move towards Northern and Central regions above all. Very young and consequently single people (thus, with no educational qualifications yet) place themselves on the left, lower part of the figure; such movements can be classified as migratory flows caused by other movements (for example, of the family of origin). Always in the lower part of this figure, the so-called "re-entry waves" can also be identified – i.e. older, widowed people with a low level of education. They are individuals who come back to their native Southern regions after having passed their working years in other areas of the country. An important confirmation of what stated above arises from the reading of the Figure 1c, where it is worth pointing out that all workers place themselves always on the right, higher part (referring to Central and Northern regions) together with their own economic activity. Those who do not seek for a job as well as students or housewives place themselves on the other side of this figure. Finally, the data reported in the Figure 1d are extremely interesting: in fact, here we have represented movements in connection with the various countries of origin. We have clearly recorded that non-EU citizens go towards the less productive regions of Italy: they are from Africa, the Americas or even from other European countries but not belonging to the EU; on the contrary, people coming from EU countries go towards the more productive areas of Italy. Therefore, contrary to what one may think about, Italian employers prefer to recruit EU workers rather than non-EU ones. A likely reason may depend on Italian bureaucracy – meaning that, in times of economic imbalance and little chance of finding a job, an Italian concern prefer to recruit an EU citizen because he/she gives less problems in terms of identity papers or residence permits to be produced. Finally, here follows a remark on the "central" position of Italy in this figure: it is the only country with a non-oriented position. This is due to the action of two conflicting forces: the above-mentioned re-entries towards Southern Italy on

the one hand, the employment opportunities towards Central and Northern Italy on the other.

Figure 1a – Main features of interregional movements in Italy: outbound regional localization (years 2006-2008).




Figure 1b – Main features of interregional movements in Italy: gender, age, marital status and educational qualification (years 2006-2008)




Figure 1c – Main features of interregional movements in Italy: professional status and economic activity (years 2006-2008).





Figure 1d – Main features of interregional movements in Italy: nationality (years 2006-2008).



5. Final remarks

Internal migratory flows as a whole are, from a quantitative point of view, the same as in the 1980s, even if a change in migrants' profiles can be observed as regards the typology as well as the qualitative factors. In fact, more recent movements are characterized both by a greater territorial spread and a higher complexity: however, they have qualitatively improved, meaning that people with a high level of education move towards the more economically advanced regions. From the point of view of employment, a greater vitality of EU citizens, able to offer a more qualified job, has been noticed.

Of course, the presence of foreign employees affects the behaviour of Italian citizens and the job opportunities for them. Negative effects on the chances of Italians in the labour market caused by such greater presence of foreigners are, however, restrained and limited to those less educated segments of the population where individuals are most in danger of being replaced with non-EU citizens.

Such analysis leads all of us to the following remark: if Italy, and Europe, in general, aim at recovering competitiveness, they cannot merely make production cost savings but they have to overcome the protectionist reticence as well as welcome a more qualified manpower.

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SUMMARY

The main goal of this paper has been the definition of a qualitative profile of those moving from a region to another. Such a profile – based on five characteristic variables representing a well-balanced explanatory compromise – has been used as a diagnostic tool of the labour markets in Italy. Extremely interesting situations have emerged from the analysis carried out: first of all, we verified that some changes have taken place in the profiles if compared to the past, basically due to the higher educational level of those who move across the territory for employment purposes; secondly, that a prevalence of movements of EU citizens has been recorded if compared to non-EU migrants; thirdly, that such movements do not adversely affect the chances of Italian young people in the labour market; finally that, though in light of the traditional South-to-North strand, the more substantial territorial spread of these movements has been the consequence of the greater productive delocalization that has taken place over the past decades.

SOUTH-NORTH POPULATION MOVEMENTS IN ITALY FORTY YEARS LATER

Antonio Golini, Cecilia Reynaud

1. Introduction

One feature of present-day society is its ever greater individual mobility (Livi Bacci 2010, Golini 2008, Gesano 1995, Nuvolati 2007), linked to the great changes in its economy. The development of transport systems has made medium and long distance movements both easier and more frequent, while daily mobility is no longer essentially a matter of movements between home and workplace, but includes many others, due to the multi-polarity of the space used. More widespread means of communication have also, counter-intuitively, contributed to increased mobility, as they have made for more solid contacts between people in different places (Martinotti, 2007).

There is a network of trajectories on the territory that is now busy as never before, making incisive changes not only on individual lives, but on the national life too, as well as on the territory on which it stands. At the same time the increasing number of living and work places is generating further mobility.

Logically, mobility is defined as the sum total of all the movements of people in a given space. Territorial movements can be classified on the basis of numerous variables, both of the movement itself and of the individuals who make them; one may, for example, choose to examine only the daily movements within a town or that start from a town, or those made by working people, etc.

2. An attempt to classify migrations

The main classifications of movements consider the distance between the place of origin and of destination, the frequency with which the movement considered is made, and individual stability of the after the movement. As the distance of a movement, either absolutely or relatively, is unlikely to be a significant and measurable value, movements are more often characterized by reference to the definition of the boundary crossed; as even the entrance of a house can be identified as the point from which a movement begins, the boundaries need to be identified with administrative ones to allow a univocal definition of the boundary

and a correspondence with what is the statistical, social and political interest. This means that a distinction is often made between municipal, metropolitan, provincial, regional and national boundaries. Frequency can easily be distinguished as daily, weekly or other, and so the duration of the period involved in the movement, can be classified as short, average or long.

As table 1 shows, the combination of these three elements for classifying migrations can define 36 types of movement; but classifying all of them clearly becomes too complex. These types of movement, which include those defined as migrations, are often actually alternatives: for instance, internal and international migrations have often been alternatives, and it is only for historical and other reasons that certain types of mobility have been given different and greater importance than others.

Table 1 – *A possible typology of territorial movements in relation to distance, periodicity, and length.*

Boundary to be crossed	Recurrent			Non-recurrent		
	<i>daily</i>	<i>weekly</i>	<i>other</i>	<i>short period</i>	<i>average period</i>	<i>Long period</i>
Nothing	01	02	03	04	05	06
Municipal	07	08	09	10	11	12
Metropolitan	13	14	15	16	17	18
Provincial	19	20	21	22	23	24
Regional	25	26	27	28	29	30
<i>National</i>	<i>31</i>	<i>32</i>	<i>33</i>	<i>34</i>	<i>35</i>	<i>36</i>

Even though frequency and/or duration and/or distance, are very useful criteria for analysing and studying internal migrations and for all the operative questions linked to them, the distinction of internal migrations in the wider context of territorial movements should also be based on the *purpose* of the movement. The main one behind internal migrations is leaving, or changing, one's home because of one's job; this reason can also be extended to the movements of other family members of the worker; but a change of residence can also play an important role for reasons other than work, like starting a new family, even a single-person family, or the break-up of a family, or the purchase of a new house, or more strictly personal reasons like the search for an environment more suited to one's life style, etc. Nor are purposes of study or training insignificant, as they make up many of the most typical movements: daily or otherwise in the case of school students, or

non-recurrent, and short or medium term, in the case of university students. There can also be various other “minor” reasons, such as movements made to receive better treatment for an illness.

The causes and types of movements vary in time and are constantly modified when new links and the development of new technologies can change the pre-existing balance between domicile and work/study (for example, high-speed internet, or convenient or fast rail or road links).

3. Types of migrations

3.1 Short-term and short-distance migrations

First, let us consider commuter migrations, or, more correctly, diurnal mobility, which is mainly identified in daily movements for purposes of study or work.

In Italy in 2008 around 33,000,000 people claimed to travel daily to reach their place of study or work: these include almost 11,000,000 schoolchildren and students (including nursery-school and playschool children) and 22,000,000 job-holders (Istat, 2009).

Age, sex and professional condition are decisive for the means of movement and travelling time: children and the young usually travel short distances as they normally go to schools close to home, just as women generally travel shorter distances than men, as they have more need to reconcile family time and work time; in the same way employees spend longer reaching the workplace than the self-employed, who have greater possibility of choice as to where and when they work (Casacchia, 2002). The greatest influence on mobility behaviours, however, seems to be the area of domicile. Most of those who travel daily for work purposes, crossing the boundary of their municipality, live in the North, but this is also the area where the greatest number of commuters remain inside their province of domicile or the neighbouring one (tab. 2); in the South, where almost one third of those employed commute (Svimez, 2008), the percentage of those who work in a non-neighbouring province is equal to 8.3%, more than double that in the North (tab. 2). This seems largely due to the greater uncertainty of the labour market, but also in part to stronger ties with their territory.

Table 2 – *Commuters distributed according to residence and place of work, 2007.*

Geographical area of residence	absolute values (thousand)			% composition			incidence %	
	In the same province of residence or a neighboring one	In a different province	Total	In the same province of residence or a neighboring one	In a different province	Total	All commuters	Long distance commuters
North	5,482	194	5,676	96.00	3.4	100	50.0	1.6
Center	1,484	71	1,555	95.40	4.6	100	32.5	1.5
South	1,914	174	2,089	91.60	8.3	100	32.1	2.7
Italy	8,880	439	9,320	95.30	4.7	100	32.1	2.7

Source: Rapporto Svimez 2008 sull'economia del mezzogiorno (Svimez, 2008)

More than half of Italian workers are commuters (Svimez, 2008), and the extreme vitality of commuting is due not only to the dynamism of the labour market, but also to territorial development. On the one hand, the labour market affects the territory both in the workplaces that are built and abandoned, and in its capacity to attract workers and condition their life choices, allowing them to decide on short, average or long term movements; on the other, territorial expansion is also caused by the development of housing, services and communications through the various means of transport. If we consider Local Labour Systems, constructed on the basis of commuting as measured in censuses, these have changed greatly, both from 1981 to 1991, and from 1991 to 2001: their number has declined and, above all, they extend further across the territory, now including municipalities that are far from being contiguous. In the past many Local Labour Systems depended on the fragmentation of human settlements (both homes and workplaces), but today the creation of new Local Systems depends on the creation or consolidation of new businesses, mainly industrial.

Most of Italy is now urbanized: a satellite view of the country shows very large urban systems, particularly along the coast, where they are almost unbroken. We now have inter-regional and, sometimes, even international urban systems, that are unlikely ever to be administered: we do not have the tools to manage such large and developed systems beyond the already defined administrative territories; one need only think of the difficulties in defining and implementing metropolitan areas, which are already recognized in the Constitution, but are still inexistent in practical, administrative and legislative terms. The prospect of creating metropolitan areas is of fundamental importance, as they will inevitably influence territorial development and so individual mobility too. In the same way, we cannot

ignore the future effects of housing policy after local councils have carried out feasibility assessment and defined time requirements. The territory, which is constantly developing, will therefore undergo constant further variations, given changes in productivity and domicile and, above all, the economic crisis of 2008-09.

3.2 Internal migratory movements, with the exclusion of short-term ones

Going back to the classification made (see table 2), it seems important to continue considering all movements that do not necessarily cross an administrative boundary, but that are not merely short-term.

Studying mobility, however, raises the problem of sources: being such a dynamic and complex phenomenon, it often escapes official observations, and it seems difficult even to think of the various ad hoc observations that cover all forms of mobility, which are very different in form and in their impact on society, and so are unlikely to be considered together.

If we consider merely crossing the threshold of the home as a movement, estimating movements of this type can be made starting from data on changes of domicile, which are non-short-term migrations, in which the boundary crossed can also simply be that of one's original home. In 2008, 5.2% of Italian families changed their home (tab. 2). As there are 23,634,000 families in Italy (average for 2007-2008), we can estimate that around 1,230,000 families have made a movement of this type. As families in Italy have an average of 2.5 components, more than 3,000,000 individuals are involved in this type of mobility. We realise that still more members of the population are involved in this phenomenon than we would think if we consider that the number of families that would like to change home is 7.9% of the total.

There are geographical differences in movements of this type: in the North, particularly in the North-East, not only is there the largest percentage of those who have changed home, but also of those who would like to change it, indicating that the different behaviours observed are a genuine expression of a different attitude; this reproduces the typical north/south division in Italy in demographic, social and economic phenomena (tab. 3). It is interesting to note that, in the breakdown of the various areas, the suburbs of the metropolises are the most mobile areas, and those that most feed the desire for change, indicating that they are the areas of greatest vitality, as they are also the most recently formed type of area (tab. 3).

These figures suggest a fast-changing situation, particularly given the very high percentage of families in Italy that own their home (73.3% in 2006); this in itself certainly acts as a brake on mobility. Nevertheless, internal migrations due to a

change of home cannot be ignored, even if only some of the expectations/hopes of those who would like to change home (slightly less than half of those who rent) were made real.

Table 3 – Families that have changed home or that would like to change it. 2008.

Geographical area or typology of municipalities	% families that have changed home	% families that like to change home
North-west	5.6	9.5
North-east	6.1	10.2
Center	5.5	7.2
South	3.7	5.3
Islands	4.6	6.2
Center of metropolitan area	5.2	8.5
Suburb of metropolitan area	6.7	10.9
Municipalities	Untill to 2000 inhabitants	3.9
	from 2001 to 10000	4.8
	from 10001 to 50000	5.3
	From 50001	4.9
Italy	5.2	7.9

Source: Istat 2010, La vita quotidiana nel 2008, Roma

Another attempt to estimate this type of mobility can be made, starting from young people and their desire to move, as the young are the most mobile sector of the population (Rossi, 2007, Cassata, Reynaud, 2008)

The willingness of young people to move is notably higher, particularly if we also consider those who are willing to move to a municipality from which they might return every day, and so are willing to increase that element of diurnal mobility defined as commuting, which is already quite high. More than 20% of young people are also willing to move to a municipality from which they might return at the weekend. This willingness would increase another type of mobility that in any case contributes to creating a decidedly mobile picture of the present and future state of Italy, even allowing for the fact that the difficulties of the labour market, the peculiarity of the housing situation and strong family ties suggest a state of affairs less subject to mobility (Golini, 2008).

3.3 *Internal migratory movements that have involved a change of municipality*

Long-term movements that involve crossing the boundary of a municipality are what we normally mean by mobility when we speak of internal migrations. Long-term movements should involve a change of domicile between municipalities that is officially registered and so enters into official statistics. We are dealing, then, with internal mobility, which is one of the aspects of mobility most considered in demographic studies, which certainly has a greater impact on society and above all on demographic phenomena, and contributes to the definition of the resident population and its structure.

In 2007 there were almost 1,380,000 changes of domicile between Italian municipalities, giving an average annual rate of 23.6 per thousand.

Of course, these figures do not exhaust long-term internal mobility across municipal boundaries as not all those who move necessarily change their domicile at the same time; this might happen later, or never if the migration is not regarded as definitive. The present concept of domicile seems different now (De Santis, 2010). The new forms of mobility, the means of communication, the greater flexibility and uncertainty of the labour market and, in general, changes in society, have brought about a not insignificant medium or long term mobility that nevertheless does not lead to a change of domicile. In addition, official registers do not take account of mobility for study, which may be considered medium term and often becomes long term: they do not take account, for example, of all the university students studying away from home. On the other hand, changes of domicile register as movements what might not actually be so: changes of domicile for practical purposes, such as registering a new home as the main home, for example.

Official figures cannot give us an estimate of overall long-term mobility as there are no records of changes of domicile within the same municipality.


4. **Internal mobility in Italy**

4.1 *Internal mobility 40 years ago*

Since the 1950s internal mobility has been most marked in Italy, particularly in the immediate post-war period. The rate of internal mobility in the 1960s was higher than 30 per thousand and, in the following three-year period, increased again, reaching a peak of over 40 per thousand (fig. 1). Even though this peak seems mainly linked to the repeal of the fascist law on urbanization and the corrections to official figures following the census of 1961 (Casacchia, 2002), the

levels reached in this period show an extraordinary phase of internal mobility, such as had never been registered before or after.


Figure 1 – *Intra-regional and inter-regional changes of residence, Italian Municipalities, 1955-2008. Rates per thousand inhabitants.*



Source: Population registers, ISTAT, 2010

Before, migration from the southern regions had been directed abroad, but when the industrial development of the North began to offer a valid alternative, it had destinations within the country too (Pugliese, 2006). There was a migratory model that responded to the need to rebalance the labour market, which saw a massive influx of unemployed farm labourers from the most depressed and unproductive areas of the countryside towards areas that were becoming the economic motor of the country, partly thanks to chain migration (Piras, Melis, 2007). The North-West attracted very significant migratory flows, not only from the regions of the South, but also from those of the North-East (fig. 2); while other poles of attraction were the large cities of the Centre, Rome in particular, thanks to its being the political-administrative heart of the country (Golini, 1974).

Figure 2 – Interregional migratory currents (immigrants minus emigrants) of the period 1955-70.



Source: Golini A., *Distribuzione della popolazione, migrazioni interne e urbanizzazione in Italia*, Roma, 1974

In the 1950s and 1960s movements were mainly long-range ones towards the cities: there was a mass exodus from farming and a massive urbanization of the population. It was the period of large internal migrations, which made a strong contribution to the modernization of Italy, but also seemed decisive in defining and consolidating the growing North-South dichotomy. The other side of the coin of

industrial development in the North seems to be a poor and backward South, which lost some of its population and remained unchanged. The imbalance between the two parts of the country worsened with the passing of time.

Thus, these years seem to show an extremely dynamic picture with mobility as one of the fundamental and growing components, to the point that it substantially modified the distribution of the population across the country, tracing the fundamental lines of the models of settlement that exist to this day.

In later years there was an attenuation of mobility levels, largely determined by the diminishing importance of movements from South to North: there were far fewer long-distance migrations, both in absolute and relative terms, compared with short-distance ones. The economic character of some areas of the country also changed, particularly in the North-East, which now began to attract migrants rather than supply them, thanks to the development of small and medium industry. These were the years in which movements from country to town continued to increase the level of urbanization, even though there were also phases of counter-urbanization and suburbanization, which meant that cities expanded to become metropolitan areas. Following the large-scale restructuring of Italian industry and the reduction of employment in this sector, one of the main factors of attraction disappeared. The age of large-scale internal migration ended in favour of a multipolarity of destinations that were almost always short-range.


The substantial drop in internal mobility was a response to the reduction in salary differentials between the regions that attracted labour and those that lost it, but were also partly determined by the growing importance of “a cultural model that was hostile to the migratory process” (Sarcinelli, 1989). In this period factors of socio-economic rigidity like the cost of living and the housing shortage had a notable effect: there was a large gap between the cost of housing in the South and in the North, where the purchase of a home became impossible without a steady job (Cannari, 1997). But behavioural factors became more and more important too: “..i.e. the widespread, growing attention for those qualitative aspects of family wellbeing and the realization by politicians and civil society in these populations of their right to a job in their place of origin” (Bisogno, 1997). In addition policies supporting the development of the South allowed resources to be transferred to this area, reducing the interest in moving. Despite these policies and the change in the economic and social situation, migration from the South continued, though to a significantly lesser extent. The imbalance between the two parts of the country reduced with the passing of time, but left room for a dichotomization to the disadvantage of the South.

From the 1970s till the mid 1990s migrations seemed to stabilize: there continued to be a limited and intermittent exodus from the regions of the South, which did not seem to create particular problems or require attention.

4.2 Internal mobility in recent years.

Since the late 1990s mobility in Italy seems to have been sharply rising: the number of changes of address registered between Italian municipalities at national level has once again been increasing, passing from little more than a million to almost 1,400,000, with the single exception of 2001 – i.e. in the census year, when values are always a case apart – and reaching a new high in 2004 (fig. 3).

Figure 3 – *Changes of residence between Italian Municipalities. Italy 1987-2007. Absolute values per thousand.*



Source: own calculations on population register data, ISTAT

Taking 1996 as reference point, a year which registered a decline to a level never again reached, mobility levels increased at rates greater than 10% - with the exception of 2001 – registering an increase greater than 20% in the last two years observed.


In recent years, 2004 seems to be the year with the greatest growth, an increase of 7,5% over the previous year. 2006, too, seems a particularly lively year with an increase of 3,5% over 2005. If we consider the almost 1,400,000 transfers registered in 2007, these show a rise both against the previous year, with a rate of increase of 0,8% and against 1996, with an increase of 23%.

In the light of the recent figures we can say that this period seems to be extremely dynamic. The pick-up in mobility would prove even greater if we linked a study of internal mobility with immigration from abroad (De Santis, 2010). As De Santis claims, there seems to be no reason to consider differently a newcomer from another Italian municipality who registers his new address from that of a newcomer from abroad, particularly in present-day society where the means of communication and transport make society more and more globalized.

Mobility within municipalities also probably contributes to increase the levels of mobility, given the greater possibilities of changing home; the unavailability of data for these transfers necessarily involves an underestimation of the phenomenon, and it seems a serious gap in our knowledge.

This period, then, was one of great mobility and seems very different from that of the great North-South migrations of the 1960s, as in it there seems to be an increase in short-range mobility. It was intra-provincial movement that was most important and most increasing, as well as a slight increase in that between provinces in the same region; migrations between provinces of other regions, which obviously includes mobility from South to North, seems to be constant, but still greater than that between provinces of the same region, which continues the picture of a model of mobility in which distance does not have the containing effect on flows that can be found in other countries¹ (Casacchia *et al.*, 2005) (fig. 4).

Figura 4 – *Changes of residence between Italian Municipalities. Italy 1998-2007. Absolute values.*



Source: own calculations on register population, ISTAT

Although Italian society seems more and more dynamic, with mobility being ever more important, we should bear in mind that, when studying a phenomenon that is dynamic, we also need to revise definitions and typologies. The concept of short range seems to be changing, and may no longer correspond to not crossing the boundaries of a province, partly thanks to the above-mentioned improvements

¹ As conjectured in the various definitions of gravitational models, the effect of distance should be such that population flows between two places are less than the increase of the distance of places.

in the means of communication. In the face of the concept of urban sprawl, mentioned above, provincial boundaries no longer seem sufficient to contain the mobility of those seeking better living conditions or forming new families, which is typical of short-range mobility, rather than that driven by the needs of the labour market, which mainly leads to longer journeys. The increase registered in mobility between provinces of the same region, then, seems to be concealing a modification of the types of mobility rather than be a development of the phenomenon.


This change in mobility in recent times may suggest that the strong gap between North and South is diminishing, but if we analyse variations in mobility in different areas of the country, we realize it is partly fictitious. Intra-provincial mobility in the North is drastically higher than in the Centre and the South, in recent years registering a rate of around 20‰, which is almost double that both in the Centre and the South; in the Centre, however, the rate of intra-provincial mobility oscillates around values slightly above 10‰, while in the South this value was touched only in 2007 (figs. 5 and 6). Intra-provincial mobility in the same region also shows levels decidedly lower than other types in all parts of the country; it seems higher in the North, where it is also increasing more swiftly than in the other two areas. But it is interesting to note that in the last two years, in the South too this type of mobility is starting to increase although until then it had registered a slight contraction, unlike the dynamic observed at national level (figs. 5 and 6).

Registrations of change of residence from other regions, however, are similar for the North and the Centre, at values slightly above 6‰, but, while in the North these registrations have diminished slightly, notably after the small increase between 1999 and 2000, in the Centre, apart from the peak in 2000, they seem more or less stable with the exception of the last year when there was a dip of around 4% (fig. 5). If this trend in the last year were confirmed in the following years, this might indicate a merely temporary lag of the Centre compared with the North. Registrations from other regions are decidedly more limited and practically stable.

As for cancellations of domicile when moving to a province in another region² are greater in the South than anywhere else (fig. 6).


² The other types of cancellations of domicile obviously coincide with the new registrations in that they are within the parts of the country being considered, and so are a zero sum.

Figure 5 – New registrations for changes of residence between Italian Municipalities for typology. Years 1998-2007.



Source: own calculations on register population, ISTAT

Figure 6 – Cancellation for changes of residence between Italian Municipalities for typology. Years 1998-2007.



Source: own calculations on register population, ISTAT

For this typology the essential stability and similarity between the Centre and the North shows a slight diversification in the trend of the last two years, as in the first of these two areas cancellations are starting to increase, while in the second, they are slightly diminishing. In the South cancellations in favour of other regions are above all a highly significant aspect of mobility, as they show a level only slightly inferior to that of intra-provincial mobility; in particular, in the years around 2000 they are very close to the levels of this other mobility, showing a profoundly different situation from the rest of the country. In addition, a limited decrease has been noted recently that would mean an inversion of the traditional dynamic of Italian migrations.

Concentrating on the South, this part of the country seems to be lagging behind again, seeming to be less affected than the rest of the country by the upswing in mobility. In particular, as Bonifazi claims (2009), the worrying reason is the reduction in short-range mobility registered in the first decade of the century, unlike what we see in the other areas where this type of mobility is notably increasing. This is an important signal as to the economic and social situation of this areas and bears witness to economic stagnation and a lack of easy and convenient infrastructures. On the other hand, one must underline that the South is a territory that is morphologically completely unlike the North, with fewer possibilities for distributing the population and less accessibility to neighbouring areas, given its long, narrow form; while the North is both wider and generally flatter, and also better linked both internally and internationally, particularly after the fall of the Berlin Wall and all that that has meant.


It is the reduction in short-range mobility, more than the lower levels than other parts of the country that have always been registered, that suggests a further reduction in job opportunities and the possibility for young people to move without uprooting themselves.

If we draw up a balance sheet for migration between the South and the Centre-North, it has always been negative and more or less unchanging; even though it seemed as if the gap might be reduced in the early years of the century, in the last two years it has stabilized (fig. 7). If, then, as Livi Bacci claims (2007), it is true that we are not facing a new boom in emigration from the South, it is also true that this emigration continues to exist and is an important loss of human capital for this area. In addition, the balance sheet of migration by region shows that population loss in the southern regions has increased recently: almost all the southern regions have seen an increase in their levels of population loss both over 1991 and 2002 (fig. 8).

In addition, various studies (Svimez, 2008) indicate that this loss of human capital has profoundly changed in quality from that of the 1960s: then the main factor was that of the need for manpower in industry, while now the driving factors


seem to be for a better qualified human capital that cannot find suitable work either in their own areas or in those surrounding, which would allow them to maintain their ties with their original context, as most young people today would wish (Golini, 2008).

Figure 7 – *Migratory balance between the South and the Centre-North.*



Source: own calculations on register population, ISTAT

Figure 8 – *Interregional migratory balance per one thousand inhabitants. 1991, 2002, 2007*



Source: Casacchia et al. (2005) and own calculations on register population, ISTAT

There are still very many young people in the South, 19.2%, who study at universities in the Centre-North (Istat, 2009), although small universities have been spreading in the South too in recent years; these young graduates then maintain their ties with their new environments in the Centre-North, where there are more job opportunities, and have increased in number to around 60% of this sub-set (D'Antonio, Scarlato, 2007). In addition, more than 40% of graduates in the South who have found a job later decided to emigrate to the North (Svimez, 2008).

Mobility and migrations are a positive, physiological component of a population and a society, but we need to ask if they are the result of choice or are compulsory (Livi Bacci, 2007). It seems that even now, after 150 years of unity, in many cases it is the latter.

5. Conclusions

To judge from the figures, Italy is a country of great mobility. Today, just like forty years ago, migrations are still not only directed abroad, but also within the country, and are important enough to have demographic, economic and social consequences.

The country is marked by a dense series of migratory lines, mainly linked, as is well known, to domicile and places of study and work.

As regards *domicile*, we should bear in mind that an urban life style is the norm throughout the country. Though there has already been a significant depopulation of mountain and rural areas, the population is continuing to spread across the territory and take over larger spaces to the point that city boundaries are no longer easily defined, and most cities are large, sprawling conurbations. Large cities are now often defined and identified in the metropolitan areas; these include a multiplicity of inhabited and productive centres, with a pole that is still very important, but also ever stronger ties with the surrounding territory. To study both definitive and daily mobility, we should bear in mind that there are increasing diseconomies of living in these areas, and that this often involves abandoning the centre of the large cities, partly as a result of technology, which has broken down the walls that once made cities synonymous with contemporary civilization.

It is extremely difficult to evaluate the possible future of mobility due to a change of domicile, which depends on many different factors and is an extremely dynamic and volatile phenomenon. As we have noted, mobility is highly dependent on territorial development, which creates mobility: the growing number of large, swift communication paths, real and virtual, are crucial for the development of mobility, in that the real ones may increase mobility, more probably short-term

mobility, and diminish definitive mobility, while virtual ones may reduce physical mobility and increase communication.

Different types of mobility will also be strongly conditioned by housing policy and the building of public housing, even though further unauthorized building and possible future amnesties may play an important role. Given the importance of the extended city and how to administer it, whether or not metropolitan areas are created will be fundamental in the development of both diurnal and definitive mobility: any future upgrading of some areas and the improvement of links within the overall area – a fundamental part of the managing of metropolitan areas – might change mobility patterns for many families.

Socio-demographic trends too will have a decisive role in how mobility develops, particularly as regards the age of marriage, procreation and the number of children, the break-up and re-establishment of unions, longevity and the system of social and care services for the old, and the quality of life in the post-work retirement period. For example, the break-up of families brings with it mobility for a new family nucleus and the possibility of forming a new family would lead to additional mobility; just as the quality of life after retirement may lead to the decision, as happens already in other countries, to spend what remains of life in places that are more congenial to one's life style and needs. Just as in the past, the importance of family ties and a strong "attachment" to roots generated a significant flow of return migrations, which played an important part in deciding how mobility developed; now and in the future these characteristics of our society are and will be one of the most decisive factors in the increase or decrease of mobility. Finally, we cannot ignore the future effects of the present economic crisis, particularly as regards employment. Some of which are still not clear and await interpretation.

As regards *study*, short-term mobility will be mainly conditioned by the ongoing reform of the secondary school system and the consequent locations of institutes, while medium-term mobility will be conditioned most by the profound reorganization of the University, which involves a serious reduction in the number of institutes in the country. If, as mentioned previously, students who travel to a university away from home often later become stabilized in that place, a reduction in the number of universities will condition not only short-term, but also long-term mobility. In addition, with the new autonomy that has been given to individual universities, there is now more competition between them in attracting students; this will probably create further movements that will also be conditioned by how successfully the main universities organize a system of low-cost lodgings for their students. But the economic crisis will have an effect on this too as parents might find themselves less able to send their children away from home to study.

As regards *work*, we need to bear in mind that in Italy there are now very few farm-workers, the age of the large factories and industrial areas seems to be over,

and employment seems more and more to be concentrated in the service sector, particularly personal services. As with domicile, this type of mobility too will be conditioned by the increased presence of large, fast communication paths, both real and virtual. The main driving force of migrations, as of mobility in general, has always been work and in particular the quantitative imbalance of the jobs market: the strong dichotomy in Italy of economic and social development in the North and the South has led, as we have seen, to massive population shifts from South to North. In recent times, however, the resumption of migrations from South to North seems also to be dictated by a large qualitative imbalance in the labour market. The persistence or reduction of migratory flows between the different areas, then, can only depend on the extent and duration of the quantitative and/or qualitative imbalance between supply and demand of jobs, between strong and weak areas, also bearing in mind the increasing technological development that may lead to a reduction in the need for manpower, as a result, for example, of the use of robots. It is worth underlining that, as young people are those mainly involved in mobility, the crucial point will be what emerges in the jobs market for young people, and so the extent and duration of the imbalance between supply and demand of jobs for the young. If, as has been observed, internal migrations seem to be competing with international ones, we cannot ignore that all this has depended recently, and will continue to depend, on foreign immigration to Italy, and so on the extent and duration of the influx of foreign immigrants, where they are located and how they are integrated. Obviously the present economic crisis, which has already been cited with regard to both domicile-related and study-related mobility, will have its greatest impact on work mobility, given the serious employment crisis it has brought with it.

All the previous points will be strongly conditioned by the political world, and its capacity to produce and implement inter-municipal and inter-regional (and even international) plans for managing the territory, as regards new building programmes for homes and industry and infrastructures.

There will be important effects on mobility from investment in safeguarding and renovating the old historic centres of our cities and of the small towns subject to depopulation, but also from the development of socio-cultural trends, notably the new importance given to the local as a reaction/response to the global.

Politicians will need to be able to identify and implement the right balance between individual needs, also bearing in mind history and tradition, collective needs, with particular regard to those of industry and education, and the needs of the land itself, with particular regard to environmental protection.

This is an extremely difficult task for a country with more than 8,000 municipalities and 20 regions, whose boundaries are often unbreachable administrative and bureaucratic frontiers.

It is difficult to imagine what the prospects might be in such a complex, dynamic situation that is strongly influencable by a multiplicity of inter-correlated aspects.

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SUMMARY

In present-day society individual mobility becomes more and more important: the development transport systems has made movements easier and more frequent; more widespread means of communication have contributed to increased mobility. The network of trajectories on the territory making incisive changes not only on individual lives, but on the national life too. To study movements in Italy it seems important to consider classification of movements based on the distance between the place of origin and of destination, the frequency with which the movement considered is made and individual stability after the movement. We are studying the different types of movements. So we can show that Italy is a country of great mobility. Since the late 1990s mobility in Italy seems to have been sharply rising. Infact today, just like forty years ago, migrations are still not only directed abroad, but also within the country, and they are important to have demographic, economic and social consequences.

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THE IMPACT OF GLOBAL ECONOMIC IMBALANCE ON MIGRANT WORKERS AND ECONOMIES OF THE GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL

Olga Marzovilla

1. Introduction

In May 1981, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the Union of Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Qatar and Oman set up the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in order to achieve closer co-operation and integration in all sectors. In the economic sector, the integration process included the following milestones: setting up of a free exchange area in 1983; creation of a customs union in 2003; start of a single market in January 2008. The latest is the introduction of a single currency on European Monetary Union model. This step was initially scheduled for January 2010 and was subsequently postponed due to divergences and conflicts that arose between the GCC members.¹

Geographically speaking, the six countries make up an area that is dominated by Saudi Arabia - which includes over 68% of its population, estimated at about 40 million people, and 83.6% of its surface.

Despite the small size of most GCC countries and the prevalence of unusable land in Saudi Arabia - due to the hot climate and the large extension of desert land - the Gulf economies have become major actors in the international global arena during this new millennium. This can be explained by two main reasons:

- a. the GCC area includes 40% of world oil reserves as well as 23% of natural gas reserves, which makes it one of the leading producers and exporters of hydrocarbons;
- b. thanks to foreign exchange reserves piled up over the new millennium, following the growth in the world's oil demand and the standing increase in oil prices from 2001 to the first half of 2008, the GCC countries can impact considerably on international financial markets. At the end of 2008, they ranked

¹ In December 2006, Oman declared its inability to join the Union by 2010 as it considered the tax constraints envisaged by the latter to be excessively stringent; in May 2007, Kuwait relinquished the dollar peg and anchored its currency to a currency basket; in May 2009, the Arab Emirates withdrew from the agreement after the Council's decision to locate the headquarters of the Gulf's Central Bank in Riyadh rather than in their territories.

second after China as net capital exporters. Indeed, 13.6% of the world's net capital exports could be traced back to Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the Emirates - compared to 23.4% of China and 12.9% of Germany (IMF, 2009a). Additionally, three of the leading sovereign wealth funds currently operating on international markets belong to this area - namely, the Qatar Investment Authority (QIA), the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (ADIA), and the Kuwait Investment Authority (KIA).²

The above considerations help explain why the GCC area continued growing at a mean yearly rate of 6.4% even in 2008, while null or negative rates featured in the rest of the world following the explosion of the international economic and financial crisis (IMF, 2010a).

In fact, the Gulf countries would appear to have been affected only indirectly and any case to a limited extent by the financial crisis that started spreading worldwide from the second half of 2007. Conversely, they were markedly affected by the global economic imbalance that kept worsening throughout the new millennium and was ultimately the cause of the financial crisis.

The importance attained by these countries as leading actors in the world economic arena, along with the possible impact that their domestic developments may produce on the international milieu, point to the appropriateness of re-considering the effects of the said imbalance in the light of some characteristics that feature in the GCC members - so as to outline some possible guidance for the future, especially with a view to the monetary union they have planned.

2. The Global Economic Imbalance in the Dollar Area


The global economic imbalance was the subject of a lively debate in economic literature, including contributions from, amongst others, Mc Kinnon (2005, 2006, 2007), Bernanke (2005), Dooley, Folkerts-Landau and Garber (2003, 2004), Bhide, Phelps (2005), and Cooper (2005). Although there is no consensus on its causes, it is generally agreed that it impacts on the structure of the balance of payments of the main world economic actors - with particular regard to those of the dollar area.

Over the last decade, the growing deficit of the US current account balance has been accompanied by the growing surplus of various emerging economies.

² As estimated by the Institute of International Finance, they managed about 630 billion of US dollars in 2008 – which amount rises to about 1.1 trillion if one includes the reserves managed by the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) (IIF, 2009).

Since 1983, the US balance of payments has been characterized by the dual presence of a current account deficit and a systematic and growing surplus in the financial account. However, the opposite imbalances of the two sections of the external accounts have expanded further during the new millennium and found their counterpart in the rising current account surpluses of the GCC countries, China and developing Asian countries (Fig.1).

Figura 1 – Balance of Payments (billions of U.S. dollars).



Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis; IMF, *World Economic Outlook*, April 2010; IMF, *Regional Economic Outlook: Middle East and Central Asia*, Oct. 2009.


On different grounds, these countries have shown major surpluses in the balance on goods and services. While the successful export-led policies, as fostered by the major inflow of direct foreign investments, may account for the growing surplus of developing Asian economies, the increase in oil prices and exports underlies the surpluses shown by oil producers as well as by GCC countries.

In both cases the surplus has facilitated the creation of official reserves, most of which have been used to acquire foreign financial assets - in particular, US assets. Accordingly, these economies have become major holders of US financial securities (Fig.2).

More specifically, China overtook Japan in 2009 as the leading holder of US assets, while GCC countries quadrupled their assets in the 2002-2009 period and now rank seventh on the list of foreign holdings of US assets - after China, Japan, the United Kingdom, Cayman Islands, Luxembourg, and Belgium (US Treasury Department, 2010).³

³ In fact, these data underestimate the actual financial holdings of GCC countries. While in the 1970's petrodollars were deposited with the international banking system and invested directly by the latter, most proceeds from oil surpluses are currently re-cycled via other financial markets, which hide the ultimate identity of the individual investors and also

Figura 2 – *Official Reserves and Foreign Holding of U.S. Securities of Some Emerging and Developing Economies (billions of U.S. dollars).*



Sources: IMF, *World Economic Outlook*, April 2010; IMF, *Regional Economic Outlook*, May 2010; U.S. Department of the Treasury, *Foreign Portfolio Holdings of US Securities Historical Data*.

* Excludes Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan. ** Includes GCC Countries, Iran and Iraq.

These processes have contributed to reinforcing the US status as the world's leading debtor, with net capital imports amounting to 43.4% of the world's imports in 2008 (IMF, 2009a); while China and the GCC countries have become the main creditors.

This is an abnormal development, pointing to deep-ranging imbalances in the international economic system. Indeed, the efficiency logic predicates that capitals should flow from richer countries - where they are more plentiful and their yield is lower - to poorer countries - where they are scarce and more profitable. Conversely, the current situation would appear to show that the strongest economy in the world is subtracting savings from countries that have yet to complete their growth process, fast-paced as the latter may be, in order to finance its own high consumption standards.

As regards the Gulf countries, the opposite imbalances in their balances of payments and the US, have produced considerable effects due to their interaction with three major features of their economies, namely:


1. population dynamics;
2. labour market structure;
3. exchange rate regimes.

Segue nota a pagina precedente: makes it more difficult to monitor and quantify the actual capital flows targeted abroad. This is why the assessment of the foreign assets actually held by these countries requires taking also account of the securities to be referred to the UK, Luxembourg, Switzerland, and the Cayman Islands.

3. Population Dynamics and Migration Flows

As shown in Figure 3, from 1950 to the end of the first decade in the new century the population of the GCC countries rose from 4 million to about 40 million people - with a growth rate that was among the highest in the world and was favored not only by the natural population growth rate, but also by significant net migration flows.

Figura 3 - Population Growth and Net Migration Flows (values in thousands).



Source: United Nations Population Division, *World Population Prospects: the 2008 Revision Population Database*.

* Estimates

The high dependence of the Gulf area on hydrocarbons production and exports played a key role in its population dynamics as well as in the labour market structure. Indeed, the small population of the GCC countries, the lack of specialised labour, the high inactivity rate and widespread illiteracy resulted in the imbalance between the offer of domestic labour and the increasing demand related to the development of oil sector. This gap has been bridged by importing foreign workers since the 1930's, when major oil fields were discovered and the first extractions began.

Although the flows changed in connection with the events occurring in the hydrocarbons market as well as following the conflicts that have ever been a feature of the Middle East area, migration inflows have become a particular feature of the GCC region so much so that it has become one of the leading destination regions for migration flows. In the 1950 - 2010 period, net migration flows of foreign workers in the individual five-year spans were always positive, the sole exception being the 1990-1995 period when the Gulf War took place.

The migration flows that have featured in the Gulf area since the first half of the past century can be broken down into three sub-periods as a function of the foreign workers' countries of origin as well as of their sector-related utilization.

- One first sub-period covers the years from the oil discovery in the 1930's up to the first half of the 1970's. This period featured the inflow of foreign workers mainly from the Arab region. The conflicts and tensions that were rife in those years, including the many Arab-Israeli conflicts, fuelled major migration flows of Palestinians, Yemenites, Egyptians and Lebanese towards the Gulf economies. They were mostly unskilled workers that met the demand for growth of the oil sector and were accepted easily in the various destination countries because of their language, cultural and religious similarities that seemed capable of ensuring respect for individual national identities. These flows grew consistently throughout this period and peaked in period from 1970-1975 - which include the first oil shock - when about 1 million workers moved to this area.

- The flows increased further in the second sub-period, ranging from the half of the 1970's to the end of the 1990's. In particular, over 4.5 million of foreign workers entered the Gulf countries in the 1975 - 1990 period in order to meet both the growing demand for manpower, due to the expansion and modernization of the oil sector and the requirements arising from the diversification of production processes that had started in the early 1980's. Indeed, major changes have started to surface in these years, increasing their importance in the 1990's as well as in the third sub-period. These changes have to do with the diversification of the employment sectors of the workforce, the increased demand for skilled workers and the origin of migration flows.

The experience gathered in the 1970's and 1980's - when the major oil revenues piled up after the 1973 and 1979 oil shocks were depleted in a few years' time and the external surplus, along with the budget surplus, turned into a deficit - raised awareness of how transitional the positive effects produced by the increased oil revenues were and led the GCC countries to implement policies that were targeted at diversifying production activities so as to reduce the dependency of their economic growth on the ebb and flow of oil prices. These policies also ultimately resulted in fostering the creation and growth of the private sector, since they were supported by the introduction of privatization and liberalization processes.

These developments fuelled the demand for manpower and can account not only for the major flows observed in this period, but also for the more diversified sector-related distribution of foreign labour along with the increased demand for skilled, highly-specialised workers (technicians, engineers, architects, medical doctors, managers, etc.).

However, the most striking changes have to do with the origin of migration flows. Indeed, the remarkable growth in the incidence of foreign workers of Arabian origin led to some concern both in political and in social and economic terms. As for the former, there were fears about the possible spread of extremist and radical positions within the framework of a pan-Arabist ideology whereby the union of all Arab countries was to be regarded as the solution for the underdevelopment caused by colonialism. As for the latter, the concern was mostly focused on the expectations of Arab migrants to remain indefinitely in the Gulf countries, where they usually also took their families. Conversely, Asian workers proved less demanding: they accepted lower wages and temporary work; their families stayed in their home countries; they were easier to employ and dismiss given the brokerage function discharged by Asian agencies in their recruitment.⁴

The de-Arabization of labour was accelerated following the first Gulf War in 1991. The invasion of Kuwait by Iraq caused a major gap between Middle-Eastern pro-Iraq and pro-Kuwait countries, which was mirrored by migration flows once the war was over. About 2 million workers from countries that had supported Iraqi claims (Yemenites, Palestinians, Jordanians, Sudanese) were expelled from Kuwait and Saudi Arabia and replaced by many Asian workers from India, Pakistan, Philippines, Indonesia, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka. Overall, the incidence of the Arab component over the total migrants in the GCC region fell between 1975 and 2004 from 72% to 32%, to the benefit of the Asian component (A.Kapiszweski, 2006).


- The third sub-period, which started with the new millennium, confirmed and emphasized the trends that had already begun during the second sub-period. The diversification of economic structures became the leading feature of this period along with the steady increase of oil prices that fuelled such diversification. Indeed, the oil price rise from 20 dollar/barrel in 2002 to over 140 dollar/barrel in 2008 increased the flow of foreign exchange earnings from exports and allowed financing the investments and fiscal stimulus required by the process of growth in the non oil sector.

⁴ One of the reasons most frequently referred to in order to account for the fast-growing Asian immigration has to do exactly with the initiatives undertaken by the governments in the countries of origin, which have fostered migration in order to reduce unemployment within national borders. To that end, they have relied on specialised agencies that have channelled labour towards companies operating in the Gulf area by way of temporary, low-wage contracts. The number of such agencies has been rising quickly since the end 1970's: they rose from 55 in 1977 to 300 in 1980 in Bangladesh; from 4 to 544 in Sri Lanka; from 850 in 1980 to 1119 in 1985 in India; and from 650 to 964 in the Philippines during the same period (Kouaouci, 2006).

However, the fast accumulation of foreign exchange reserves in small economies, where wealth is markedly concentrated and the public sector is under the control of a handful of powerful families, led entrepreneurs to invest mainly in areas where they could be executed more quickly and easily - which caused the unbridled growth of the real estate, building, and services sectors, i.e. of the so-called FIRE (Financial, Insurance, Real Estate) economy. Due to the small domestic population, the feverish diversification process required additional inflows of foreign workers and led to new peak net migration flows - which were estimated to amount to about 2.5 million in the last decade (Fig. 3).

Although it is impossible to gauge the real dimension of this phenomenon,⁵ over 10 million of migrant workers are estimated to have entered the GCC region between 1950 and 2008 - whereby foreigners nowadays make up a considerable percentage of the total population and the foreign labour force outnumbers the domestic one in almost all the countries of this area.

Figura 4 – Percentage Distribution of Population and Labour Force by Nationality¹: 2008²



Sources: Labour Market Regulatory Authority (LMRA), Kingdom of Bahrain, *Bahrain Labour Market, 2009*; Central Informatics Organization of Bahrain (CIO), *Statistical Abstract, 2007*; Institute of Banking Studies of Kuwait (Kibs), *Economic and Financial Data base for 2009*; Statistics Authority of Qatar, *Labour Force Sample Survey, Results,*

⁵ The difficulties here have to do with the poor quality of the statistics available from the countries in this area – which tend to downsize the numbers related to foreigners and emphasize those for domestic population – as well as with the impact produced by illegal migration. Although a work visa is necessary to enter these countries along with a permit to stay, many foreign workers enter the individual countries regularly, and then they become illegal migrants as they remain in GCC countries after expiry of the respective contracts – often with their employers’ full knowledge thereof. Other major illegal migration channels include ports, such as the one in Oman, as well as pilgrimages to Saudi Arabia: indeed, the latter allow being granted visas that often facilitate illegal migration (P. Cadène, B.Dumortier, 2008).

December 2008; Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, *45th Annual Report*; UAE Ministry of Economy, *UAE in Numbers 2007*; UAE Ministry of Economy, Central Department of Statistics, *Labour Force Survey*, 2008.

¹Legend: BA (Bahrain); KU (Kuwait); OM (Oman); QA (Qatar); UAE (United Arab Emirates); SA (Saudi Arabia). ²Data of Bahrain and Oman on population refer to 2007; those of UAE refer to 2005 for population and to 2006 for labor force.

As shown in Figure 4, the incidence of migrants on the total population ranges from 27% in Saudi Arabia to about 80% and 90% in the UAE and Qatar, respectively - while the foreign labour force rates are higher, being in excess of 80% in Kuwait (84.4%), the UAE (92%) and Qatar (94%).

4. The Impact of Migration on the Labour Market

It is understandable that the remarkable incidence of foreigners on the overall population and labour force has resulted in several problems for the Gulf economies - first and foremost the need to ensure citizens' rights by preserving their cultural identity.


This requirement has led to the adoption of measures since the 1970's in order to ensure that foreigners could only stay on a temporary basis. To that end, they have been excluded from nationality rights, political and ownership rights, and welfare rights. Additionally, highly restrictive conditions have been imposed on family reunion; the duration of employment contracts has been rarely in excess of two years; and a recruitment mechanism has been introduced that relies on a sponsorship system (*kafala*), whereby any foreigner intending to work in a Gulf country should find a national of that country (*kafil*) who stands surety for him/her. In this way, the sponsorship system has increased the dependence of foreign workers on private nationals of the GCC countries, allowing the latter considerable influence on composition and amount of migration flows as well as allowing major flexibility in setting salaries and labour conditions - which often borders on exploitation and black market situations, as is the case with permits to stay.

While several constraints limit foreigners' decision-making power, a number of benefits have been granted to nationals - including the right to study and receive medical care; free transportation systems; precedence in public employment and certain private sector activities; high wages and generous retirement benefits; and almost non-existent taxation. Thanks to the bountiful welfare system and the granting of specific rights, these States are enabling their nationals to benefit from oil export revenues.

Thus, it can be argued that, on the whole, the high incidence of migrants on the overall population and labour force in the GCC countries has resulted in the unequal allocation of rights and duties, which has influenced the labour market and ultimately resulted in its segmentation.

One major gap that has opened is the one separating the public from the private sector. The first is where most foreign labour can be found. In all GCC countries the incidence of foreign labour on the total labour force is definitely higher than that of nationals, with rates in excess of 90% in Qatar (99.5%) and Kuwait (96.6%) (Fig.5).

Figura 5 – *Distribution of Labor Force by Nationality in Private Sector and Public Sector (% , 2008¹)*



Sources: Labour Market Regulatory Authority (LMRA), *Bahrain Labour Market, 2009*; Institute of Banking Studies of Kuwait (Kibs), *Economic and Financial Data base for 2009*; Statistics Authority of Qatar, *Labour Force Sample Survey, Results, December 2008*; Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, *45th Annual Report*; UAE, Ministry of Economy, *UAE in Numbers 2007*, UAE Ministry of Economy, Central Department of Statistics, *Labour Force Survey, 2008*.

¹Data of Oman refer to 2007.

This can be accounted for by considerations relating both to the demand and to the offer of labour. On the demand side, entrepreneurs prefer foreigners because the recruitment mechanisms can ensure lower wages, longer work hours and higher possibilities for dismissal. On the offer side, the higher competition rate in the private sector makes the latter less appealing to nationals as it impacts on wage levels and labour conditions. Furthermore, the employment positions made available by the private sector are regarded as either excessively menial or inadequate to the formation that nationals have developed, which are essentially humanistic.


The domestic workforce can be found mostly in the public sector, which it finds appealing because of the high wages, generous retirement benefits, favourable work conditions, and the social status that the public employment gives. In all GCC countries there is a high incidence of nationals in the public sector (Figure 5), the highest rates being those found in Saudi Arabia (92%), Oman (84.7%) and Bahrain (80.3%).

Thus, migration flows have created two segments in the labour market that are totally different, not only due to the nationalities involved, but also in terms of their respective flexibility; indeed, the private sector is highly flexible⁶, while the public sector is completely non-flexible.

The rigidity of the public segment in the labour market can account, furthermore, for the paradox whereby high unemployment rates can be found among nationals of several countries in this area (Figure 6) in spite of the high demand for foreign labour. The rigidity in question actually hampers the migration of national and foreign workers between the public and the private sector and thus leads the former towards the public sector, which has by now reached saturation and can no longer absorb adequately the labour force.

The cases of Saudi Arabia, UAE and Bahrain are especially significant in this connection: the unemployment rate is close to 10%, 14%, and 18%, respectively, as regards nationals, while the rates concerning foreigners are very low (0.4%, 2.6%, 2%, respectively) and foreign labour force makes up almost 80% of the total labour force in the private sector. The same applies to Oman, where unofficial sources estimate a total unemployment rate of about 15% (CIA, 2010).

⁶ The wage flexibility index as estimated by the World Economic Forum – ranging from 1 to 7 – shows very high values ranging from 5.4% in Saudi Arabia to 6.2% in Qatar; conversely, the rigidity of employment index – ranging from 1 to 100 – shows very low values ranging from 27% in Saudi Arabia to 13% in Kuwait (World Economic Forum, 2009).

Figura 6 – Rate of Unemployment, 2008¹

Sources: SAMA, *45th Annual Report*; UAE Ministry of Economy, Central Department of Statistics, *Labour Force Survey*, 2008b; Qatar Statistics Authority, *Labour Force Sample Results*, 2008; Institute of Banking Studies of Kuwait, *Economic and Financial Database for Bankers*, 2009; Ministry of Labour and Bahrain Centre for Studies and Research, *Labour Force Survey*, November 2004.

¹ Data of Bahrain refer to 2004; data of UAE refer to 2005.

This problem is compounded if one considers the data relating to youth unemployment rate, which is on average in excess of 30% throughout the area. In fact, the occupational outlook of youths is a very serious issue for the GCC countries, given the high growth rate of national populations - estimated to be in excess of 2% in all countries. Among youths, those aged 0 to 24 years make up over 55% of the total in all countries, and their mainly humanities-oriented curriculum in both high school and universities does not fit in with the occupational requirements arising from the needs of economic growth.

Faced with the urgent need to cope with this issue, national policies have followed a three-fold approach: a) on the one hand, the production structure has been diversified further to stimulate demand for labour in a way that can meet the requirements of a young, rapidly growing population, which the oil sector is unable to ensure on its own given its capital intensive nature; b) on the other hand, educational and training policies have been implemented to promote skills appropriate to the needs of the labor market; c) thirdly, the nationalization of the labour force has been fostered (Saudization, Omanization, Kuwaitization, etc.).

As for the latter, governments in the GCC countries have tried to increase the incidence of nationals on the workforce by way of various measures, including the ban on recruiting foreigners or the obligation to reserve labour quotas for nationals regarding certain activities; the granting of facilitations to businesses if they employ nationals, coupled with the imposition of taxes in case they recruit foreigners; the extension of the benefits featuring in the public sector to some private sector occupations so as to make them more appealing to nationals.

However, nationalization policies only have proved successful in the public sector. In the private sector market logic has continued to predominate. Indeed, the

higher competitiveness of foreign labour in terms of wages, productivity, and work conditions have led companies to ignore the prohibition on recruitment and disregard the facilitations envisaged for the employment of nationals. On the other hand, the fast pace of growth of these economies and their high population growth rates have determined new needs and demands that the national component of the population is unable to meet because it lacks the required skills and/or is not interested there in. Additionally, given the marked segmentation of the labour market, nationalization policies actually have increased social segmentation as well.

5. Social Segmentation

In the presence of a social system featuring the high incidence of foreigners on both the overall population and the labour force, nationalization policies have increased the unequal allocation of rights and duties and fuelled mutual tensions and grievances between nationals and foreigners. The former blame the latter for their unfair competition in the private sector, which makes difficult for them to get access to private employment and worsens the overall work conditions; the latter blame the former for the privileges they enjoy, which are regarded as completely inadequate in the light of their contribution to the fast growth experienced by the Gulf economies.


However, segmentation does not only affect foreigners vs. nationals, as can also be found among the former - where different segments can be defined depending on nationality, work executed, education levels and skills, and the underlying cultural models. This has translated into a sort of social scale, ranging from Westerners to non-Gulf Arabians up to Asians, as well as in major differences in terms of wage levels and living conditions. In short, a major gap has arisen between Western workers, mainly Europeans and North Americans, and the Asian labour force.

The former are a small minority of the foreign population, practising highly-skilled professions and usually covering high-level positions in the GCC societies. The main reason why they are welcome to Gulf nationals consists in their having chosen to work in their countries on a purely voluntary basis, on account of the high living standards they can afford in those countries. Additionally, their choice is usually a temporary one, given that they ultimately expect to get back to the highly-developed countries they come from. Conversely, for all the other workers, and in particular for Asian workers, the decision to migrate is mostly mandated by the difficult living conditions existing in their countries, which often makes it

impossible for them to get back home and obliges them to accept more burdensome and vexatious conditions. It is no mere chance that *contract labourers* are mostly to be found among Asian workers. Those labourers are usually recruited by brokerage agencies in the respective countries of origin. They are unskilled, illiterate workers and usually live in labour camps from which they are taken daily to the places they have to work - mostly construction sites and farms. Given their humble conditions and the recruitment mechanisms, they are especially prone to the risk of exploitation and abuse - including lower wages, forfeiture of their passports, deduction of visa-related costs from their wages, black market trafficking in visas, extended working hours, delayed payment of their wages, dangerous working conditions, and segregation in labour camps as they are prohibited from living in urban areas and/or going to urban areas at night.

Accordingly, the unequal distribution of wealth, rights and duties in a society featuring a large number of foreigners fuels a climate of conflict, not only among nationals, but also among expatriates. Thus, non-Gulf Arab workers believe they are discriminated against compared to Asian workers as regards recruitment, in spite of their language and cultural similarities with the nationals; Asian workers claim they get lower wages and are exposed to unhealthy living conditions; nationals in turn see the massive numbers of foreign workers as a threat for the social and political stability of their countries in terms of loss of cultural identity and captive foreign policy decisions. Against this backdrop, the greatest fears felt by GCC nationals over the past few years have resulted from the fast growth rate of Asians - in particular Indians and Bengalis, who make up the majority of foreigners as well as including most contract labourers (Fig. 7).

Figura 7 – Main Expatriate Communities in GCC Countries (values in thousands)¹



Source: A. Kapiszewski, *Arab versus Asian Migrant Workers in the GCC Countries*, UN/POP/EGM/2006/02, 22 May 2006.

¹Estimates for various years: Bahrain, Oman, Saudi Arabia, 2004; Kuwait, 2003; Qatar, UAE, 2002.

In a context of a highly unequal, segmented, increasingly conflictual society, the effects of the global economic imbalance were produced. Those effects were increased by the exchange rate regime that features in the Gulf countries.

6. Exchange Rate Regimes in the GCC Countries

For over thirty years the GCC countries have been formally or informally pegging their currencies to the dollar⁷. However, since 1 January 2003 the Gulf economies have officially adopted a dollar peg regime as a first step towards their full monetary integration.⁸

The reasons which led the GCC members to link their currencies to the dollar are basically two-fold:

1. firstly, one should consider the marked incidence of oil revenues on total exports and public revenues. Since international oil prices are in dollars, pegging national currencies to the US currency can ensure the stability of export earnings and government revenues, reducing foreign exchange risk.

2. secondly, one should consider the delays that still characterize the financial, economic and institutional structures of the GCC countries. These suggest anchoring their currencies to that of a country with strong institutions and traditions of stability in order to import that stability along with the credibility and confidence in their respective economies.

Indeed, the dollar peg allowed the GCC members to keep price dynamics basically stable for over twenty years. Still, the worsening of the global economic imbalance that started in 2002, along with the widening of the gap between the growing deficit of the US balance of payments and the balance surplus of the Gulf countries, ultimately resulted in turning the dollar peg into a vehicle of instability from the anchor country to the GCC economies - via both a liquidity effect and a cost effect.


⁷ Oman has officially pegged the riyal to the US currency since 1973; while Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar and the UAE, despite having *de jure* tied their currencies to the SDR until 2001, *de facto* have pegged the dollar at a fixed rate since the eighties. Even the Kuwaiti dinar, which was formally tied to a *basket peg* until 2002, has always shown a pronounced stability against the dollar.

⁸ However, Kuwait withdrew from the agreement in may 2007 and re-instated the previous basket peg regime.

6.1. Inflationary Effects Produced by the Dollar Peg: the Liquidity Effect.

The dollar peg translated the standing surpluses of the balances of payments in the GCC countries - resulting from the increase in the world oil demand as well as in oil prices - into monetary base increases (Fig.8).


Figura 8 – Monetary Base (values in national currencies).



Source: IMF, *International Financial Statistics Yearbook*, 2009b

This led to the well-known dilemma of the so-called *impossible trinity* - i.e. the impossibility to simultaneously pursue the three objectives consisting of internal balance, external balance, and exchange stability in the presence of fixed exchange rates.

In the experience of the GCC countries, the objective renounced was the achievement of internal balance. Indeed, the need to defend the exchange rate and prevent capital inflows made it difficult to keep monetary circulation under control. This led to the alignment of the GCC member interest rates to the lower US rates, at a time when the rapidly growing economies of the area would have required more stringent monetary policies. This can be seen quite clearly from 2007 onwards, when the short-term interest rates of Gulf countries fell in parallel with those of the US, despite the pressure of inflation existing in their economies. The consequences were negative real interest rates, which encouraged borrowing and the expansion of monetary offer in its broadest sense (Figure 9). This fuelled inflation and gave rise to speculative bubbles in those areas where bottlenecks were especially rife - e.g. the real estate sector.

Figura 9 – Interest Rate and Inflation Rate

Sources: Qatar Central Bank; Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency; Kuwait Central Bank; UAE Central Bank; www.global-rates.com; IMF, *Regional Economic Outlook: Middle East and Central Asia*.

¹ UAE data refer to the central bank overnight interest rate.

The mean inflation rate as measured from the consumer price index rose in the GCC countries as a whole from 0.2% in 1998-2002 to 10.2% in 2008 - the peak values being recorded in Qatar (15%), Oman (12.6%), and UAE (11.5%). In Saudi Arabia, where inflation was always lower than 1%, consumer prices rose starting from 2006 so that the 2008 inflation rate was as high as 10% (Figure 9).

The peak increase concerned food and housing prices, which impact to a greater extent on the living standards of the poorest part of the population. More specifically, in the 2004 - 2008 period food prices rose by between 24% - 30% in the Gulf countries with peak increases of 29.7% and 30.1% in Qatar and the UAE, respectively. As to the latter, the increase was in excess of 46% in the Emirates (UAE Ministry of Economy, 2008a) and peaked at 60% in Qatar (Qatar Central Bank, 2008).

Thus, it can be argued that - in the presence of diverging economic cycles in the GCC countries as opposed to the US - the dollar peg translated an inflation process initiated by the increase in the international oil demand as well as in oil prices into the expansion of the monetary base, which ultimately fuelled inflation.⁹

The inflationary effect was actually also due to a cost effect that was fostered by the dollar peg and amplified by the features of the local labour market.

⁹ From an econometric standpoint, this conclusion is supported by a study performed by Saidi, Scacciavillani, Prasad and Ali to identify the factors that influence inflation pressure in GCC countries (2009). Based on VAR models of different complexity, they showed that the monetary base changes were the key determinants of the inflationary spiral.

6.2. *Inflationary Effects Produced by the Dollar Peg: the Pass-Through Effect*

The dollar peg converted the depreciation of the US currency, which featured in the 2002 - 2008 period, compared to the currencies of the main GCC countries' trade partners in increased costs, due to the pass-through mechanism. Indeed, it also entailed the depreciation of the GCC currencies compared to the euro, yen, and the UK pound, raising the prices in national currency for imported goods. In this connection, special importance should be attached to the depreciation of the US dollar compared to the euro, since Europe is the main import area for the GCC members.¹⁰

This effect plays a major role in the Gulf countries, as their economies are: small-sized; open to international trade; highly focused on oil production; with a segmented labour market and a considerable incidence of foreign workers; with limited agricultural production and manufacturing, for which they have to turn abroad to import a large share of their consumer goods, raw materials, intermediate inputs and capital goods.

Special importance should be attached in this context to the fact that these countries are highly dependent on imports of farming produce and food. The latter are a significant portion of their total imports - with peak values recorded in 2008 in Kuwait (16%), Saudi Arabia (13.2%), Oman (10.9%) and Emirates (9.2%) (WTO, 2009b). Indeed, the dry climate, the scarcity of arable land, and the high population growth rates make the internal supply insufficient to meet domestic needs and require these countries to import considerable amounts of food - whose prices markedly impact on the living conditions of working classes and, above all, migrant workers. Against this backdrop, it can be easily understood that - given the dollar peg - any increase in import prices resulting from the depreciation of the dollar can jeopardize the working classes' living standards and fuel demands for wage rises along with social tensions.

In fact, the particular structure of the labour market interacted with the specific features of the exchange rate regime giving rise to a mixed inflationary spiral, in which the pressures on the cost side overlapped with the tensions on the demand side.

¹⁰ The pass-through effect was recently estimated to range between 25% and 35% (Al-Qudsi, Kaloti, Numan, Obeid, Marar, 2008). Accordingly, if a 10% depreciation rate of the US dollar translates into a 3% increase of the inflation rate, the depreciation cumulated by the US dollar vis-à-vis the Euro in the 2002 to 2008 period - amounting approximately to 30% - may have resulted into increasing the inflationary pressure by about 15%.

7. The Influence of Labour Market Features on Inflationary Dynamics

In the context of a highly segmented and conflictual labour market, where migrants predominate and the allocation of rights and duties is imbalanced, the effects of inflation, initiated by the oil price increase and amplified by the dollar peg in the presence of the global economic imbalance, should be assessed.

The price increases, especially those of food and housing, translated into a reduction of real income for a large section of the population - with particular regard to the poorer migrants - and resulted in wage increase claims among growing tensions.

The highest wage increases were granted in the public sector. From 2005 to 2007, public salaries were repeatedly increased in all GCC members - the peak growth being the one found in the Emirates (125%) (Gulf Talent, 2008). This contributed to enlarging the inequalities existing in a labour market which was already markedly segmented, as it made the public sector employment more appealing and more difficult for the private sector to employ national workers. Accordingly, the private sector's dependency upon foreign manpower increased further at a time of strong wage demands, due to the need to defend the purchasing power of wages. This resulted ultimately in a steady increase in basic salaries: the highest increases were granted by the construction and banking sectors. More specifically, in the 2005 - 2009 period wages rose in the GCC countries as a whole by about 41% - the peak values being recorded in UAE (46.6%) (Gulf Talent, 2009b).

Wage increases were also favored by the effects produced by the dollar peg on the value of migrants' remittances. The dollar depreciation throughout the 2002 to 2008 period could be observed not only with regard to the main currencies, but also in respect of some of the countries from which the main migration flows originate. In particular, from December 2003 to December 2007 the dollar depreciated by 17% and 33.5% compared to Indian rupee and the Filipino pesos, respectively. Due to the dollar peg, the Gulf currencies also showed the same level of depreciation, which resulted in reducing the value of remittances as calculated in the currencies of the countries of origin of migrants.

This data should not be overlooked, considering the high incidence of migrants on the total population and labour force in the GCC countries. The temporary work contracts and the many obstacles hampering family reunions are leading migrants to send a considerable part of their wages back home¹¹ and assess their savings in the currencies of their countries (Razgallah, 2007; Naufal, Termos, 2009). In this context, the dollar depreciation contributed to fuelling the claims for wage increases.

The greatest claims came from Indian workers, who are the majority of foreign workers and, in particular, of contract workers. Being increasingly aware of their numbers as well as of the changed conditions in the labour market of their home country - where growth was accompanied by major wage increases - and faced with the exploitation and vexatious recruitment mechanisms they are subjected to, they have staged major strikes and demonstrations that have led their wages to increase in recent years at a faster pace than those of workers from other countries (Gulf Talent, 2008).

In conclusion, the peculiar structure of the labour market in the GCC countries interacted with the exchange rate regime, giving rise to a mixed inflation in which the pressure on the cost side overlapped with those on the demand side.

8. Conclusions: the Need for the GCC Countries to Amend their Exchange Rate Regimes

The GCC countries are characterized by a small indigenous population; the need to import labor from abroad to meet the demand coming from the oil sector and the diversification processes of the production structure; a high proportion of immigrants in the population and in the labor force; a wide-ranging inequalities in social and economic terms. Given these features, it is fundamental for them to reconcile growth with social stability. The latter requires a more equitable allocation of rights and duties along with not only more effective actions in terms of human rights, but also more stable economic dynamics such as preventing the redistribution effects of inflation from increasing inequalities in income allocation.

The anti-inflationary objective is a priority for the Gulf countries, which entails not only countering the effects, but also removing the causes of inflation.

¹¹ Saudi Arabia's ranks second worldwide in terms of remittances sent abroad, while the remaining countries of the GCC are among the first thirty ones on this list. Still, in terms of percent incidence of remittances on the GDP, these countries rank much higher on the list – Bahrain ranks fourth and Kuwait is the twelfth (World Bank, 2008).

The experience of the new millennium has shown that the dollar peg was a major vehicle of inflation for the GCC members and suggests that it should be amended. An alternative might consist of a basket peg system, whereby national currencies could be anchored to a basket of strong currencies that mirror direction and intensity of commercial and financial flows on the international market.¹²

Given this context, it would be appropriate to include the euro in the said basket. Indeed, including the euro can reduce the risks related to possible exchange losses, pass-through effect and unwanted liquidity changes due to the exclusive anchorage to the US dollar.

(Exchange Risks) - In small economies such as those of the Gulf countries, which are open to international exchanges, trade relations play a key role and make it especially advisable to rely on an exchange rate regime that can reduce transactional costs as related to currency conversion and the exchange risk. This requires considering direction and composition of trade flows.

As for the GCC countries, oil exports is the main item of their sales abroad, with an incidence over total sales ranging from about 40% in the Arab Emirates to over 83% in Kuwait. Such sales are targeted mainly at Asian countries; conversely, Europe is the main partner of the Gulf countries in terms of their imports, which consist basically in food and manufactured products.

Taking account of this framework, special importance should be attached to the features of the exchange rate regime. The currency revenues related to exports are essentially in dollars, both because oil is quoted in US dollars and because the latter are widely used as transaction currency in Asian countries. Conversely, their imports are paid mostly in euro, given the current practices whereby European countries quote their exports in the respective national currencies. Accordingly, the euro/dollar exchange rate plays a key role in the GCC region and in the past decade it has caused significant currency losses because of the trend towards depreciation of the US currency compared to the euro. This would appear to suggest that greater consideration should be given to the euro in the GCC countries' exchange rate system.

(The Pass-through Effect) - The importance of imports to the Gulf area from Europe increases the risks related to the pass-through effect. Europe is actually the source of 33.4% of the imports for Qatar; 31.9% of the imports for Saudi Arabia;

¹² A more in-depth overview of the benefits resulting from a basket peg to the GCC countries can be found in the following: Nuri Erbas, Guerami (2003); Aleisa, Hammoudeh, Yuan (2008); Habib, Stràsky (2008); Khan (2008); O. Marzovilla (2010); O. Marzovilla, M. Mele (2010). Some studies attempted to determine the appropriate composition of this basket: see Aleisa, Hammoudeh, Yuan (2008); Jen and Bindelli (2008); Saidi, Scacciavillani, Prasad, and Ali (2008).

28.5% for Kuwait; 22% for the Arab Emirates; and 17.1% for Qatar (WTO, 2009)¹³. Given this framework, the dollar depreciation compared to the euro - as was the case in the 2002-2008 period - entails the depreciation of the Gulf currencies as well and might translate into a major increase in the price of the goods imported from the EU as calculated in national currencies, such as resulting in significant inflationary pressure on the costs side. The latter pressure might be reduced by introducing a basket peg, in which the weight allocated to the euro should mirror its use in trade transactions of the GCC members.

(The Liquidity Effect) - Including the euro in the basket might also reduce the unwanted liquidity changes due to the dollar peg.

The unquestionable predominance of import flows of the Gulf countries from the EU compared to export flows can account for the trade surplus that the European area taken as a whole generally shows respect to the GCC region - unlike the deficits shown by the other major trade partners of the Middle Eastern countries (WTO, 2009a).

This is an important item in order to devise an exchange rate system that can appropriately meet the requirements coming from the GCC members. Indeed, creating links to the currency of an area that - given the structure of its trade relations with the Gulf countries - mostly shows trade surpluses can allow such countries to partly recover their monetary sovereignty by limiting the expansion effects on the monetary base that result from their being anchored to the currency of a country that shows systematic trade deficits respect to them.

(Stabilization of Remittances) - The dollar depreciation that has featured throughout the last decade along with the oscillations observed in the latest part of the decade - including revaluation in 2008, depreciation in early 2009, revaluation in April-May 2010 - has produced destabilizing effects on the value of the remittances from foreign workers, which are the majority of the overall labour force. These continuous oscillations have given rise to uncertainty among expatriates, influencing their families' living conditions and fuelling tensions in the labour market. The basket peg may reduce those uncertainties by enabling greater stability of nominal effective exchange rates.

One may therefore conclude that the advantage of a basket peg including the euro would consist of preserving the benefits in terms of credibility and stability of expectations that arise from the anchorage to currencies with a strong and established reputation. At the same time, it would contribute to stabilizing nominal effective exchange rates along with the value of remittances in the currencies of the

¹³ The percent rates related to the US are rather smaller: 13% SA, 11.3% KU, 9% QA, 7% UAE, 5.7% OM.

migrants' countries, while reducing the risks due to the pass-through effect and restoring some measure of flexibility in monetary policies - which would partly reduce the constraints imposed by their dependency on the US monetary policy.

Although the dollar has appreciated in recent times and uncertainties have focused on the euro, the experience of the past decade shows that the weakness of the US currency - which has prevailed over most of the past decade - may no longer be construed as an episodic event. In fact, it mirrors a world that is no longer as asymmetrical as the one that emerged from World War II. Indeed, the USA are still the world's most powerful economy; however, their leadership is no longer absolute and unquestioned, as it has to come to terms with a new reality that has been developing during this new millennium. It is a reality where globalization is advancing and speculation is on the rise, while the global economic imbalance is worsening and new major players are emerging on the international scene, including several developing countries and a large unified monetary and economic area, i.e. the European Monetary Union.

Given this context, one may not rule out a new trend of depreciation of the dollar in the coming years and, in presence of dollar peg, a new inflationary spiral in the economies of the GCC. The major costs due to inflation in the Gulf countries - given their economic, demographic, and social structures - would point to the advisability of amending their exchange rate regimes by relying on a basket peg.

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SUMMARY

The GCC countries are characterized by a high incidence of foreigners in both the overall population and the labour force as well as by deep inequalities in social and economic terms. These features have influenced the labour market and fuelled mutual tensions and grievances between nationals and foreigners. Consequently, these countries need to reconcile the demands of economic growth with those of social stability. The latter requires more stable economic dynamics, which prevent the redistributive effects of inflation.

The experience of the new millennium has shown that the dollar peg, which characterizes the exchange rate regime of the GCC countries, has been a major vehicle of inflation for the Gulf economies and suggests that it should be amended. The alternative proposed in this paper is to anchor the national currencies to a basket of strong currencies that mirror the direction and intensity of commercial and financial flows on the international market and in which there is also the euro.

SAMPLING AND ESTIMATION OF AN ELUSIVE UNIVERSE: THE MULTIPLICITY APPROACH

Fulvia Mecatti


1. Introduction

Studies of immigrants and of foreign presence in the country are challenging under many respects. From the point of view of the sampling statistician the target population to be sampled and estimated, and especially with regard its illegal component, lacks some basic features which are fundamental for applying the traditional sampling theory so that *ad hoc* solutions are required. For instance a conventional sample survey presumes the use of a unique list for selection purposes, complete and up-to-date, where all the individuals eligible for the survey are recorded and identified by a label. In surveys concerning immigrants, complete unit lists exploitable as sampling frames are usually unavailable. Moreover the detectability of eligible individuals is generally an issue due to the combination of both the essential *rarity* of the migranhood status and the underlying requirement of anonymity which is crucial for the illegal part. In addition, the very size of the population, although finite, is typically an unknown parameter itself. For these reasons there is an increased risk of under-coverage bias and high non-response rate that should be addressed at both the selection and the estimation stage of the survey. Thus the immigrant population classifies as a *difficult-to-sample* human population for being rare, elusive and hidden. Survey researchers have been committed since the sixties in developing efficient methods for designing sample surveys of difficult-to-access human population. Sirken (2004) and Thompson (2002) offer comprehensive accounts of those methods. In this paper two popular and widely applied strategies feasible for sampling difficult-to-sample populations are reviewed (Section 2). In Section 3 the multiplicity approach is described as a formal environment able to unify and simplify both methodologies as well as many estimators accessible in literature. In Section 4 a class of estimators for the total of a quantitative characteristic or for a category percentage is discussed, based upon multiplicity and showing the traditional Horvitz-Thompson structure so that unbiasedness is assured and accuracy assessment can be easily addressed. The performance of a collection of estimators both included and not-included in the class is compared and discussed by using simulation results from a previous extensive study.

2. Network Sampling and Multiple Frame Survey

A very popular method in social research concerning hidden and hard-to-access populations is the Network Sampling (Birnbaum and Sirken, 1965). Also known as Multiplicity Sampling or Snowball Sampling, it constitutes a *link-tracing* sampling procedure in which social links are followed from one respondent to another in order to obtain a sample and successively are accounted for in order to obtain an accurate estimate of the unknown quantity of interest. Network sampling was originally introduced for surveying rare traits or small segments of a larger population such as for instance special ethnic groups, shortly referred as *rare populations*. For a rare population a separate list, perfectly representing all and only the eligible individuals is usually non-accessible. In practice, alternative available lists not perfectly including the target universe must be used instead for selection purposes, for instance an official register or a former decennial census. The target population for which a perfect list is nonexistent and formed by people with the rare characteristic of interest is named *target units* and is then associated with a separate sampling frame of *selection units*, for instance a households list. The target population and the sampling frame do not usually coincide; furthermore one is seldom simply included in the other but the two lists are linked according to a possibly complex pattern. In fact the target units and the selection units may coincide but more frequently are linked by a *linkage rule* for instance a family linkage such as sibling or a social linkage such as acquaintance, community membership and similar. In Figure 1 an example of linkage structure between a target population and a sampling frame is sketched. The linkage rule connects every selection units to a network of target units. The Network selection scheme implies that when a (selection) unit is selected from the sampling frame, the entire network of target units to which it is linked automatically enters the final sampling. For example, the householder (selection unit) selected from an official register (sampling frame) is asked to report about all the family members living in the house (target units), *i.e.* also about units included in the target population and not included in the sampling frame but all linked to the selected unit by the in-leaving family linkage rule. As a consequence, target units linked to more than one selection unit, *i.e.* appearing in more than one network, show an increased probability of being both included and duplicated in the final sample.

Figure 1 – Example of linkage pattern between target units belonging into the target population and selection units included in the available sampling frame.



In order to adjust for duplications in network sampling estimation, a first concept of *multiplicity* is suggested, namely the number of selection units to which every target unit is linked and consequently its potential number of duplications in the final sample.

A Multiple Frame Survey is an alternative perhaps more flexible strategy for dealing with a difficult-to-sample universe. It applies to situations in which the conventional unique list is nonexistent or unapproachably resource-consuming to be acquired. Instead a collection of two or more lists whose union offers an adequate coverage of the target population might be easier to access. In the general case the lists are allowed to be partial and overlapping each other, *i.e.* singularly considered each list normally does not cover the universe of interest and the same unit may be duplicated in more than one list and possibly in all of them. However, a Multiple Frame survey can be convenient even if a conventional unique list did exist. In fact the special case of a complete list coupled with a second partial list obviously totally overlapping (included) is provided in order to motivate a Dual Frame survey in the original papers introducing the topic, with the main purpose of survey cost savings (Hartley, 1962; 1974). For instance let assume that an area frame covering the target universe is available but expensive to sample for needing

a local visit, and that a second partial list cheaper to sample is also available, for example a collection of email addresses. Thus an efficient sampling design would contemplate a combined use of both the available lists by under-sampling from the expensive complete list and over-sampling from the cheaper one. More recently, starting from the '90s, Multiple Frame surveys have been revalued as a feasible tool for dealing with difficult-to-sample populations. Particularly appealing for this sort of application is the possibility of using different modes of data collection for different lists. This can facilitate to reach specific subsectors of the universe of interest, for instance personal visit for a list with high prevalence of elder people and email contact for another list with high prevalence of teenagers. Besides there is no theoretical limit to the number of lists that can be brought into the survey with the aim of improving upon the two main issues of surveying rare, elusive and hidden populations, namely under-coverage and missing values. The Multiple Frame structure also encases the so called Center Sampling design (Blangiardo, 1996; Mecatti, 2004) which has been successfully applied in European migration studies (Eurostat, 2000). In a recent fundamental paper (Lohr and Rao, 2006) is stated <<As the U.S., Canada and other nations grow in diversity, different sampling frames may better capture subgroups of the population. [...] We anticipate that modular sampling designs using multiple frames will be widely used in the future>>. On the other hand selecting the final sample by relying on a set of partial and overlapping lists implies that the estimation stage must account for both the chance of duplicated sampled units and the increased, usually unknown, inclusion probability of individual appearing in more than one list. These issues have stimulated a wide multiple frame literature where a series of approaches and estimators were proposed with a general enhanced complexity. All of these approaches and estimators can be both unified and simplified by means of the *multiplicity approach* as described in the next section. The multiplicity approach generalizes the original concept of multiplicity derived from the network sampling and applies it to the more general multiple frame setup. The main purpose being the creation of a unified theoretical framework suitable for sampling and estimation of elusive, rare and hidden universe.

3. A Unified Multiplicity Approach

The conventional unique-list sampling framework is commonly formalized by a pair of sets: one set denotes the universe U of known size N listing all the individuals of interest each identified by a label, normally the integers $1 \dots N$. The second set includes the individual values y_i of the study characteristic being

measured on U . The two sets are linked by a one-to-one relation symbolized by the label $i = 1 \dots N$. This setup fails either wholly or in part when managing difficult-to-sample populations so that a third element has to enter the picture for sampling purposes, namely a *sampling device* (Figure 2). The sampling device is linked to the universe of interest according to a linkage pattern substituting the one-to-one relation of the traditional unique-frame setup. For instance in network sampling the sampling device is an external list of size M not necessary equal to the target population size N . This external list displays the selection units $\{1 \dots j \dots M\}$ linked to each target unit $i \in U$ by a well defined linkage rule. No matter how complex, the linkage pattern is completely described by a system of $N \times M$ indicator functions $\mathbf{1}_{i \rightarrow j}$ termed *counting rule*, taking value 1 if the target unit i is actually linked to the selection unit j and 0 otherwise. Thus the multiplicity, *i.e.* the number of selection units to which every target unit is linked, is readily defined as a sum over the counting rule $m_i = \sum_{j=1}^M \mathbf{1}_{i \rightarrow j}$.

When the sampling device is represented by a collection of $Q \geq 2$ lists U_q such as $U \cong \bigcup_{q=1}^Q U_q$ a Multiple Frame survey is concerned. A list-specific counting rule univocally informs about the frame membership of every target unit

$$\mathbf{1}_{i \rightarrow j, q} = \mathbf{1}_{i \in U_q} = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } U \ni i \equiv j \in U_q \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \quad (1)$$

Again, unit multiplicity is defined as a sum of counting rule

$$m_i = \{\text{number of frames } U_q \text{ in which unit } i \in U \text{ belongs}\} = \sum_{q=1}^Q \mathbf{1}_{i \in U_q} \quad (2)$$

Figure 2 – Schematic representation of a difficult-to-sample population sampling framework where the conventional unique-list in one-to-one relation is unavailable so that an external sampling device is needed





Figure 3 – Example of a three-frames survey with partial and overlapping lists. Every individual appearing in one list only has multiplicity $m_i = 1$; people appearing in two lists belong into the intersection of a pair of lists and have multiplicity $m_i = 2$. Finally, individuals listed in all of the lists are included in the intersection of all the three frames and show multiplicity $m_i = 3$.




We will now discuss the estimation phase by focusing on a Multiple Frame setup, having cleared how the multiplicity is able to handle in a unified view different cases of imperfect lists. Let $T_y = \sum_{i \in U} y_i$ be the parameter to be estimated, namely the total of a quantitative study variable. This is the parameter traditionally considered in sampling theory for covering typical situations in social research. In fact, T_y is a trivial function of the mean and can also represent the frequency of a specific category when the study variable is qualitative, either ordinal or categorical. In addition by substituting the y_i values by 1's in T_y gives the population size N which may be an unknown parameter to be estimated itself, of special interest for illegal immigration studies. Hence given an unbiased estimator of T_y , an unbiased estimator of the mean or of the percentage T_y/N as well as of the universe size N is also given.

Q samples, one from each of the available lists, are independently selected under possibly different sampling designs. Consequently the estimation of T_y becomes a problem of combining data from Q independent samples, possibly including duplications of the same unit due to the list-overlapping. The traditional approach to multiple frame estimation is based upon the classification of sampled units (selected from overlapping frames) into disjoint *domains*. Domains are the 2^{Q-1} disjoint subsets that can be arranged from the Q overlapping frames, for instance the 3 subsets in the Dual Frames or the 7 subsets in the three-frame case

sketched in Figure 4. By means of the general multiple frame notation recently introduced (Lohr and Rao, 2006) a domain is formally defined as the subset $U_K = (\bigcap_{q \in K} U_q) \cap (\bigcap_{q \in K^c} U_q^c)$ where c denotes complementation and $K \subseteq \{1 \dots Q\}$ is an index subset as showed in the right panel of Figure 4. In practice, domain classification requires first the collection of frame membership information by asking every sampled unit, besides about the study variable, also about which frames it belongs into other than the one in which it has been sampled. Secondly the domain classification should be performed with no error. Both may be strong assumptions that limit the application to immigrant studies. Target units might in fact be sensitive to the frame membership and either respond insincerely or do not respond. For example when the set of lists being used includes a socially stigmatized status or is somewhat perceived as threatening, such as enrollment in drug addiction public programs or police and criminal registers. Even if the domain membership were correctly collected, domain classification would remain in fact an error-prone activity, with increasing risk as the number of lists increases in order to improve the population coverage. Nevertheless, the domain classification is the conventional device to overcome the duplication problem due to the frame overlapping.

A number of estimators has been introduced in literature under many approaches, in general analytically complex, all relying upon the domain classification to correct for overlapping and upon weighting systems to correct for duplications.

Figure 4 – Example of domain classification with 2 frames (Dual Frame notation) and with 3 frames (Multiple Frame notation).



As a consequence, computationally demanding variance estimation methods are ordinary suggested in order to assess the accuracy of the estimate (see among others Skinner et al, 1994; Singh and Wu, 1996, 2003; Lohr and Rao, 2006). The multiplicity approach offers a unified approach to multiple frame estimation resulting in a noticeable simplification.

4. The Generalized Multiplicity-adjusted Horvitz-Thompson class of Multiple Frame Estimators

The basic idea is to re-express the unknown parameter T_y as a sum over the Q partial and overlapping frames instead of as a sum over the universe U for which a unique list is nonexistent. This is accomplished by means of a list-unit specific coefficient, α -coefficient for short, fractioning each unit over the overlapping lists so that in the grand total it counts 1, as stated in equation (3) subject to conditions (4)

$$T_y = \sum_{i \in U} y_i = \sum_{q=1}^Q \sum_{i \in U_q} \alpha_{q(i)} y_i \quad (3)$$

with

$$\alpha_{q(i)} \in [0, 1] \text{ with } \alpha_{q(i)} = 0 \text{ if } i \notin U_q \text{ and } \sum_{q=1}^Q \alpha_{q(i)} = 1 \text{ for all } i \in U \quad (4)$$

Note that the sub-index $q(i)$ is intended to stress that the focus is on the q^{th} list which can either include or not include unit i . The α -coefficient acts as the *multiplicity-adjustment* which corrects with respect to the list-overlapping and hence to the unit-duplication chance. It is also a generalization of the concept of multiplicity as introduced in the contest of the network sampling. In fact (the inverse of) unit multiplicity m_i as defined by (2), *i.e.* the number of lists in which unit i appears, is one natural choice for the α -coefficient in equation (3) but not the unique and many other choices are possible, infinitely many in fact.

In addition to the α -coefficient, for estimation purposes we introduce a sample random variable $\delta_{i(q)}$, dubbed δ -rv, where the sub-index $i(q)$ is intended to mean that the focus is on unit i who either can or cannot be selected from the q^{th} list. The δ -rv aims to summarize and synthetically arrange all the randomness due to

the sampling selection. A natural choice for the δ -rv is then the list-sample membership indicator, *i.e.* the random indicator taking value 1 if unit i is included in the sample from the q^{th} list U_q (and of course is included in U_q itself) and 0 otherwise. Notice that, although the most natural, this is still *one* possible choice for the δ -rv among infinitely many others conceivable in theory.

With the help of these two elements, the α -coefficient adjusting for multiplicity and the δ -rv accounting for randomness, an entire class of multiple frame estimators \hat{T}_y is defined (Singh and Mecatti, 2009)

$$\hat{T}_y = \sum_{q=1}^Q \sum_{i \in U_q} y_i \alpha_{q(i)} \frac{\delta_{i(q)}}{E(\delta_{i(q)})} \quad (5)$$

The class (5) is named Generalized Multiplicity-adjusted Horvitz-Thompson class (GMHT) and is design-unbiased for T_y by construction. Moreover the class is expressed in a simple and closed form readily implemented for any number of lists. The standard case of a unique and complete list is given by $Q = 1$ for which equation (5) leads to unitary α -coefficient for all units and supplies the customary Horvitz-Thompson estimator. In this sense GMHT generalizes the conventional unique-list Horvitz-Thompson estimator by adjusting for multiple frames via multiplicity. Furthermore, for (5) being a linear combination of (generalized) frame-specific Horvitz-Thompson estimators, the exact variance of any GMHT estimator is promptly derived and can be unbiasedly estimated with standard formulae easy to implement (Singh and Mecatti, 2009) so that addressing the estimate accuracy is straightforward.

Different choices of α -coefficient and δ -rv in equation (5) lead to a different GMHT estimator. All the multiple frame estimators appeared in literature so far, developed under any approach to handle for list-overlapping intended to avoid the detection and elimination of duplicated units in the final sample, is likely to be included in the GMHT class (5) for contemplating some sort of correction interpretable as a multiplicity-adjustment, either exact or approximated (Singh and Mecatti, 2009). Gathering different estimators and different approach to multiple frame estimation into the GMHT class is also remarkable for allowing to search for new estimators, under unexplored criterions of both theoretic optimality and information accessibility for practical applications.

The simplest choices for both the α -coefficient and the δ -rv, namely the (inverse of) unit multiplicity and the list-sample membership indicator, leads to a

GMHT estimator recently proposed (Mecatti, 2007). This can be termed *Simple Multiplicity* estimator (SM) and is particularly interesting for application to migrant studies as it represents a simple solution to the issues connected to the domain classification as discussed in Section 3

$$\hat{T}_{y,SM} = \sum_{q=1}^Q \sum_{i \in U_q} \frac{y_i \cdot \mathbf{1}_{i \in s_q}}{m_i \cdot \pi_{i(q)}} \quad (6)$$

where

- i. m_i is the unit multiplicity as defined by equation (2);
- ii. $\mathbf{1}_{i \in s_q}$ denotes the list-sample membership indicator taking value 1 if subject i is included in the sample s_q from the q^{th} list and 0 otherwise;
- iii. and $\pi_{i(q)}$ is the probability of unit i of being included into s_q , *i.e.* the expected value of the list-sample membership indicator.

The simple multiplicity estimator does not require the classification of sampled units into disjoint domains and applies for limited information about the universe of interest. Specifically, equation (6) can be computed on the basis of known unit multiplicity only, which is measured by asking each sampled unit about *how many* frames it belongs to instead of to *which other* frames. As a consequence unit multiplicity can be easier to collect than the frame membership required for a complete domain classification as standard multiple frame estimation would necessitate. Moreover the simple multiplicity estimator depends only on the inclusion probability $\pi_{i(q)}$ for the sample(s) in which unit i is actually selected.

This means that information about the probability to be included in samples from the other frames to which the same unit might potentially be selected are not needed *a priori* in order to obtain the estimate, unlike for instance to the Kalton-Anderson estimator (Kalton and Anderson, 1986). This is proved to be included in the GMHT class (Singh and Mecatti, 2009) and it requires, for every sampled unit, known inclusion probabilities for *all* lists, regardless of which frame it was actually sampled.

We conclude by showing some results from a previous extensive simulation study (Singh and Mecatti, 2009). Table 1 displays elementary statistics over 96 simulations covering a wide range of different scenarios. The results reported concern the (percentage) root relative mean squared error (RRMSE) of 4 multiple frame estimators. Stability and accuracy (as measured by the RRMSE) of three multiplicity estimators included in the GMHT class are compared each other and with one non-multiplicity estimator not included in the GMHT class:

- i. the simple multiplicity estimator requiring basic information and α -coefficient defined as the inverse of the unit multiplicity;
- ii. the Kalton-Anderson estimator requiring full information (both the frame membership and the inclusion probability for all Q lists) and with α -coefficient proportional to unit multiplicity;
- iii. a hybrid estimator suitable for mixed cases of *a priori* information about the universe of interest, for instance full information for some frames and only basic information for the remaining frames; and
- iv. the Bankier estimator which is not included in the GMHT class for requiring for the duplications to be detected and eliminated from the final sample. Hence, this non-multiplicity estimator needs extra information than the other estimators considered.

Simulation results clearly reveal that GMHT estimators, that deal with list-overlapping and unit-duplication via multiplicity-adjustment, are essentially as efficient as the non-multiplicity estimator which uses extra information in order to

Table 1 – $100 \times$ RRMSE of 4 multiple frame estimators: elementary statistics over 96 scenarios simulated.

	Average	Min	25 th quantile	Median	75 th quantile	Max	Standard deviation
Simple Multiplicity (Mecatti, 2007)	24.57	9.63	16.63	22.86	31.31	50.34	9.83
Proportional Multiplicity (Kalton and Anderson, 1986)	22.90	9.62	16.27	20.26	29.21	50.09	9.26
Hybrid Multiplicity (Singh and Mecatti, 2009)	23.45	9.61	16.51	20.49	29.96	50.34	9.19
Non - Multiplicity (Bankier, 1986)	23.39	10.03	16.93	20.66	29.81	50.19	9.14

eliminate duplications. Moreover, when full information is available as for the proportional multiplicity estimator, greater efficiency is even achieved. As a

conclusion empirical evidence indicates that there is no need to individuate and eliminate duplicated units in order to estimate efficiently in a multiple frame set up such as for rare, elusive and hidden population since the multiplicity-adjustment provides for a proper correction. Furthermore empirical evidence encourages more research on GMHT estimators by showing that there is no need to look outside the class for a good multiple frame estimator.

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SUMMARY

The universe of immigrants, especially its illegal component, classifies in sampling theory as a *difficult-to-sample* population for being rare, elusive and hidden. This usually prevents the straight application of standard methodologies so that *ad hoc* solutions are needed. Survey statisticians have been involved in developing efficient methods for sampling and estimating this sort of universe since the sixties. In this paper two popular and widely applied strategies feasible for sampling difficult-to-access human populations are first briefly reviewed and then showed to be unified under the multiplicity approach. Multiplicity approach is described as a formal environment able to unify and simplify almost all the estimators accessible in literature for dealing with rare, elusive and hidden universes. The GMHT class of unbiased estimators for the total is discussed, based upon multiplicity and showing the standard Horvitz-Thompson structure. The performance of a set of estimators both included and not-included in the class is compared and discussed by using simulation results from a previous extensive study.

FROM WORKFORCE TO POPULATION: PROCESSES OF SETTLEMENT OF IMMIGRANTS IN ITALY

Laura Terzera

1. Introduction

To a demographer, the term “population” refers to a collection of persons alive at a specified point in time who meet certain criteria (for example language, residence, race, religion, etc.). However, the main factor that turns any group of persons into a “population” is the ability to “persist through time”, that is a dynamic concept. This feature can be ensured by migratory flows (exogenous factor), but generally is the result of procreation (endogenous factor).

For the collection of migrants there is essentially one common feature: the territory of presence (in our case Italy). Among the migrants there are in fact different languages, religions, countries of origin etc. and to determine whether this group is also a population, from the demographic point of view (that is if it has the ability to persist through time thanks, at least in part, to the natural component), it may be useful to analyse the trends of different events.

First of all, the indication obtained by analysing births is of course fundamental. It should be considered that, in the case of migrants, the process of procreation may originate in different places. The birth of a child may take place in the country of origin (or at any rate in a territory other than the country of immigration), and the event is revealed only on reunification. Family cycles and projects thus become interwoven with migrating cycles and projects, reciprocally influencing one another.

An essential factor for having albeit indirect indications on the transformation into population is therefore the presence of emigrating family groups, that is the contexts in which procreation generally comes about. The family group may assume different roles in the migratory path of the migrant depending on the project causing mobility; conversely, family transitions and transformations are influenced by the mobility of the family members. In this sense, the element on which we wish to focus in the following pages is the “centre of gravity” chosen by migrants to accomplish the various stages that identify their family cycles (choice of partner, union, birth of the first child, etc.) both in terms of place/space (Italy or

elsewhere, the latter generally being the country of origin) and in terms of the “human environment”.

By reading the official figures and using the indications obtained from some sample surveys, we shall therefore try to identify *towards which population* the contingent of migrants now present in Italy is directed.


2. The picture that emerges from the official data

The official sources available show a distinct tendency for the foreign presence to be transformed into a population from the demographic point of view. A few aspects are illustrated below as explanation.

2.1. Births and marriages

The trend of births from foreign citizens is growing constantly. It exceeded 70 thousand units in 2008, bringing the incidence of foreign births in relation to births from Italian residents from 4% in 1999 to 12.6% in 2008 (figure 1).

Figure 1 – Estimate of foreign births. Italy, 1999-2008. Values in thousands.




Source: Istat

A similar growth trend is also observed in marriages. Considering as a statistical unit the union involving at least one spouse with foreign citizenship, it may be observed that, among these, mixed marriages (one foreign spouse and one Italian spouse) are the most widespread, although this intensity is decreasing with the

passing of time. In 1996 mixed marriages represented over 80% of marriages with at least one foreign spouse, but this figure fell to 2/3 in 2008 (figure 2a).

Figure 2 – *Marriages with at least one foreign spouse. Italy, 1996-2008. Values in thousands.*



Source: Processing of Istat data

Instead, if the phenomenon is considered in terms of individuals (figure 2b), the data available for recent years show how the number of foreigners involved in marriages between foreigners has now reached the number of immigrants who marry an Italian citizen.

The high diffusion and constant increase (in absolute value) of mixed marriages, even in the presence of a growth of homogamous unions as regards nationality, could point to a process of integration of the immigrant contingent, as is well documented in the literature on that phenomenon (Tognetti Bordogna, 1996). However, to confirm this interpretation we must change perspective and, rather than observe the events, or the individuals involved in said events, we must consider the migrant contingent as a whole and analyse the diffusion of mixed unions among immigrants. The lack of official data does not allow this viewpoint, so it is necessary to make use of sample data to have some indications. In particular, sample surveys carried out in Lombardy in the last ten years (<http://www.orimregionelombardia.it/index.php>) can offer some indications, although they are limited as regards territory. This different perspective shows how the phenomenon of mixed marriages, even though increasing in absolute value, involves a quota of foreign individuals that is more or less constant over time (between 10 and 12%, table 1).

Table 1 – *Percentage distribution of foreigners over fourteen years of age from countries with high migratory pressure and in unions with respect to the nationality of the partner. Lombardy, 2001 and 2009*

	Partner's nationality		
	Same	Italian	Other
2001	84.4	11.6	4.0
2009	85.2	11.2	3.6

Source: Processing of Foundation ISMU data

Moreover, the distribution of the foreigners involved in marriages with Italians with respect to gender and macro-area of origin shows a strong characterisation that is also to be seen in the official data and is persistent through time: it is especially women who marry or enter a union with an Italian, in more than $\frac{3}{4}$ of the mixed couples, and in this case the place of origin is prevalently Eastern Europe and Latin America. On the male side too, a distinct prevalence of particular origins can be observed: the foreigners in couples with Italian women come most frequently from Eastern Europe or from North Africa (table 2).

Table 2 – *Percentage distribution of foreigners over fourteen years of age from countries with high migratory pressure and in unions with an Italian respect to gender and macro-area of origin. Lombardy, 2009.*

	Macro-area of origin					Total
	Eastern Europe	Asia	North Africa	Sub-Saharan Africa	Latin America	
Man	5.6	2.6	8.2	4.8	2.3	23.5
Woman	30.2	7.7	6.5	5.9	26.2	76.5

Source: Processing of Foundation ISMU data


2.2. Reunifications

Family reunification is conditioned not only by the decisions and projects of the migrant, but also by the contingent conditions that he experiences and by the legislation in force on this subject in the country of destination. At present in Italy a foreigner whose documents are in order for his presence, suitable habitation and sufficient income, can apply to be joined by his partner (if a major and joined by a formal bond) and children (if minors or majors with total invalidity), whereas only in particular cases can he be joined by his parents.

Data on residence permits show that the flows of migrants towards Italy, now in a mature stage of the phenomenon, are being more and more characterised by

family motivations (at present almost 1/3 of the total of residence permits is issued for this reason).

Figure 3 – Residence permits for family reasons with respect to gender. Italy 1992-2007, values in thousands.



Source: Istat

It should also be noted that these reunifications have a strong gender connotation which seems to be slackening only in recent years (Figure 3). In particular, since minors are not counted in permits and, due to the legislation which, as previously remarked, allows the reunification of members of the extended family only in particular conditions, most of these reunifications concern the partner, who in the great majority of cases is the wife. This aspect leads us to interpret the phenomenon as it is traditionally described: the man assumes the role of scout and breadwinner and is followed by the wife who migrates mainly for family reasons. Faced with this classic and traditional representation of the phenomenon, a few remarks must be made:

- what happened to the flows of female scouts who characterised the initial phase of the migratory phenomenon in Italy? Have these contingents perhaps completed their reunifications? Are they migrants among whom the project for the definitive migration of the family is less widespread?


- the most recent flows of female migrants (from South America, but especially from Eastern Europe) already enjoy or will soon enjoy conditions for reunification of their family members. What contribution will they make in terms of

reunifications? Can the recently observed slackening with respect to gender be explained by these flows of migrants?

2.3 Structure according to sex and age

By examining the two pyramids (Figure 4) which show the structure according to sex and age of the foreigners residing in Italy on 1st January 2003 and 1st January 2009 respectively, we can note the sustained growth of this contingent due (at least in part) to natural factors (the base of the pyramids is expanded in the youngest age groups), but there is also a broad exogenous contribution (migratory flows) that may be deduced from its extension at the level of active ages.

Figure 4 – Foreign residents: structure according to sex and age. Italy, 2003 and 2009.



Source: Istat

Again, if we compare the percentage of minors with respect to the total of foreigners on the two dates, in the hypothesis that they are the children of immigrants, it may be seen that this figure has remained substantially stable (almost 30% in 2003, a little over 28% in 2009). This simple figure indicates that, although the “children of immigrants” are always more and more present in society, in school and among our children’s friends, nevertheless in the last six years the quota of minors who share the migratory experience of their parents has

not changed substantially, so we are in the presence of a growth of the “adult” contingent.

3. Family migration

For a better understanding of the current dynamics, it is therefore useful to refer to and study the family of immigrants: how it is formed, how it is extended, how its movement becomes interwoven with migration. Who and how many have acquired a family of their own? And among those who “have formed a family”, how many share the migratory experience with the family? What are the prevailing characteristics in discriminating between a complete migrating family and a divided family?

On this topic the official data are of very little help. If we refer to census data, we come up against a strong time limit¹ and against the lack of an instrument for measuring a contingent that is by nature more elusive than the native population. Comparing the census data of 2001 with the civil registry data for 2008 (families with at least one foreigner, whose residence documentation is in order), the only thing we can infer for certain is the strong increase in the presence of foreign families in Italy. The census in fact revealed a little more than 670 thousand families with at least one foreigner, while on 1st January 2008 there were about 1685 thousand, counting only those with documentation in order.


However, from these sources it is not possible to reply to questions such as: what type of family have the immigrants acquired? Do immigrants who have a family of their own live in Italy with all the family members? When a family is divided, who is generally absent? These are questions for which it is essential to find a reply in order to understand the population tendency of the immigrants present in Italy today.

To have some indications we therefore have to make use of information obtained from a sample source. On this point the most recent nationwide investigation on immigrants over fourteen years of age from countries with high migratory pressure (Cesareo, Blangiardo, 2009) confirms that the foreign presence now has a family character: if about 1/3 of immigrants do not currently have an acquired family (that is they are individuals without a partner and without children)

¹ The migratory phenomenon, characterised by high dynamism in terms of both quantity and characteristics, has also recorded, from 2001 to the present day, extensions and changes in the family profile resulting from reunifications, the formation of new unions and the birth of children.

and consequently the family of reference is the family of birth², the relative majority of immigrants live in Italy with their whole acquired family while a little less than 30%, despite having “formed a family”, are experiencing emigration without any of their family members or, at the most, with only a part of the family.

Figure 5 – *Family types among foreigners over fourteen years of age from countries with high migratory pressure. Italy, 2009.*



Source: *Foundation Ismu*


The sample surveys in Lombardy show that in divided families the absence of all family members is most common. Otherwise the absent members are generally the children, left in the home country (especially if very young) so as to allow both parents an “intense” working activity in order to reunite the family more rapidly, either in Italy or in the home country (Bonomi, Terzera, 2003; Terzera, 2010).

As has already been stressed, the process of forming and extending the family is highly dynamic and this movement is further emphasised in a migratory context. Considering the event of union, for example, this may take place before or after the event of migration and, in the second case, it may occur in the place of migration or even elsewhere. Consequently, the partner may or may not join the subject in emigration at a later date. A similar consideration may be made concerning the birth of children. That is the family cycle is interwoven with the migratory cycle and so the possible “case histories” of states are multiplied and in this sense it seems important to learn what family and migratory states/conditions lead with greater probability to the transition towards family migration. The only sources that

² Since the statistical unit of reference in this sample survey was the individual and not the family and, moreover, the aim of the research did not contemplate further investigation on the family, there is no information available on migrants living with members of their family of birth.

allow an analysis of this type come from panel, retrospective or trend surveys, and in Italy only sample sources of the second and third type are available, albeit at local level (Ismu Foundation's sample surveys). So referring once more to the Lombardy context, which assumes the role of a "workshop" due both to the size of the presence (about 1/4 of the regular immigrants are settled in this region) and to its characteristics (this context has an "anticipating" character, in fact many of the trends recorded here are often traced later also at national level), the following aspects of the migrating family phenomenon come to light (figure 6):

Figure 6 – Family types among foreigners over fourteen years of age from countries with high migratory pressure with respect to gender. Lombardy, 2001 and 2009.



Source: Processing of Foundation ISMU data

- an ever growing presence of individuals with an acquired family: the spread of the tendency to "form a family" is noted mostly in the male contingent, that is in the contingent where migrations for family reasons are traditionally less frequent;
- a tendency to experience emigration more and more as a family event: while this characteristic was traditionally more widespread among women (who more frequently emigrate for family reasons), it seems to be spreading in the male context too, with the passing of time;

- a substantial constancy of the weight of divided families among both men and women. This family type comprises: individuals who are intentionally experiencing emigration without the complete family and individuals who have to accept this family status due to living conditions during emigration (so they do not possess suitable requirements for reunification); among the latter are foreigners who are experiencing this condition only transiently, generally because they have been migrated for a shorter time.

One of the factors that appears to be decisive in forming or reforming the family in migration is the length of migration. If we deprive the data of the decisive role of the duration of stay (through the construction of standardised rates, table 3; Terzera 2006; Blangiardo, Terzera, 2008) there is still a model of traditional migration that distinctly defines the roles taken by men and women: the former are above all assigned the task of “being a migrant in the strictest sense” or, at the most, of creating suitable conditions to (re)form the family, which role is prevalently assigned to the women. The analyses of the data from Lombardy also highlight the important role of the cultural background, usually represented by the macro-area of origin. Outstanding, for example, is the condition of North African women, the most involved in the family theme: just less than 9 out of 10 have acquired a family and nearly 7 out of 10 of those who have a partner and children live in Lombardy with all their family members; in contrast, North African men appear to be the ones with the least “familiar” attitude (less than 6 out of 10). In general, cases can thus be identified that are distinctly defined with regard to gender (for example the case of North Africans), while others are less characterised because they refer to situations that are diametrically opposed. In the Asiatic case, for example, there are at least three different models: the Chinese, among whom there is a greater equilibrium of gender, a second, more traditional model characterised by males and represented by the Indians and Pakistanis, and lastly a “feminine” model seen among the Filipinos.

Returning to the original question, “towards what population?”, since the quota of migrants who share the experience of migration with all their family members is tending with time to be ever greater and such a phenomenon presupposes, at least in their intentions, prolonged and indeed even definitive settlements, it is clear that the family centre of gravity is tending to develop in this country for a growing portion of the foreigners present in Italy. This may of course be accomplished in various stages, not all of which necessarily developed in Italy (for example they may marry in their home country, have children and only later be joined by them in migration).

Table 3 – Raw and standardised rates of “familiarisation” and “complete familiarisation” classified according to macro-area of origin and gender. Lombardy, 2007 (per 1000 individuals)

“Familiarisation”				
	Raw rate		Standardised rate	
	Men	Women	Men	Women
<i>Eastern</i>				
<i>Europe</i>	643	806	647	807
<i>Asia</i>	686	823	665	823
<i>North Africa</i>	641	882	585	882
<i>Other Africa</i>	659	783	634	765
<i>Latin America</i>	713	767	727	781
<i>Total</i>	662	812	648	815
“Complete familiarisation”				
<i>Eastern</i>				
<i>Europe</i>	348	340	350	370
<i>Asia</i>	373	476	349	478
<i>North Africa</i>	317	681	261	679
<i>Other Africa</i>	209	485	191	478
<i>Latin America</i>	268	298	291	315
<i>Total</i>	319	427	304	436

Source: Blangiardo, Terzera, 2008.

4. Population among whom?

To reply to this second question we shall still refer to the sample data that allow us to identify the characteristics of subjects who have formed a union and thus offer the possibility of determining the most probable profile of the population we are examining. There are three possible trends in the formation of couples:

- couples of foreigners from different places of origin (not Italy);
- couples of foreigners from the same place of origin;
- mixed couples, of which one Italian

Observing the nationality of the partner over time (table 1), it may be concluded that the unions are characterised by a high rate of homogamous origin. Mixed couples of foreign individuals are irrelevant as regards quantity and those composed of foreigners and Italians are highly selected by gender and origin of the immigrated partner and anyway their relative weight is constant over time, as has already been stressed in the previous pages. Consequently the mixed model is

excluded both within the group of immigrants and in the wider area of the Italian population, so the contingent examined may be described, not so much as a single population, but as a “sum” of several populations. In the light of this situation it is therefore fundamental to describe the role played by the “bond” with the home country, for example in the definition and delimitation of the marriage market. In this sense the survey carried out in Lombardy in 2001 highlights the strong connection between the behaviour in the formation of the couple and their place of origin, which is a variable indication of their cultural background (Bonomi, Terzera, 2003; Terzera, 2002).

Another aspect that may be useful for outlining the capacity to “form couples” of the immigrant contingent in Italy is the ratio between the genders. If we observe the different places of origin separately, once again we can see differentiated models, but which can substantially be assigned to three macro-models (Terzera, 2010):

- *Balanced model.* This model may be converged on starting from situations of both female and male imbalance. Examples of these are nationalities among the most numerous in Italy, such as Albanian, Romanian and Chinese.
- *Static model.* This is the case in which the strong predominance of one gender does not substantially change over time. Although this model is present on both the male and the female side, in the latter case it is most often a question of flows of migrants that have occurred more recently and consequently are still subject, very probably, to evolution (flows arriving from Latin America and from Eastern Europe, but the model may also include migrants from the Philippines). On the male side, this model is represented above all by nationalities where the Muslim religion is most widespread.
- *Feminisation model.* In the majority of these cases an accentuation, over time, of the female component is observed in contingents already characterised by a high presence of women; this is mainly the case of migrants from some countries in Latin America, but above all from Eastern Europe.

5. Conclusions

The phenomenon of foreign presence in Italy comprises situations and conditions that are even quite different from one another. Through official and sample data it has been possible to show that, for an increasingly larger part of migrants, a mature phase has now begun in which the role of the immigrant family is more central and, consequently, we can certainly start to talk about them in terms of “population”. On the other hand, incoming flows are still continuing with reasons other than family reunification, flows that “rejuvenate” the phenomenon

not only with respect to the duration of stay, but also to the stage and cycle that the phenomenon has reached.

So, if the foreign presence that can be called a population in Italy is increasing more and more, its particular features are the result of different factors. Just as for most of the phenomena linked with definitive settlement, a decisive role is played by the duration of stay; in fact it is only over time that people can adapt and achieve the migratory projects that become interwoven and “adjusted” with their family projects. However, the population of immigrants present in Italy appears still to be in an initial stage; it is in fact a population resulting mainly from the “sum” of many populations that are often “unbalanced” outside Italy towards their country of origin, for example with regard to the marriage market or the care of children in the early years of life.

For the study of the transformations in progress and the analysis of the direction taken by the immigrant population, or the one that will be taken by the new influxes, different factors must be borne in mind and different perspectives considered. So it is fundamental to use different kinds of sources, official and sample ones; but it is also essential to consider migrants distinctly as regards their country of origin, to understand the dynamics of acquiring a family and of recomposing it in emigration; lastly it is to be hoped that there will be an increased use of panel or introspective surveys, useful to understand the interweaving of family formation and migration, between the country of destination and the country of origin.

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SUMMARY

The phenomenon of foreign presence in Italy comprises situations and conditions that are even quite different from one another. Through official and sample data it has been possible to show that, for an increasingly larger part of migrants, a mature phase has now begun in which the role of the immigrant family is more central and, consequently, we can certainly start to talk about them in terms of “population”. On the other hand, incoming flows are still continuing with reasons other than family reunification, flows that “rejuvenate” the phenomenon not only with respect to the duration of stay, but also to the stage and cycle that the phenomenon has reached. So, the population of immigrants present in Italy appears still to be in an initial stage; it is in fact a population resulting mainly from the “sum” of many populations that are often “unbalanced” outside Italy towards their country of origin, for example with regard to the marriage market or the care of children in the early years of life.

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